| dc.coverage.temporal | 計畫年度：88 起迄日期：19980801～20000131 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 周德宇 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 1999 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Apr-2007 18:25:47 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Sep-2008 09:03:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Apr-2007 18:25:47 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 9-Sep-2008 09:03:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Apr-2007 18:25:47 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | 882415H004016.pdf | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://tair.lib.ntu.edu.tw:8000/123456789/5009 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/5009 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 核定金額：286200元 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本計畫之研究目的在於觀察利益團體如何透過一訊號賽局之互動方式,對公共部門進行遊說;並分析對均衡可能產生影響的要件。舉例而言,勞資團體在基本工資制定的協商過程中,存在著資訊不對稱的情況,並且有協商和遊說並存的過程。本計畫採用訊號賽局理論的分析方法,最後可確認一個分離的均衡(Separating equilibrium),說明勞方可以根據資方所傳送的訊號去正確的猜測到資方所擁有的私人資訊。主要結論為:在求取社會福利極大的目標下,公共部門應該在社會福利函數中給予資訊弱勢團體較高的權數,或是在賽局環境中限制政府取得全部資訊,預期將可以減少利益團體投入遊說的成本而減少社會資源的浪費。 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This research project aims to develop a signaling game-theoretic model with the features of two interest groups lobbying under asymmetric information structure while the government playing as both a information transfer mechanism and a final policy maker. One of the real-word examples fitting the framework is the determination of minimum wages. Among the findings, two important policy-relevant conclusions can be reached: Firstly, the higher is the weight put on the less-informed interest group, the better are the chances to settle without incurring litigation or lobbying (deadweight) costs; Secondly, the public sector being less-informed about the settlement offer is a welfare improving status than the completely informed case. | - |
| dc.format | applicaiton/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 39761 bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 39761 bytes | - |
| dc.format.extent | 12402 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | - |
| dc.language | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.publisher (Publisher) | 臺北市：國立政治大學財政研究所 | en_US |
| dc.rights (Rights) | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 利益團體;資訊傳遞;訊號賽局;分離均衡 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Interest group;Information transfer;Signaling game;Separating equilibrium | - |
| dc.title (題名) | 利益團體 - 資訊傳遞機制之分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Interest Groups---An Analysis of the Information Transfer Mechanism | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
