學術產出-Theses
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
題名 安倍第二次執政時期的中日關係研究 ——對華制衡外交之視角
Sino-Japan Relations during Abe’s Second Administration: Perspective of Foreign Policy for Balancing China作者 靳成
Jin, Cheng貢獻者 于乃明
Yu,Nai-ming
靳成
Jin, Cheng關鍵詞 安倍第二次執政時期
中日關係
制衡意願
制衡能力
軟制衡
Abe’s Second Administration
Sino-Japan Relations
Balancing Willingness
Balancing Ability
Soft Balancing日期 2023 摘要 本論文對安倍晉三第二次執政期間的對華制衡外交及其對中日關係演變之影響進行了考察。 本論文的分析架構如下：國家只有兼具制衡意願與制衡能力，才會傾向於實施制衡；反之，只要其中任意一者出現變化，便可能影響到制衡的實施。影響制衡意願的因素主要包括平衡或爭奪權力的考量、應對現實威脅的考量、以及國內對於制衡是否形成政治共識。影響制衡能力的因素則主要包括制衡國與被制衡國的實力差距、制衡國的絕對實力這兩方面。制衡可運用軟、硬兩種方式為之。硬制衡的手段一般可分為內部制衡和外部制衡。軟制衡的策略則主要包括制度制衡、協調外交、經濟制裁等。 本論文認為，及至安倍第二次擔任首相時，日本已具備制衡中國的強烈意願以及一定的制衡能力。制衡是安倍第二次執政時期日本對華外交的主線。制衡意願方面：（1）21世紀進入第二個十年後，中國的加速崛起正在改變東亞乃至全球的權力格局，激發了日美兩國制衡中國的意願；（2）2012年以來，中國軍力快速發展，中日領土、海洋爭端持續加劇並趨向長期化，日本將中國視為「現實威脅」；（3）安倍首相本人、日本精英階層以及日本民眾，在制衡中國方面已形成政治共識。 本論文主要從政治、軍事兩方面考察日本的制衡能力。（1）政治方面：安倍晉三第二次出任首相後，實現了長期穩定執政。這不僅有利於形成相對穩定的對華政策，亦使得安倍政府在強化軍力、深化對外安全合作時能較少受到國內政局牽制。（2）軍事方面：及至安倍第二次擔任首相之時，日本業已具備不可小覷的軍事實力。安倍執政後，對內進一步推動改革強軍，對外進一步深化與美、澳、印、東南亞國家的安全合作，且其中的許多舉措具有一定的對華指向性。因此，安倍增強日本軍事實力的努力亦是其對華硬制衡的主要表現。 除硬制衡之外，安倍政府還透過加大介入南海問題、拒絕加入亞投行等，對華實施軟制衡。前者綜合運用了多種軟制衡策略，後者則主要運用了制度制衡這一策略。 制衡雖是安倍政府對華外交的主線，但其手段、強度等受到若干內外因素的制約。這些因素主要包括：（1）美國對日本的管控；（2）中日對話的重啟；（3）日本國內因素。因此，2012-2016年間，日本雖然持續實施對華制衡，導致中日關係呈現緩慢改善、曲折前行的樣貌，但安倍政府不願亦不敢突破中日關係底線，進而有助於中日避免走向兵戎相見。 2017年前後，一些新的因素弱化了日本的制衡意願，促使安倍政府加速改善對華關係。這些因素包括：（1）美國因素的催化作用；（2）日本國內改善對華關係的呼聲。另一方面，中日之間的一些新舊矛盾此時亦因各種原因，客觀上得到了一定程度的管控或緩和，為中日關係改善提供了有利環境。具體包括：（1）中日對話交流得到重啟，兩國在領土、海洋、歷史問題上的矛盾得到一定管控；（2）日本構建抗中「朋友圈」、介入南海問題、抵制亞投行等行動，由於效果不彰，對中日關係的衝擊趨向減弱；（3）安倍晉三本人兼具堅定性與靈活性的為政風格、安倍政府的長期穩定執政亦有利於其調整對華政策。 2017年起，安倍政府加大調整對華政策力度，中日關係進入加速改善期，並在2018年重新回到正常軌道。但另一方面，安倍政府並未放棄制衡中國。安倍政府繼續維持和強化對華威脅認知，加大軍力建設和針對中國的軍力部署。日本在對華軟制衡方面亦有新發展，包括參與四方安全對話機制、出台和推動「印太戰略（構想）」。對於中日第三方市場合作，安倍政府亦有所保留和限制。由此可見，安倍政府對華政策調整的本質是由積極的全方位制衡轉向在不放棄防範和圍堵中國的前提下，通過加強對華合作來實現經濟利益，並以日本所主張的「秩序」來規制中國的發展。安倍第二次執政後期中日關係的改善僅具有短期、戰術性意義。 後安倍時代，中日關係的前景不容樂觀。這是因為促成日本對華制衡的條件依舊存在；同時，一些新的、不利於中日關係健康穩定發展的因素正在集聚。面對世界百年未有之大變局，日方應客觀理性看待中國發展，順應潮流大勢，將中日「互為合作夥伴、互不構成威脅」的政治共識切實反映到政策上，積極落實在行動中。唯有如此，中日關係的航船才能夠不擱淺、不偏航，持續、健康、穩定地邁向未來。這也是最符合日本根本利益的對華戰略選擇。
This dissertation studies Shinzo Abe`s diplomatic policies for balancing China during his second administration period and its impact on the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations. The dissertation makes an analysis as follows: A state will tend to implement balancing only if it has both the will and the ability to do so; conversely, any change in either may affect the implementation of balancing. Factors affecting the willingness for balancing include considerations of balancing or competing for power, responding to real threats, and a domestic political consensus on balancing. Factors affecting the ability for balancing include the power gap between the counterbalancing state and the counterbalanced state, and the absolute power of the counterbalancing state. Balancing can be implemented in both soft and hard modes. Hard balancing can generally be divided into internal and external ones. Soft balancing includes institutional balancing, coordinated diplomacy, economic sanctions, etc. The dissertation suggests that, by the time Abe became Prime Minister for the second time, Japan had a strong will to balance against China and a certain ability to do so. Balancing was the main line of Japan’s diplomacy with China during Abe’s second administration period. In terms of its willingness for balancing: (1) The accelerated rise of China in the second decade of the 21st century is changing the power pattern in East Asia and the rest of the world, which has inspired Japan and the US to balance against China; (2) Since 2012, China`s military power has been developing rapidly, and the territorial and maritime disputes between China and Japan have been intensifying and tending to become chronic, and Japan sees China as a `real threat`; (3) Prime Minister Abe himself, the Japanese elite and the Japanese public have