| dc.contributor | 財管系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 黃嘉威 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Chia-Wei | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsu, Ching-Yu | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Sheng-Syan | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2021-09 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 11-Apr-2022 15:46:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 11-Apr-2022 15:46:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 11-Apr-2022 15:46:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/139828 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Using hand-collected governance data and a two-stage least squares approach to control for the endogeneity of firm governance structure, this paper shows that private investments in public equity (PIPE) issuers with higher board independence grant investors lower price discounts and experience improved announcement effects, improved long-run operating and stock performance, and increased investment. Board independence also encourages issuers to place more shares with venture capital investors, and fewer shares with managerial investors. These findings suggest that strong independent governance can mitigate the agency costs inherent in PIPEs. | |
| dc.format.extent | 740282 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol.75, pp.478-500 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Private investment in public equity;Board independence;Asymmetric information;Managerial entrenchment;Resolution of underinvestment | |
| dc.title (題名) | Board Independence and PIPE Offerings | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.iref.2021.04.018 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2021.04.018 | |
