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題名 隱私權的化約論與反化約論之爭
Right to Privacy: Reductionism vs. Anti-reductionism作者 林怡仲
Lin, Yi-Chung貢獻者 鄭光明
Cheng, Kuang-Ming
林怡仲
Lin, Yi-Chung關鍵詞 湯姆森
沃倫
布蘭戴斯
史坎能
派倫特
派克
隱私權
財產權
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Samuel D. Warren
Louis D. Brandeis
Thomas M. Scanlon
W. A. Parent
Richard B. Parker
Right to privacy
Property right日期 2023 上傳時間 1-Sep-2023 16:20:37 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文旨在探討隱私權 (right to privacy) 的化約論 (reductionism) 與反化約論 (anti-reductionism) 之爭，前者的代表是Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975)，她主張隱私權可以化約為財產權 (property right)；後者的代表是Samuel D. Warren和 Louis D. Brandeis (1890)，他們主張隱私權是獨立特殊的權利，且不可化約至財產權。本文將主張Thomson與Warren和 Brandeis的主張看似互斥，實則有共識：兩者的隱私權皆不可化約至狹義財產權 (narrow sense of property right)，而皆可化約為廣義財產權(broad sense of property right)（狹義財產權是指與金錢價值有關的財產權，而廣義財產權是指與金錢價值無關的財產權）。接著，筆者將主張若隱私權可化約為廣義財產權，則：1. Thomson 主張的隱私權必須由「我的所有物不被看、聽的權利」修正為「為我的所有物創造物理遮蔽的權利」，理由是廣義財產權為「以動作為基礎的權利」(action-based right)，而隱私權也必須一致；且 2. Warren和 Brandeis 的「隱私權是我的訊息不被公開的權利」此一主張則無法言之成理，理由是「我的事實或訊息」不受廣義財產權保障。此外，筆者將主張 Thomson 的修正版理論將可抵禦 Thomas M. Scanlon (1975) 的「隱私權不可化約為財產權，而是以隱私利益 (privacy interests) 與隱私規約 (privacy norms) 為核心的權利」此一主張的攻擊。最後，筆者認為本文所得的隱私權理論以及隱私理論，相較於 W. A. Parent (1983) 的隱私狀態說 (condition theory of privacy) 與Richard B. Parker (1974) 的隱私控制說 (control theory of privacy) 更為言之成理，且可為當代的隱私爭論提供解答：筆者主張若隱私權可化約為廣義財產權，則隱私權不保障「我的訊息或所有物不被看、聽、知道、公開的權利」，只保障「對我的所有物創造物理遮蔽的權利」。
In this paper, I will discuss the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism on the right to privacy. The former is advocated by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975), who claims that the right to privacy can be reduced to property right; the latter is advocated by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis (1890), who argue that the right to privacy is an independent and distinct right so that it cannot be reduced to property right.I argue that Thomson`s claim and Warren and Brandeis` claim seem to be conflict to each other, but in fact there is a consensus: both believe that privacy right cannot be reduced to the narrow sense of property right, and both agree that privacy right can be reduced to the broad sense of property right (the narrow sense of property right is the property right related to monetary value, while the broad sense of property right is the property right that has nothing to do with monetary value).Next, I argue that if the right to privacy can be reduced to the broad sense of property right, it follows that the right to privacy advocated by Thomson must be revised from the right not to be looked at or listened to to the right to create physical barriers for my belongings. The reason is that the broad sense of property right is an action-based right, so is the right to privacy. It also follows that privacy is the right to keep my information from being published, which Warren and Brandeis claim, cannot be justified because my facts or information are not protected by the broad sense of property right.Also, I will argue that Thomson`s revised version of the theory of privacy will survive facing Thomas M. Scanlon`s claim that the right to privacy, a distinct right based on privacy interests and privacy norms, cannot be reduced to property right.Finally, I maintain that my theory of privacy right is more robust than W. A. Parent`s condition theory of privacy and Richard B. Parker`s control theory of privacy, and I believe that my theory of privacy right can provide satisfactory solutions to contemporary privacy debates: I argue that if the right to privacy can be reduced to the broad sense of property right, then the right to privacy does not protect that my information or belongings will not be looked at, listened to, known, or made public, but only protect the right to create physical barriers for my belongings.參考文獻 林怡仲 (2022)。〈隱私的規範理論：隱私的化約論〉，《華文哲學百科》（2022 版本），王一奇（編）。林怡仲 (2022a)。〈隱私的規範理論：隱私的反化約論〉，《華文哲學百科》（2022 版本），王一奇（編）。Allen, Anita. (1987). Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.Allen, Anita. (2011). Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Baker, C. Edwin. (2004). Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment. Social Philosophy and Policy, 215-268.Beardsley, Elizabeth. (1971). Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 56-71). New York, NY: Atherton Press.Blaauw, M. J. (2013). The Epistemic Account of Privacy. Episteme, 10, 2: 167–177.DeCew, Judith Wagner. (1997). Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Feinberg, Joel. (1973). Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Fried, Charles. (1968). Privacy. Yale Law Journal, 77: 475-93.Fried, Charles. (1970). An Anatomy of Values. