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題名 Say-on-Pay制度和CEO與一般員工薪酬比之關聯性研究
The Association between Say-on-Pay and Pay Ratio
作者 蕭惠云
Shiau, Huei-Yun
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
Liang, Jia-Wen
蕭惠云
Shiau, Huei-Yun
關鍵詞 陶德法蘭克法案
Say-on-Pay
薪酬比
CEO薪酬
員工薪酬
Dodd-Frank Act
Say-on-Pay
Pay ratio
CEO compensation
Employee compensation
日期 2022
上傳時間 2-Sep-2022 14:43:20 (UTC+8)
摘要 近年來，許多國家陸續規範公司執行諮詢性質股東投票(Say-on-Pay)，並揭露CEO與一般員工之薪酬比(pay ratio)。美國於2015年修正陶德法蘭克法案 (Dodd-Frank Act)，透過美國證券交易委員會(Securities and Exchange Commission)要求符合條件之公司揭露薪酬比，並預期將能為股東Say-on-Pay投票提供攸關且實用之資訊。本研究探討股東Say-on-Pay投票結果對公司未來薪酬比相關資 訊之影響，包含：薪酬比、CEO 薪酬、員工中位數薪酬和薪酬比揭露之說明。本研究以2018至2020年的美國標準普爾500指數公司為樣本，實證研究發現股東反對率高的公司較傾向於次年大幅調降薪酬比、CEO薪酬及薪酬比揭露內容之長度。而針對員工中位數薪酬，僅於股東反對率達 30%時，才有微幅調升傾向。整體而言，董事會會根據股東Say-on-Pay投票結果，對未來薪酬及揭露政策作出調整，顯示在 Say-on-Pay 制度下，股東確以監督角色參與薪酬設計，並對公司薪酬相關決策造成影響。
In recent years, many countries mandated advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation and the disclosure of CEO-employee pay ratio. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expects that pay ratio is relevant and useful to shareholders’ Say-on-Pay (SOP) voting. This study examines the effects of SOP on subsequent pay ratio, its components, i.e. CEO compensation and median employee compensation, and the disclosure of pay ratio information. Based on a sample of S&P500 firms from 2018 to 2020, I find that firms with high SOP dissent tend to adjust their pay ratio and CEO compensation downwards and provide lengthier discussion on pay ratio information. However, I find little evidence on the relation between SOP votes and future changes in median employee compensation, except for firms with a 30% voting dissent. In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that boards adjust compensation and disclosure policy in response to voting outcomes, which demonstrates that shareholders can influence corporate pay practice via their SOP votes.
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Abernethy, M. A., Y. F. Kuang, and B. Qin. 2015. The influence of CEO power on compensation contract design. The Accounting Review 90 (4):1265-1306.
Agrawal, A., I. Hacamo, and Z. Hu. 2021. Information dispersion across employees and stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies 34 (10):4785-4831.
Akerlof, G. A., and J. L. Yellen. 1988. Fairness and unemployment. The American Economic Review 78 (2):44-49.
Akerlof, G. A., and J. L. Yellen. 1990. The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2):255-283.
Alissa, W. 2015. Boards` response to shareholders` dissatisfaction: The case of shareholders` Say on Pay in the UK. The European Accounting Review 24 (4):727-752.
Armstrong, C. S., I. D. Gow, and D. F. Larcker. 2013. The efficacy of shareholder voting: Evidence from equity compensation plans. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (5):909-950.
Baird, J., and P. Stowasser. 2002. Executive compensation disclosure requirements: The German, UK and US approaches. PracticalLaw. com, PLC Document 29:29-42.
Bao, M. X., X. Cheng, and D. Smith. 2020. A path analysis investigation of the relationships between CEO pay ratios and firm performance mediated by employee satisfaction. Advances in Accounting 48:100457.
Barrall, J. Consensuses on CEO pay ratio planning 2017. Available at: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/04/10-consensuses-on-ceo-pay-ratio-planning.
Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation: Harvard University Press.
