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題名 網絡效果對於消費者資訊價值的影響
The Impact of Network Effects on the Value of Consumer Information作者 蔡文鋒
Tsai, Wen-Feng貢獻者 廖郁萍
Liao, Yu-ping
蔡文鋒
Tsai, Wen-Feng關鍵詞 消費者資訊
差別取價
網絡效果
產品水平差異化
資訊提供商
Consumer Information
Price Discrimination
Network Effects
Horizontal Product Differentiation
Information Provider日期 2023 上傳時間 6-Jul-2023 16:40:33 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文參考Montes et al. (2019)產品水平差異化雙佔模型設定，假設市場上僅有一家資訊提供商，並將市場上的消費者分為新消費者與舊消費者。本文假設資訊提供商僅提供舊消費者的資訊，若零售商購買消費者資訊，則可以針對舊的消費者進行差別取價；並假設共有三種情況，分別為資訊提供商未販售消費者資訊、資訊提供商僅販售給資訊給一家零售商與資訊提供商同時販售資訊給兩家零售商。上述設定下，本文加入網絡效果(Network Effect)，進而探討網絡效果對於零售商與消費者的是否有正面效益，最後也會探討消費者資訊價值是否會因為網絡效果而有所變化。結果發現在網絡效果相對小時，其結論與Montes et al. (2019)相同，皆是資訊提供商只販售消費者資訊給一家零售商的權利金最高，且本文發現雖然網絡效果可以使消費者增加產品的附加價值，並願意付出更高的價格，但零售商卻也因為更想爭取消費者而削價得更加厲害，並使利潤反而低於無網絡效果時，最終造成不論兩家零售商是否有消費者資訊，網絡效果對於零售商皆為負面效果大於正面效果，使得消費者因為零售商互相競爭而得利。然而在網絡效果極大時，儘管只有兩家零售商皆有消費者資訊的情況符合本文的競爭均衡，但與Montes et al. (2019)不同，網絡效果能降低零售商在新消費者間的競爭程度，使得零售商在基礎價格訂定更高的定價，並得出零售商與消費者皆可以從網絡效果中得利。
This passage discusses the setting of horizontal product differentiation duopoly model, referencing Montes et al. (2019). It is assumed that there is only one information provider in the market and divides consumers into new consumers and old consumers. The paper assumes that the information provider only offers information to old consumers. If a retailer purchases consumer information, they can engage in price discrimination based on the old consumers. The paper considers three scenarios: the information provider does not sell consumer information, the information provider sells information to only one retailer, and the information provider sells information to two retailers simultaneously.Under the above settings, the paper incorporates network effects and examines whether network effects have positive benefits for retailers and consumers. It also explores whether the value of consumer information changes due to network effects.The results reveal that when network effects are relatively small, the conclusions align with Montes et al. (2019). The highest licensing fee is obtained when the information provider sells consumer information exclusively to one retailer. The paper finds that although network effects can increase the additional value of the product for consumers and make them willing to pay a higher price, retailers become more aggressive in price competition to attract consumers, resulting in lower profits compared to the scenario without network effects. Ultimately, regardless of whether the two retailers have consumer information, the negative effects of network effects on retailers outweigh the positive effects, benefiting consumers due to the intense competition among retailers.However, when network effects are substantial, although the case where only two retailers have consumer information conforms to the competitive equilibrium described in this paper, it differs from Montes et al. (2019). Network effects can reduce the level of competition among retailers for new consumers, allowing retailers to set higher base prices and benefit both retailers and consumers from the network effects.參考文獻 一、中文部分何琳潔(2019)，你的個資真的已經匿名化了嗎，中研院法律所資訊法中，https://infolaw.iias.sinica.edu.tw/?p=1831二、英文部分Bellefiamme, P. & M. Peitz (2010), Industrial organization: markets and strategies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.Braulin, F. C. & T. Valletti (2016), “Selling customer information to competing firms,” Economics Letter, 149, 10-14.De Palma, A & L. Leruth (1993), “Equilibrium in Competing Networks with Differentiated Products,” Transportation Science, 27, 73-80.Di Cintio, M. (2007), “A note on the Hotelling principle of minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd,” Research in Economics, 61(3), 122-129.Duan, Y., Y. Xie & Y. Hu (2020), “The value of personal information in vertically differentiated markets with privacy concerns,” Annals of Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03794-3Grilo, I. & O. Shy & J.-F. Thisse (2001), “Price competition when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity, ” Journal of Public Economics, 80(3), 385-408.Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition, ” The Economic Journal, 39 (153), 41–57.Jean-Jacques L., R. Patrick & T. Jean (1998), “Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination, ” RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 38-56.Kim, J. H., L. Wagman & A. L. Wickelgren (2019), “The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 28, 373-391.Mattioli, D. (2014), “On Orbitz, Mac users steered to pricier hotels,” Wall Street Journala(August23),https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882.Montes, R., W. Sand-Zantman & T. Valletti (2019), “The value of personal information in online markets with endogenous privacy,” Management Science, 70, 186-196.Shy, O. & R. Stenbacka (2013), “Investment in customer recognition and information exchange,” Information Economics and Policy, 25, 92-106.Shy, O. & R. Stenbacka (2015), “Customer privacy and competition,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 25, 539-562.Taylor, C. & L. Wagman (2014), “Customer privacy in oligopolistic markets: Winners, losers, and welfare,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 34, 80-84.Tolotti, M. & J. Yepez, (2020), “Hotelling-Bertrand duopoly competition under firm-specific network effects,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 176(C), 105-128.Valentino-Devries, J., J. Singer-Vine & A. Soltani (2012), “Websites vary prices, deals based on users’ information,” Wall Street Journal (December24), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
110258017資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258017 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 廖郁萍 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Liao, Yu-ping en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔡文鋒 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tsai, Wen-Feng en_US dc.creator (作者) 蔡文鋒 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Tsai, Wen-Feng en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 6-Jul-2023 16:40:33 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 6-Jul-2023 16:40:33 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Jul-2023 16:40:33 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110258017 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/145833 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 110258017 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文參考Montes et al. (2019)產品水平差異化雙佔模型設定，假設市場上僅有一家資訊提供商，並將市場上的消費者分為新消費者與舊消費者。本文假設資訊提供商僅提供舊消費者的資訊，若零售商購買消費者資訊，則可以針對舊的消費者進行差別取價；並假設共有三種情況，分別為資訊提供商未販售消費者資訊、資訊提供商僅販售給資訊給一家零售商與資訊提供商同時販售資訊給兩家零售商。上述設定下，本文加入網絡效果(Network Effect)，進而探討網絡效果對於零售商與消費者的是否有正面效益，最後也會探討消費者資訊價值是否會因為網絡效果而有所變化。結果發現在網絡效果相對小時，其結論與Montes et al. (2019)相同，皆是資訊提供商只販售消費者資訊給一家零售商的權利金最高，且本文發現雖然網絡效果可以使消費者增加產品的附加價值，並願意付出更高的價格，但零售商卻也因為更想爭取消費者而削價得更加厲害，並使利潤反而低於無網絡效果時，最終造成不論兩家零售商是否有消費者資訊，網絡效果對於零售商皆為負面效果大於正面效果，使得消費者因為零售商互相競爭而得利。然而在網絡效果極大時，儘管只有兩家零售商皆有消費者資訊的情況符合本文的競爭均衡，但與Montes et al. (2019)不同，網絡效果能降低零售商在新消費者間的競爭程度，使得零售商在基礎價格訂定更高的定價，並得出零售商與消費者皆可以從網絡效果中得利。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This passage discusses the setting of horizontal product differentiation duopoly model, referencing Montes et al. (2019). It is assumed that there is only one information provider in the market and divides consumers into new consumers and old consumers. The paper assumes that the information provider only offers information to old consumers. If a retailer purchases consumer information, they can engage in price discrimination based on the old consumers. The paper considers three scenarios: the information provider does not sell consumer information, the information provider sells information to only one retailer, and the information provider sells information to two retailers simultaneously.Under the above settings, the paper incorporates network effects and examines whether network effects have positive benefits for retailers and consumers. It also explores whether the value of consumer information changes due to network effects.The results reveal that when network effects are relatively small, the conclusions align with Montes et al. (2019). The highest licensing fee is obtained when the information provider sells consumer information exclusively to one retailer. The paper finds that although network effects can increase the additional value of the product for consumers and make them willing to pay a higher price, retailers become more aggressive in price competition to attract consumers, resulting in lower profits compared to the scenario without network effects. Ultimately, regardless of whether the two retailers have consumer information, the negative effects of network effects on retailers outweigh the positive effects, benefiting consumers due to the intense competition among retailers.However, when network effects are substantial, although the case where only two retailers have consumer information conforms to the competitive equilibrium described in this paper, it differs from Montes et al. (2019). Network effects can reduce the level of competition among retailers for new consumers, allowing retailers to set higher base prices and benefit both retailers and consumers from the network effects. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 研究背景與動機 1第一節 研究動機 1第二節 文獻回顧 4第三節 論文架構 6第二章 理論模型建立 7第三章 不同情境下的分析討論 10第一節 零售商皆無消費者資訊 10第二節 零售商皆有消費者資訊 12第三節 僅一家零售商有消費者資訊(假設零售商1有) 17第四節 均衡條件比較 23第四章 資訊對零售商的價值 25第五章 結論與建議 28本文附錄 30附錄A 30參考文獻 32 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1664102 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258017 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 消費者資訊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 差別取價 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 網絡效果 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 產品水平差異化 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊提供商 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Consumer Information en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Price Discrimination en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Network Effects en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Horizontal Product Differentiation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information Provider en_US dc.title (題名) 網絡效果對於消費者資訊價值的影響 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Impact of Network Effects on the Value of Consumer Information en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部分何琳潔(2019)，你的個資真的已經匿名化了嗎，中研院法律所資訊法中，https://infolaw.iias.sinica.edu.tw/?p=1831二、英文部分Bellefiamme, P. & M. Peitz (2010), Industrial organization: markets and strategies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.Braulin, F. C. & T. Valletti (2016), “Selling customer information to competing firms,” Economics Letter, 149, 10-14.De Palma, A & L. Leruth (1993), “Equilibrium in Competing Networks with Differentiated Products,” Transportation Science, 27, 73-80.Di Cintio, M. (2007), “A note on the Hotelling principle of minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd,” Research in Economics, 61(3), 122-129.Duan, Y., Y. Xie & Y. Hu (2020), “The value of personal information in vertically differentiated markets with privacy concerns,” Annals of Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03794-3Grilo, I. & O. Shy & J.-F. Thisse (2001), “Price competition when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity, ” Journal of Public Economics, 80(3), 385-408.Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition, ” The Economic Journal, 39 (153), 41–57.Jean-Jacques L., R. Patrick & T. Jean (1998), “Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination, ” RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 38-56.Kim, J. H., L. Wagman & A. L. Wickelgren (2019), “The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 28, 373-391.Mattioli, D. (2014), “On Orbitz, Mac users steered to pricier hotels,” Wall Street Journala(August23),https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882.Montes, R., W. Sand-Zantman & T. Valletti (2019), “The value of personal information in online markets with endogenous privacy,” Management Science, 70, 186-196.Shy, O. & R. Stenbacka (2013), “Investment in customer recognition and information exchange,” Information Economics and Policy, 25, 92-106.Shy, O. & R. Stenbacka (2015), “Customer privacy and competition,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 25, 539-562.Taylor, C. & L. Wagman (2014), “Customer privacy in oligopolistic markets: Winners, losers, and welfare,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 34, 80-84.Tolotti, M. & J. Yepez, (2020), “Hotelling-Bertrand duopoly competition under firm-specific network effects,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 176(C), 105-128.Valentino-Devries, J., J. Singer-Vine & A. Soltani (2012), “Websites vary prices, deals based on users’ information,” Wall Street Journal (December24), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534. zh_TW