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Gavison, Ruth. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. Yale Law Journal, 89: 421-71.Gerety, Tom. (1977). Redefining Privacy. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 12: 233-93.Gross, Hyman. (1971) Privacy and Autonomy. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 169-81). New York, NY: Atherton Press.Hettinger, Edwin C. (1989). Justifying Intellectual Property. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18, 1: 31-52.van den Haag, Ernest. (1971). On Privacy. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 149-168). New York, NY: Atherton Press.van den Hoven, J. (1999). Privacy and the Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, 1, 1: 30–44.Inness, Julie. (1992). Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.Kalven, Harry Jr. (1966). Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and Contemporary Problems, 31: 326-341.Matheson, David. (2007). Unknowableness and Informational Privacy. Journal of Philosophical Research, 32: 251–67.Miller, Arthur R. (1971). The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Nissenbaum, Helen. (2004). Privacy as Contextual Integrity. Washington Law Review, 79: 101–139.Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.Parent, W. (1983). Privacy, Morality and the Law. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12: 269-88.Parent, W. (1983a). Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20, 4: 341-355.Parker, Richard B. (1974). A Definition of Privacy. Rutgers Law Review, 27: 275-296.Powers, Madison. (1996). A Cognitive Access Definition of Privacy. Law and Philosophy, 15, 4: 369-386.Prosser, William. (1960). Privacy. California Law Review, 48: 383-423.Rachels, J. (1975). Why Privacy is Important. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 323-33.Rössler, Beate (ed.)(2004). Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Rubel, Alan. (2011). The Particularized Judgment Account of Privacy. Res Publica, 17, 3: 275–90.Scanlon, T. (1975). Thomson on Privacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 315-322.Schoeman, F. (ed.)(1984). Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Schoeman, Ferdinand. (1984) Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 1-33). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Solove, D. (2006). A Taxonomy of Privacy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 154: 477–564.Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1975). The Right to Privacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 295–314. Also in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 272-289). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1990). The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Tribe, Lawrence. (1978). American Constitutional Law. Mineola, NY: Foundation Press.Warren, S. and Brandeis, L. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4: 193-220.Westin, Alan F. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum. 描述 博士
國立政治大學
哲學系
109154501資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154501 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 鄭光明 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Cheng, Kuang-Ming en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林怡仲 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Yi-Chung en_US dc.creator (作者) 林怡仲 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Yi-Chung en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Sep-2023 16:20:37 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Sep-2023 16:20:37 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Sep-2023 16:20:37 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0109154501 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147267 - dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 哲學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 109154501 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文旨在探討隱私權 (right to privacy) 的化約論 (reductionism) 與反化約論 (anti-reductionism) 之爭，前者的代表是Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975)，她主張隱私權可以化約為財產權 (property right)；後者的代表是Samuel D. Warren和 Louis D. Brandeis (1890)，他們主張隱私權是獨立特殊的權利，且不可化約至財產權。本文將主張Thomson與Warren和 Brandeis的主張看似互斥，實則有共識：兩者的隱私權皆不可化約至狹義財產權 (narrow sense of property right)，而皆可化約為廣義財產權(broad sense of property right)（狹義財產權是指與金錢價值有關的財產權，而廣義財產權是指與金錢價值無關的財產權）。接著，筆者將主張若隱私權可化約為廣義財產權，則：1. Thomson 主張的隱私權必須由「我的所有物不被看、聽的權利」修正為「為我的所有物創造物理遮蔽的權利」，理由是廣義財產權為「以動作為基礎的權利」(action-based right)，而隱私權也必須一致；且 2. Warren和 Brandeis 的「隱私權是我的訊息不被公開的權利」此一主張則無法言之成理，理由是「我的事實或訊息」不受廣義財產權保障。