Benedetti, A. H., and S. Chen. 2018. High CEO-to-worker pay ratios negatively impact consumer and employee perceptions of companies. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 79:378-393.
Bernstein, A., and L. Beeferman. 2015. The materiality of human capital to corporate financial performance. Available at SSRN 2605640.
Bertrand, M. 2009. Ceos. Annual Review of Economics 1 (1):121-150.
Boone, A. L., A. Starkweather, and J. T. White. 2021. Spinning the CEO pay ratio disclosure. Available at SSRN 3481540.
Brunarski, K. R., T. C. Campbell, and Y. S. Harman. 2015. Evidence on the outcome of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond. Journal of Corporate Finance 30:132-149.
Cai, J., and R. A. Walkling. 2011. Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it create value? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46 (2):299-339.
Chasan, E. 2014. Cfo journal: Companies say `no way` to `Say on Pay`. The Wall Street Journal. Eastern edition.
Collins, D., B. B. Marquardt, and X. Niu. 2019. Equity‐based incentives and shareholder say‐on‐pay. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 46 (5-6):739-761.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (3):371-406.
Correa, R., and U. Lel. 2016. Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics 122 (3):500-520.
Cotter, J. F., A. R. Palmiter, and R. S. Thomas. 2013. The first year of Say-on-Pay under Dodd-Frank: An empirical analysis and look forward. George Washington Law Review 81:967.
Crawford, S. S., K. K. Nelson, and B. R. Rountree. 2021. Mind the gap: CEO–employee pay ratios and shareholder say‐on‐pay votes. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 48 (1-2):308-337.
Deegan, C. 2002. Introduction: The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures–a theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal.
Dikolli, S. S., S. L. Kulp, and K. L. Sedatole. 2009. Transient institutional ownership and CEO contracting. The Accounting Review 84 (3):737-770.
Dittmann, I., M. Montone, and Y. Zhu. 2021. Wage gap and stock returns: Do investors dislike pay inequality? European Corporate Governance Institute–Finance Working Paper (727).
Faleye, O., R. Hoitash, and U. Hoitash. 2011. The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics 101 (1):160-181.
Faleye, O., E. Reis, and A. Venkateswaran. 2013. The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios. Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (8):3258-3272.
Ferri, F., and D. A. Maber. 2013. Say on Pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. Review of Finance 17 (2):527-563.
Ferri, F., and D. Oesch. 2016. Management influence on investors: Evidence from shareholder votes on the frequency of Say on Pay. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (4):1337-1374.
Fisch, J., D. Palia, and S. D. Solomon. 2018. Is Say on Pay all about pay: The impact of firm performance. Harvard Business Law Review 8:101.
Frydman, C. 2019. Rising through the ranks: The evolution of the market for corporate executives, 1936–2003. Management Science 65 (11):4951-4979.
Graham, J. R., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2012. Managerial attributes and executive compensation. The Review of Financial Studies 25 (1):144-186.
Green, T. C., and D. Zhou. 2019. Pay inequality, job satisfaction, and firm performance. Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper (2019-07):03.
Grosse, M., S. Kean, T. Scott, and T. Smith. 2017. Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: Three strikes and the board is out. Accounting and Finance (Parkville) 57 (3):701-725.
Hartzell, J. C., and L. T. Starks. 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation. The Journal of Finance 58 (6):2351-2374.