formed a political consensus on balancing against China. The dissertation investigates Japan`s ability to balance against China from two main perspectives: political and military. (1) Politics: after he became Prime Minister for the second time, Shinzo Abe had been in power for a long and stable period of time. This was not only conducive to a relatively stable policy towards China, but also allowed the Abe government to be less constrained by the domestic political situation when strengthening its military power and deepening foreign security cooperation. (2) Military: by the time Abe became Prime Minister for the second time, Japan already had significant military power. After Abe took office, he was pushing all the time to reform and strengthen the military and deepen security cooperation with the US, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries, and many of these initiatives were against China. Therefore, Abe`s efforts to enhance Japan`s military power were also the main manifestation of the hard balancing. The Abe government also exercised soft balancing to China by increasing its involvement in the South China Sea issue and refusing to join the ADB. The former used a combination of soft balancing strategies, while the latter mainly used the strategy of institutional balancing. Although balancing was the main line of Abe`s diplomacy with China, the means and intensity were constrained by a lot of internal and external factors, which mainly include (1) the US`s control over Japan; (2) the resumption of Sino-Japanese dialogue; and (3) domestic factors in Japan. Therefore, although Japan continued to balance against China during the years 2012-2016, resulting in a slow improvement of and tortuous Sino-Japanese relations, the Abe government was unwilling and dared not break through the red line of Sino-Japanese relations, which helped China and Japan to avoid moving towards a war. Around 2017, on one hand, some new factors weakened Japan`s willingness for balancing against China, prompting the Abe government to accelerate improvements in relations with China. These factors include (1) the catalytic role of the US factor and (2) the domestic calls for improving relations with China. On the other hand, some old and new conflicts between China and Japan were also objectively managed or eased at this time for various reasons, providing a favourable environment for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations: (1) dialogues between China and Japan were restarted, and conflicts between the two countries over territorial, maritime and historical issues were managed; 2) Japan`s actions to build a "circle of friends" against China, intervene in the South China Sea and boycott the ADB tended to have less impact on Sino-Japanese relations due to their ineffectiveness; (3) Shinzo Abe`s governance style, which combines firmness and flexibility, and the long-term stability of the Abe government also helped to adjust his policies towards China. After 2017, the Abe government made greater efforts to adjust its China policies, and Sino-Japanese relations entered a period of accelerated improvement and returned to a normal track in 2018. However, the Abe government did not give up the balance against China. The Abe government continued to maintain and strengthen its perception of threats to China, increasing military build-up and military deployment against China. There were also new developments in Japan`s soft balancing on China, including its participation in the Quad and the promotion of the FOIP. The Abe government also had reservations and restrictions on cooperation between China and Japan in the third-party market. It can be seen that the essence of the Abe administration`s China policy adjustment is to shift from active all-round balancing to strengthening cooperation with China to realize economic interests without abandoning prevention and containment of China, and to regulate