| dc.creator (作者) | 王智賢;王世綱 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2007-04 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jan-2009 15:09:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jan-2009 15:09:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jan-2009 15:09:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22165 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在現今的社會中，工會所扮演的角色就如同是替勞工傳遞訊號的工具，不僅如此，其對於勞工的影響也十分地顯著。本文以 Kessing和Konrad (2006) 之模型作為基礎，以賽局中序列均衡 (sequential equilibrium) 的方法，討論在資訊不對稱的情形下，政府面對加入工會與否的勞工，所採行之租稅補貼政策，並嘗試放寬原本對於預算平衡的限制，找出對於政府當局來說真正有利的預算政策。 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In nowadays society, labor unions act as a tool to pass on information on behalf of workers. This paper is based on Kessing and Konrad’s model (2006). We used the game theory’s sequential equilibrium (SE) method to discuss what kind of taxing or subsiding policy would be selected when a government faces workers’ decision to join labor unions. Besides, we tried to loosen the restriction of balanced budget and found a better budget policy which is really beneficial for government. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 社會科學論叢,1(1),127-160 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 資訊不對稱;序列均衡;工會;最適租稅 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | asymmetric information; sequential equilibrium; labor union; optimal taxation | - |
| dc.title (題名) | 資訊不對稱下勞工與政府之工會租稅賽局 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Workers vs. Governmental Labor Union’s Tax Policies in Asymmetric Information Games | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
