| dc.contributor | 財政系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 賴育邦 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lai, Yu-Bong | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2023-04 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jul-2022 15:32:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jul-2022 15:32:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jul-2022 15:32:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140806 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Emission taxes and tradable-emission-permit (TEP) programs are two popular instruments used to regulate transboundary pollution. In a framework with capital, monopolistic competition, and interregional trade, we show that when capital is immobile, the two instruments are equivalent. When capital is mobile, the TEP program is more efficient. We also find that the presence of capital mobility reverses some conventional results. It may lead the non-revenue-raising instruments to be more efficient than the revenue-raising instruments, which counters the double-dividend hypothesis. With mobile capital, the initial allocation of permits affects the efficiency, which contrasts with the Coase theorem. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 106 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Tax and Public Finance, Vol.30, No.2, pp.326-350 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Capital mobility; Coase theorem; Double-dividend hypothesis; Emission tax; TEP program; Transboundary pollution | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Capital Mobility and Environmental Policy: Taxes versus TEP | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s10797-021-09721-x | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-021-09721-x | - |
