| dc.contributor.advisor | 王信實<br>李文傑 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wang, Shinn-Shyr<br>Lee, Wen-Chieh | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 黃文甫 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Huang, Wen-Fu | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 黃文甫 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Wen-Fu | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2023 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Sep-2023 15:33:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Sep-2023 15:33:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Sep-2023 15:33:15 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0110258027 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147068 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 經濟學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 110258027 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 信譽是影響晶圓代工廠能否與客戶維持長期合作關係的關鍵因素之一，因 此本研究首先利用賽局理論並引入信譽作為激勵機制建立晶圓代工廠商業模式 決策模型，說明信譽與其他市況參數，對廠商是否選擇持續與客戶合作而採純 代工模式，所要求的耐心水準臨界值之影響。再推廣至廠商面對地緣政治風險 的不確定性恆常影響下，將模型加入相關的風險與擴張參數，以分析特定情況 下，地緣政治風險與代工廠擴張策略，和其他市況參數對持續選擇與客戶合作 所要求的耐心水準臨界值之影響，並進一步找出風險與擴張策略等參數間的交 互影響。最後再以比較靜態分析解釋不同情境下各參數的變動對代工廠策略選 擇意願的影響，冀能提供應對地緣政治的不確定性與不同市場環境下，晶圓代 工廠制定擴張策略與商業模式選擇之參考。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The recent rising issue shocks the world regarding the escalating geopolitics risks would put the nowadays stable international supply chain into risk. In view of the concentration of semiconductor foundry business, the geopolitical risks are especially highlighted to endanger the further development of foundry business. This research; thus, put together the reputation accumulation process into the repeated game theoretic framework. In this vein, the research framework is able to delicately analyze how the rising geopolitical risks would intertwine with other parameters directing the dynamics of the business environmental. In addition to typical qualitative arguments, the current developed framework can excel at consecutive evolutionary analyses once putting more accumulating data. Hence, in sum, this research aims to provide some insight for the initial attempt at systematic research regarding the flows of discussions on geopolitical risks. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1 緒論 72 半導體產業簡介 122.1 半導體產業歷史沿革12 2.2 現代主要晶圓代工廠 143 文獻回顧 163.1 無窮期重複賽局與關係激勵契約 16 3.2 地緣政治與半導體產業17 3.3 研究貢獻 184 研究方法 194.1 基本賽局理論介紹 19 4.1.1 單期賽局 19 4.1.2 優勢策略 (Dominant Strategies) 21 4.1.3 納許均衡 (Nash Equilibrium) 22 4.1.4 無窮期重複賽局 234.2 本文模型架構與假設 25 4.2.1 信譽模型 33 4.2.2 地緣政治風險模型 384.3 比較靜態分析 485 結論與建議 545.1 研究結論54 5.2 研究限制與建議 56附錄 A 59附錄 B 60 參考文獻 61 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 2051462 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258027 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 賽局理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 信譽累積 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 晶圓代工 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 地緣政治 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Game theory | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Reputation accumulation | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | IC foundry business | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Geopolitical risks | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 論地緣政治風險對晶圓代工廠商擴張策略的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The Effects of Geopolitical Risks on the Expansion of IC Foundries | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 參考文獻中文部分太田泰彦 (2022)。半導體地緣政治學 (卓慧娟譯)。野人文化。林愛雪 (2022)。台灣半導體業對於地緣政治之因應策略 [碩士論文]。國立陽明交通大學。張忠謀 (2023)。半導體世紀對談。天下雜誌。https://www.cw.com.tw/graphics/2023-chip-war-forum/。彭春明 (2023)。半導體晶圓代工之動態競爭:以台積電為例 [碩士論文]。國立台灣大學。劉文獻 (2021)。COVID-19 疫情對半導體產業全球價值鏈的影響。人文與社會科學簡訊，22(4)，58-63。英文部分Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. J., (2002). Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 39-84.Chen, Ming-Jer and Leong, Jin, (2022). Geopolitics and the Global Semiconductor Industry. Darden Case No. UVA-S-0373.Doornik, K. (2006). Relational contracting in partnerships. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15(2), 517-548.Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1990). Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), 194-206.Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. (1986). The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 533-554.Friedman, J. W. (1971). A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. The Review of Economic Studies, 38(1), 1-12.Levin, J. (2003). Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review, 93(3), 835-857.Miller, C. (2022). Chip War: The Fight for the World`s Most Critical Technology. Simon and Schuster.Radner, R. (1985). Repeated principal-agent games with discounting. Econometrica, 53(5), 1173-1198.Rubinstein, A. (1979). Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(1), 1-9.Watson, J. (2021). Discounting and cooperation in repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory, 192, 105144. | zh_TW |