China`s development with the `order` advocated by Japan. The improvement in Sino-Japanese relations during the latter part of Abe`s second administration period had only a short-term, tactical significance. In the post-Abe period, the outlook for Sino-Japanese relations is not optimistic. This is because the conditions contributing to Japan`s balancing policy was not changed, and some new factors that are not conducive to the healthy and stable development of Sino-Japanese relations are gathering. In the face of the world`s greatest change in a century, Japan should look at China`s development objectively and rationally, follow the trend and reflect the political consensus that China and Japan "are partners but not a threat to each other" in its policies and actively put them in its actions. Only in this way can the ship of Sino-Japanese relations not run aground or deviate from its course, and move towards the future in a sustainable, healthy and stable manner. This is also the strategic choice in relations with China that best serves Japan`s fundamental interests.描述 博士
國立政治大學
日本研究學位學程
107863502資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107863502 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 于乃明 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Yu,Nai-ming en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 靳成 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Jin, Cheng en_US dc.creator (作者) 靳成 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Jin, Cheng en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107863502 en_US dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 日本研究學位學程 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107863502 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文對安倍晉三第二次執政期間的對華制衡外交及其對中日關係演變之影響進行了考察。 本論文的分析架構如下：國家只有兼具制衡意願與制衡能力，才會傾向於實施制衡；反之，只要其中任意一者出現變化，便可能影響到制衡的實施。影響制衡意願的因素主要包括平衡或爭奪權力的考量、應對現實威脅的考量、以及國內對於制衡是否形成政治共識。影響制衡能力的因素則主要包括制衡國與被制衡國的實力差距、制衡國的絕對實力這兩方面。制衡可運用軟、硬兩種方式為之。硬制衡的手段一般可分為內部制衡和外部制衡。軟制衡的策略則主要包括制度制衡、協調外交、經濟制裁等。 本論文認為，及至安倍第二次擔任首相時，日本已具備制衡中國的強烈意願以及一定的制衡能力。制衡是安倍第二次執政時期日本對華外交的主線。制衡意願方面：（1）21世紀進入第二個十年後，中國的加速崛起正在改變東亞乃至全球的權力格局，激發了日美兩國制衡中國的意願；（2）2012年以來，中國軍力快速發展，中日領土、海洋爭端持續加劇並趨向長期化，日本將中國視為「現實威脅」；（3）安倍首相本人、日本精英階層以及日本民眾，在制衡中國方面已形成政治共識。 本論文主要從政治、軍事兩方面考察日本的制衡能力。（1）政治方面：安倍晉三第二次出任首相後，實現了長期穩定執政。這不僅有利於形成相對穩定的對華政策，亦使得安倍政府在強化軍力、深化對外安全合作時能較少受到國內政局牽制。（2）軍事方面：及至安倍第二次擔任首相之時，日本業已具備不可小覷的軍事實力。安倍執政後，對內進一步推動改革強軍，對外進一步深化與美、澳、印、東南亞國家的安全合作，且其中的許多舉措具有一定的對華指向性。因此，安倍增強日本軍事實力的努力亦是其對華硬制衡的主要表現。 除硬制衡之外，安倍政府還透過加大介入南海問題、拒絕加入亞投行等，對華實施軟制衡。前者綜合運用了多種軟制衡策略，後者則主要運用了制度制衡這一策略。 制衡雖是安倍政府對華外交的主線，但其手段、強度等受到若干內外因素的制約。這些因素主要包括：（1）美國對日本的管控；（2）中日對話的重啟；（3）日本國內因素。因此，2012-2016年間，日本雖然持續實施對華制衡，導致中日關係呈現緩慢改善、曲折前行的樣貌，但安倍政府不願亦不敢突破中日關係底線，進而有助於中日避免走向兵戎相見。 2017年前後，一些新的因素弱化了日本的制衡意願，促使安倍政府加速改善對華關係。這些因素包括：（1）美國因素的催化作用；（2）日本國內改善對華關係的呼聲。另一方面，中日之間的一些新舊矛盾此時亦因各種原因，客觀上得到了一定程度的管控或緩和，為中日關係改善提供了有利環境。具體包括：（1）中日對話交流得到重啟，兩國在領土、海洋、歷史問題上的矛盾得到一定管控；（2）日本構建抗中「朋友圈」、介入南海問題、抵制亞投行等行動，由於效果不彰，對中日關係的衝擊趨向減弱；（3）安倍晉三本人兼具堅定性與靈活性的為政風格、安倍政府的長期穩定執政亦有利於其調整對華政策。 2017年起，安倍政府加大調整對華政策力度，中日關係進入加速改善期，並在2018年重新回到正常軌道。但另一方面，安倍政府並未放棄制衡中國。安倍政府繼續維持和強化對華威脅認知，加大軍力建設和針對中國的軍力部署。日本在對華軟制衡方面亦有新發展，包括參與四方安全對話機制、出台和推動「印太戰略（構想）」。對於中日第三方市場合作，安倍政府亦有所保留和限制。由此可見，安倍政府對華政策調整的本質是由積極的全方位制衡轉向在不放棄防範和圍堵中國的前提下，通過加強對華合作來實現經濟利益，並以日本所主張的「秩序」來規制中國的發展。安倍第二次執政後期中日關係的改善僅具有短期、戰術性意義。 後安倍時代，中日關係的前景不容樂觀。這是因為促成日本對華制衡的條件依舊存在；同時，一些新的、不利於中日關係健康穩定發展的因素正在集聚。面對世界百年未有之大變局，日方應客觀理性看待中國發展，順應潮流大勢，將中日「互為合作夥伴、互不構成威脅」的政治共識切實反映到政策上，積極落實在行動中。唯有如此，中日關係的航船才能夠不擱淺、不偏航，持續、健康、穩定地邁向未來。這也是最符合日本根本利益的對華戰略選擇。