此外，筆者將主張 Thomson 的修正版理論將可抵禦 Thomas M. Scanlon (1975) 的「隱私權不可化約為財產權，而是以隱私利益 (privacy interests) 與隱私規約 (privacy norms) 為核心的權利」此一主張的攻擊。最後，筆者認為本文所得的隱私權理論以及隱私理論，相較於 W. A. Parent (1983) 的隱私狀態說 (condition theory of privacy) 與Richard B. Parker (1974) 的隱私控制說 (control theory of privacy) 更為言之成理，且可為當代的隱私爭論提供解答：筆者主張若隱私權可化約為廣義財產權，則隱私權不保障「我的訊息或所有物不被看、聽、知道、公開的權利」，只保障「對我的所有物創造物理遮蔽的權利」。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this paper, I will discuss the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism on the right to privacy. The former is advocated by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975), who claims that the right to privacy can be reduced to property right; the latter is advocated by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis (1890), who argue that the right to privacy is an independent and distinct right so that it cannot be reduced to property right.I argue that Thomson`s claim and Warren and Brandeis` claim seem to be conflict to each other, but in fact there is a consensus: both believe that privacy right cannot be reduced to the narrow sense of property right, and both agree that privacy right can be reduced to the broad sense of property right (the narrow sense of property right is the property right related to monetary value, while the broad sense of property right is the property right that has nothing to do with monetary value).Next, I argue that if the right to privacy can be reduced to the broad sense of property right, it follows that the right to privacy advocated by Thomson must be revised from the right not to be looked at or listened to to the right to create physical barriers for my belongings. The reason is that the broad sense of property right is an action-based right, so is the right to privacy. It also follows that privacy is the right to keep my information from being published, which Warren and Brandeis claim, cannot be justified because my facts or information are not protected by the broad sense of property right.Also, I will argue that Thomson`s revised version of the theory of privacy will survive facing Thomas M. Scanlon`s claim that the right to privacy, a distinct right based on privacy interests and privacy norms, cannot be reduced to property right.Finally, I maintain that my theory of privacy right is more robust than W. A. Parent`s condition theory of privacy and Richard B. Parker`s control theory of privacy, and I believe that my theory of privacy right can provide satisfactory solutions to contemporary privacy debates: I argue that if the right to privacy can be reduced to the broad sense of property right, then the right to privacy does not protect that my information or belongings will not be looked at, listened to, known, or made public, but only protect the right to create physical barriers for my belongings. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 導論 8第二章 Warren 和 Brandeis與Thomson論隱私 18一、Samuel D. Warren和 Louis D. Brandeis論隱私 (1890) 18二、Thomson論隱私：財產權與自身權 23三、Thomson論隱私：隱私規約 31四、Thomson論隱私：隱私與訊息 35第三章 Warren 和 Brandeis vs. Thomson：隱私權的化約論與反化約論之爭 40一、Warren 和 Brandeis 與Thomson：爭論的關鍵 40二、Warren 和 Brandeis 論廣義財產權及狹義財產權 42三、Thomson 論財產權、自身權與隱私權 45四、Thomson的4類「我的」 51五、Warren 和 Brandeis論財產權與隱私權 56第四章 隱私權可化約為廣義財產權嗎？ 64一、Powers論四種隱私理論 65二、再論控制說與狀態說 68三、Thomson的描述義隱私理論和規範義隱私理論 70四、Thomson的「狀態版本」隱私權理論 77五、Thomson的「控制版本」隱私理論是否言之成理？ 83第五章 修正Thomson的隱私理論 95一、主張1為何言之成理 97二、主張2為何言之成理 99三、主張3為何言之成理 103四、主張4為何言之成理 106五、主張5為何言之成理 110第六章 Scanlon論隱私與Scanlon對Thomson的批評 120一、Scanlon論隱私 120二、Scanlon對Thomson的批評 122三、回應Scanlon的批評1 129四、回應Scanlon的批評4 131五、回應Scanlon的批評5：土地非我所有的情況 (例子1) 138六、回應Scanlon的批評5：X光機與地鐵地圖 (例子2) 141第七章 Thomson的隱私理論修正版本如何回應Scanlon的批評 148一、以Thomson的修正版理論回應Scanlon的批評2與批評3 148二、以Thomson的修正版理論回應Scanlon的批評1與批評4 152三、以Thomson的修正版本重新回顧Scanlon的批評5 156第八章 Warren和Brandise與Thomson論「我的事實與訊息」以及財產權163一、Warren和Brandise論「不被公開的權利」 164二、Warren和Brandise論「X的事實或訊息 (F)」 167三、Thomson論「X的事實或訊息 (F)」 174四、Thomson原版理論vs. Thomson的修正版理論 176第九章 我的事實與訊息、隱私權以及隱私 180一、隱私權的直接結果與間接結果 181二、隱私喪失 184三、Parent、Parker與Powers論隱私 192四、Parent、Parker與Powers的隱私理論有何問題 200第十章 結論 207參考文獻 213 zh_TW dc.format.extent 2797473 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154501 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 湯姆森 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 沃倫 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 布蘭戴斯 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 史坎能 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 派倫特 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 派克 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 