Hooghiemstra, R., Y. F. Kuang, and B. Qin. 2017. Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes. Accounting and Business Research 47 (6):695-729.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
109353005
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353005
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Liang, Jia-Wenen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蕭惠云zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Shiau, Huei-Yunen_US
dc.creator (作者) 蕭惠云zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Shiau, Huei-Yunen_US
dc.date (日期) 2022en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-Sep-2022 14:43:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Sep-2022 14:43:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Sep-2022 14:43:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0109353005en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/141536-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 109353005zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來，許多國家陸續規範公司執行諮詢性質股東投票(Say-on-Pay)，並揭露CEO與一般員工之薪酬比(pay ratio)。美國於2015年修正陶德法蘭克法案 (Dodd-Frank Act)，透過美國證券交易委員會(Securities and Exchange Commission)要求符合條件之公司揭露薪酬比，並預期將能為股東Say-on-Pay投票提供攸關且實用之資訊。本研究探討股東Say-on-Pay投票結果對公司未來薪酬比相關資 訊之影響，包含：薪酬比、CEO 薪酬、員工中位數薪酬和薪酬比揭露之說明。本研究以2018至2020年的美國標準普爾500指數公司為樣本，實證研究發現股東反對率高的公司較傾向於次年大幅調降薪酬比、CEO薪酬及薪酬比揭露內容之長度。而針對員工中位數薪酬，僅於股東反對率達 30%時，才有微幅調升傾向。整體而言，董事會會根據股東Say-on-Pay投票結果，對未來薪酬及揭露政策作出調整，顯示在 Say-on-Pay 制度下，股東確以監督角色參與薪酬設計，並對公司薪酬相關決策造成影響。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In recent years, many countries mandated advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation and the disclosure of CEO-employee pay ratio. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expects that pay ratio is relevant and useful to shareholders’ Say-on-Pay (SOP) voting. This study examines the effects of SOP on subsequent pay ratio, its components, i.e. CEO compensation and median employee compensation, and the disclosure of pay ratio information. Based on a sample of S&P500 firms from 2018 to 2020, I find that firms with high SOP dissent tend to adjust their pay ratio and CEO compensation downwards and provide lengthier discussion on pay ratio information. However, I find little evidence on the relation between SOP votes and future changes in median employee compensation, except for firms with a 30% voting dissent. In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that boards adjust compensation and disclosure policy in response to voting outcomes, which demonstrates that shareholders can influence corporate pay practice via their SOP votes.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 6
第一節 法規簡介與文獻探討 6
一、Say-on-Pay 法規與相關文獻 6
二、Pay Ratio 法規與相關文獻 8
第二節 假說發展 11
第三章 研究方法 15
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 15
第二節 實證模型與變數定義 16
一、主要變數與應變數 17
二、實證模型建立與控制變數 19
第四章 實證結果及分析 26
第一節 敘述性統計分析 26
第二節 相關係數分析 29
第三節 迴歸結果 29
一、Say-on-Pay 投票結果對未來 pay ratio 之影響 29
二、Say-on-Pay 投票結果對未來 CEO 薪酬之影響 37
三、Say-on-Pay 投票結果對未來員工中位數薪酬之影響 41
四、Say-on-Pay 投票結果對未來 pay ratio 段落揭露之影響 46
第五章 研究結論與建議 51
參考文獻 53
附錄 60		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2380258 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353005en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 陶德法蘭克法案zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Say-on-Payzh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬比zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO薪酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 員工薪酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dodd-Frank Acten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Say-on-Payen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pay ratioen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO compensationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Employee compensationen_US
dc.title (題名) Say-on-Pay制度和CEO與一般員工薪酬比之關聯性研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Association between Say-on-Pay and Pay Ratioen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳紫雲，2007，美國股東行動主義之抬頭與蛻變中之董事會，會計研究月刊，第259期：86-96。
Abernethy, M. A., Y. F. Kuang, and B. Qin. 2015. The influence of CEO power on compensation contract design. The Accounting Review 90 (4):1265-1306.
Agrawal, A., I. Hacamo, and Z. Hu. 2021. Information dispersion across employees and stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies 34 (10):4785-4831.
Akerlof, G. A., and J. L. Yellen. 1988. Fairness and unemployment. The American Economic Review 78 (2):44-49.
Akerlof, G. A., and J. L. Yellen. 1990. The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2):255-283.
Alissa, W. 2015. Boards` response to shareholders` dissatisfaction: The case of shareholders` Say on Pay in the UK. The European Accounting Review 24 (4):727-752.
Armstrong, C. S., I. D. Gow, and D. F. Larcker. 2013. The efficacy of shareholder voting: Evidence from equity compensation plans. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (5):909-950.
Baird, J., and P. Stowasser. 2002. Executive compensation disclosure requirements: The German, UK and US approaches. PracticalLaw. com, PLC Document 29:29-42.
Bao, M. X., X. Cheng, and D. Smith. 2020. A path analysis investigation of the relationships between CEO pay ratios and firm performance mediated by employee satisfaction. Advances in Accounting 48:100457.
Barrall, J. Consensuses on CEO pay ratio planning 2017. Available at: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/04/10-consensuses-on-ceo-pay-ratio-planning.
Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation: Harvard University Press.
Benedetti, A. H., and S. Chen. 2018. High CEO-to-worker pay ratios negatively impact consumer and employee perceptions of companies. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 79:378-393.
Bernstein, A., and L. Beeferman. 2015. The materiality of human capital to corporate financial performance. Available at SSRN 2605640.
Bertrand, M. 2009. Ceos. Annual Review of Economics 1 (1):121-150.
Boone, A. L., A. Starkweather, and J. T. White. 2021. Spinning the CEO pay ratio disclosure. Available at SSRN 3481540.
Brunarski, K. R., T. C. Campbell, and Y. S. Harman. 2015. Evidence on the outcome of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond. Journal of Corporate Finance 30:132-149.
Cai, J., and R. A. Walkling. 2011. Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it create value? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46 (2):299-339.
Chasan, E. 2014. Cfo journal: Companies say `no way` to `Say on Pay`. The Wall Street Journal. Eastern edition.
Collins, D., B. B. Marquardt, and X. Niu. 2019. Equity‐based incentives and shareholder say‐on‐pay. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 46 (5-6):739-761.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (3):371-406.
Correa, R., and U. Lel. 2016. Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics 122 (3):500-520.
Cotter, J. F., A. R. Palmiter, and R. S. Thomas. 2013. The first year of Say-on-Pay under Dodd-Frank: An empirical analysis and look forward. George Washington Law Review 81:967.
Crawford, S. S., K. K. Nelson, and B. R. Rountree. 2021. Mind the gap: CEO–employee pay ratios and shareholder say‐on‐pay votes. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 48 (1-2):308-337.
Deegan, C. 2002. Introduction: The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures–a theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal.
Dikolli, S. S., S. L. Kulp, and K. L. Sedatole. 2009. Transient institutional ownership and CEO contracting. The Accounting Review 84 (3):737-770.
Dittmann, I., M. Montone, and Y. Zhu. 2021. Wage gap and stock returns: Do investors dislike pay inequality? European Corporate Governance Institute–Finance Working Paper (727).
Faleye, O., R. Hoitash, and U. Hoitash. 2011. The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics 101 (1):160-181.
Faleye, O., E. Reis, and A. Venkateswaran. 2013. The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios. Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (8):3258-3272.
Ferri, F., and D. A. Maber. 2013. Say on Pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. Review of Finance 17 (2):527-563.
Ferri, F., and D. Oesch. 2016. Management influence on investors: Evidence from shareholder votes on the frequency of Say on Pay. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (4):1337-1374.
Fisch, J., D. Palia, and S. D. Solomon. 2018. Is Say on Pay all about pay: The impact of firm performance. Harvard Business Law Review 8:101.
Frydman, C. 2019. Rising through the ranks: The evolution of the market for corporate executives, 1936–2003. Management Science 65 (11):4951-4979.
Graham, J. R., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2012. Managerial attributes and executive compensation. The Review of Financial Studies 25 (1):144-186.
Green, T. C., and D. Zhou. 2019. Pay inequality, job satisfaction, and firm performance. Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper (2019-07):03.
Grosse, M., S. Kean, T. Scott, and T. Smith. 2017. Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: Three strikes and the board is out. Accounting and Finance (Parkville) 57 (3):701-725.
Hartzell, J. C., and L. T. Starks. 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation. The Journal of Finance 58 (6):2351-2374.
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202201408en_US