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This dissertation studies Shinzo Abe`s diplomatic policies for balancing China during his second administration period and its impact on the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations. The dissertation makes an analysis as follows: A state will tend to implement balancing only if it has both the will and the ability to do so; conversely, any change in either may affect the implementation of balancing. Factors affecting the willingness for balancing include considerations of balancing or competing for power, responding to real threats, and a domestic political consensus on balancing. Factors affecting the ability for balancing include the power gap between the counterbalancing state and the counterbalanced state, and the absolute power of the counterbalancing state. Balancing can be implemented in both soft and hard modes. Hard balancing can generally be divided into internal and external ones. Soft balancing includes institutional balancing, coordinated diplomacy, economic sanctions, etc. The dissertation suggests that, by the time Abe became Prime Minister for the second time, Japan had a strong will to balance against China and a certain ability to do so. Balancing was the main line of Japan’s diplomacy with China during Abe’s second administration period. In terms of its willingness for balancing: (1) The accelerated rise of China in the second decade of the 21st century is changing the power pattern in East Asia and the rest of the world, which has inspired Japan and the US to balance against China; (2) Since 2012, China`s military power has been developing rapidly, and the territorial and maritime disputes between China and Japan have been intensifying and tending to become chronic, and Japan sees China as a `real threat`; (3) Prime Minister Abe himself, the Japanese elite and the Japanese public have formed a political consensus on balancing against China. The dissertation investigates Japan`s ability to balance against China from two main perspectives: political and military. (1) Politics: after he became Prime Minister for the second time, Shinzo Abe had been in power for a long and stable period of time. This was not only conducive to a relatively stable policy towards China, but also allowed the Abe government to be less constrained by the domestic political situation when strengthening its military power and deepening foreign security cooperation. (2) Military: by the time Abe became Prime Minister for the second time, Japan already had significant military power. After Abe took office, he was pushing all the time to reform and strengthen the military and deepen security cooperation with the US, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries, and many of these initiatives were against China. Therefore, Abe`s efforts to enhance Japan`s military power were also the main manifestation of the hard balancing. The Abe government also exercised soft balancing to China by increasing its involvement in the South China Sea issue and refusing to join the ADB. The former used a combination of soft balancing strategies, while the latter mainly used the strategy of institutional balancing. Although balancing was the main line of Abe`s diplomacy with China, the means and intensity were constrained by a lot of internal and external factors, which mainly include (1) the US`s control over Japan; (2) the resumption of Sino-Japanese dialogue; and (3) domestic factors in Japan. Therefore, although Japan continued to balance against China during the years 2012-2016, resulting in a slow improvement of and tortuous Sino-Japanese relations, the Abe government was unwilling and dared not break through the red line of Sino-Japanese relations, which helped China and Japan to avoid moving towards a war. Around 2017, on one hand, some new factors weakened Japan`s willingness for balancing against China, prompting the Abe government to accelerate improvements in relations with China. These factors include (1) the catalytic role of the US factor and (2) the domestic calls for improving relations with China. On the other hand, some old and new conflicts between China and Japan were also objectively managed or eased at this time for various reasons, providing a favourable environment for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations: (1) dialogues between China and Japan were restarted, and conflicts between the two