隱私權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財產權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Judith Jarvis Thomson en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Samuel D. Warren en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Louis D. Brandeis en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Thomas M. Scanlon en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) W. A. Parent en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Richard B. Parker en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Right to privacy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Property right en_US dc.title (題名) 隱私權的化約論與反化約論之爭 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Right to Privacy: Reductionism vs. Anti-reductionism en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林怡仲 (2022)。〈隱私的規範理論：隱私的化約論〉，《華文哲學百科》（2022 版本），王一奇（編）。林怡仲 (2022a)。〈隱私的規範理論：隱私的反化約論〉，《華文哲學百科》（2022 版本），王一奇（編）。Allen, Anita. (1987). Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.Allen, Anita. (2011). Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Baker, C. Edwin. (2004). Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment. Social Philosophy and Policy, 215-268.Beardsley, Elizabeth. (1971). Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 56-71). New York, NY: Atherton Press.Blaauw, M. J. (2013). The Epistemic Account of Privacy. Episteme, 10, 2: 167–177.DeCew, Judith Wagner. (1997). Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Feinberg, Joel. (1973). Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Fried, Charles. (1968). Privacy. Yale Law Journal, 77: 475-93.Fried, Charles. (1970). An Anatomy of Values. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Gavison, Ruth. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. Yale Law Journal, 89: 421-71.Gerety, Tom. (1977). Redefining Privacy. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 12: 233-93.Gross, Hyman. (1971) Privacy and Autonomy. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 169-81). New York, NY: Atherton Press.Hettinger, Edwin C. (1989). Justifying Intellectual Property. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18, 1: 31-52.van den Haag, Ernest. (1971). On Privacy. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 149-168). New York, NY: Atherton Press.van den Hoven, J. (1999). Privacy and the Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, 1, 1: 30–44.Inness, Julie. (1992). Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.Kalven, Harry Jr. (1966). Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and Contemporary Problems, 31: 326-341.Matheson, David. (2007). Unknowableness and Informational Privacy. Journal of Philosophical Research, 32: 251–67.Miller, Arthur R. (1971). The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Nissenbaum, Helen. (2004). Privacy as Contextual Integrity. Washington Law Review, 79: 101–139.Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.Parent, W. (1983). Privacy, Morality and the Law. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12: 269-88.Parent, W. (1983a). Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20, 4: 341-355.Parker, Richard B. (1974). A Definition of Privacy. Rutgers Law Review, 27: 275-296.Powers, Madison. (1996). A Cognitive Access Definition of Privacy. Law and Philosophy, 15, 4: 369-386.Prosser, William. (1960). Privacy. California Law Review, 48: 383-423.Rachels, J. (1975). Why Privacy is Important. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 323-33.Rössler, Beate (ed.)(2004). Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Rubel, Alan. (2011). The Particularized Judgment Account of Privacy. Res Publica, 17, 3: 275–90.Scanlon, T. (1975). Thomson on Privacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 315-322.Schoeman, F. (ed.)(1984). Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Schoeman, Ferdinand. (1984) Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 1-33). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Solove, D. (2006). A Taxonomy of Privacy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 154: 477–564.Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1975). The Right to Privacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 295–314. Also in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 272-289). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1990). The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Tribe, Lawrence. (1978). American Constitutional Law. Mineola, NY: Foundation Press.Warren, S. and Brandeis, L. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4: 193-220.Westin, Alan F. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum. zh_TW