countries over territorial, maritime and historical issues were managed; 2) Japan`s actions to build a "circle of friends" against China, intervene in the South China Sea and boycott the ADB tended to have less impact on Sino-Japanese relations due to their ineffectiveness; (3) Shinzo Abe`s governance style, which combines firmness and flexibility, and the long-term stability of the Abe government also helped to adjust his policies towards China. After 2017, the Abe government made greater efforts to adjust its China policies, and Sino-Japanese relations entered a period of accelerated improvement and returned to a normal track in 2018. However, the Abe government did not give up the balance against China. The Abe government continued to maintain and strengthen its perception of threats to China, increasing military build-up and military deployment against China. There were also new developments in Japan`s soft balancing on China, including its participation in the Quad and the promotion of the FOIP. The Abe government also had reservations and restrictions on cooperation between China and Japan in the third-party market. It can be seen that the essence of the Abe administration`s China policy adjustment is to shift from active all-round balancing to strengthening cooperation with China to realize economic interests without abandoning prevention and containment of China, and to regulate China`s development with the `order` advocated by Japan. The improvement in Sino-Japanese relations during the latter part of Abe`s second administration period had only a short-term, tactical significance. In the post-Abe period, the outlook for Sino-Japanese relations is not optimistic. This is because the conditions contributing to Japan`s balancing policy was not changed, and some new factors that are not conducive to the healthy and stable development of Sino-Japanese relations are gathering. In the face of the world`s greatest change in a century, Japan should look at China`s development objectively and rationally, follow the trend and reflect the political consensus that China and Japan "are partners but not a threat to each other" in its policies and actively put them in its actions. Only in this way can the ship of Sino-Japanese relations not run aground or deviate from its course, and move towards the future in a sustainable, healthy and stable manner. This is also the strategic choice in relations with China that best serves Japan`s fundamental interests. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 文獻探討 8 第二章 理論架構 17 第一節 制衡理論 17 第二節 軟制衡理論 32 第三節 制度制衡理論 44 第三章 日本制衡中國之意願 53 第一節 中國崛起與美日之因應 53 第二節 中國對日本之「現實威脅」 78 第三節 日本的對華消極認知 93 第四節 安倍晉三的對華外交邏輯 125 第四章 日本制衡中國之能力與對華硬制衡 134 第一節 安倍政府的長期穩定執政 134 第二節 日本的軍力建設 153 第三節 日本的對外安全合作 166 第五章 日本的對華軟制衡 182 第一節 南海問題與對華軟制衡 182 第二節 亞投行與對華制度制衡 215 第六章 中日關係的加速改善 232 第一節 美國因素對中日關係的影響 232 第二節 中日之間若干新舊矛盾的緩和 250 第三節 安倍第二次執政時期中日關係的演變 283 第四節 安倍政府對華外交的「兩面性」與中日關係的前景 303 第七章 結論 333 參考文獻 345 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107863502 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 安倍第二次執政時期 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中日關係 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 制衡意願 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 制衡能力 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 軟制衡 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Abe’s Second Administration en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sino-Japan Relations en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Balancing Willingness en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Balancing Ability en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Soft Balancing en_US dc.title (題名) 安倍第二次執政時期的中日關係研究 ——對華制衡外交之視角 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Sino-Japan Relations during Abe’s Second Administration: Perspective of Foreign Policy for Balancing China en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis -
