學術產出-Theses

題名 相互性對公共財實驗中合作行為的影響
作者 黃裕舜
貢獻者 徐麗振
黃裕舜
關鍵詞 相互性
公共財實驗
日期 2002
上傳時間 18-Sep-2009 10:54:47 (UTC+8)
摘要 在公共財實驗中,受試者決策行為存在著「相互性」的考量是用來解釋受試者出現合作行為的原因之一。本篇研究以三人一組的實驗驗證受試者確有相互性之考量。受試者欲以較高的貢獻去「回報」同組成員的高貢獻,而受試者亦欲以較低的貢獻去「報復」同組成員的低貢獻。此外,當受試者同時面對的組員有著兩種截然不同的貢獻態度時,受試者的「相互性」卻並非是正負中和而完全抵銷,受試者行為會受兩股相反方向力量的影響而顯得變動較為劇烈,且受試者傾向有較深的報復情緒,這樣的情緒會凌駕互助的情緒而影響受試者的決策。
參考文獻 參考文獻
Andreoni, J. (1988), Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments, Journal of Public Economics 37, 291-304.
Andreoni, J. (1990), Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving, Economic Journal 100, 464-477.
Andreoni, J., P.M. Brown, and L. Vesterlund (2002), What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence, Games and Economic Behavior 40, 1-24.
Andreoni, J. and J.H. Miller (1993), Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence, Economic Journal 103, 570-585.
Bagnoli, M. and M. McKee (1991), Voluntary contribution games: Efficient private provision of public goods, Economic Inquiry 29, 351-366.
Bolton, G.E. (1991), A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence, American Economics Review 81, 1096-1136.
Bolton, G.E. and A. Ockenfels (2000), ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition, American Economics Review 90, 166-193.
Burlando, R. and J.D. Hey (1997), Do Anglo-Saxons free-ride more?, Journal of Public Economics 64, 41-60.
Carpenter, J.P. (2002), Information, fairness, and reciprocity in the best shot game, Economics Letters 75, 243-248.
Clark, K. and M. Sefton (2001), The sequential prisoner’s dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation, Economic Journal 111, 51-58.
Cooper, D.J. and C.K. Stockman (2002), Fairness and learning: An experiment examination, Games and Economic Behavior 41, 26-45.
Croson, R.T.A. (1996), Partners and strangers revisited, Economics Letters 53, 25-32.
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Rider (1993), Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 437-459.
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999), A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868.
Isaac, R.M., K.F. McCue, and C.R. Plott (1985), Public goods provision in an experimental environment, Journal of Public Economics 26, 51-74.
Isaac, R.M., D. Schmidtz, and J.M. Walker (1988), The assurance problem in a laboratory market, Public Choice 62, 217-236.
Isaac, R.M. and J.M. Walker (1988), Group size effect in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 179-199.
Isaac, R.M., J.M. Walker, and S.H. Thomas (1984), Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations, Public Choice 43, 113-149.
Isaac, R.M., J.M. Walker, and A. Williams (1994), Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics 54, 1-36.
Keser, C. and F. van Winden (2000), Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102, 23-29.
Kim, O. and M. Walker (1984), The free rider problem: Experimental evidence, Public Choice 43, 3-24.
Kreps, D.M., P. Milgrom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson (1982), Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma, Journal of Economics Theory 27, 245-252.
Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1979), Experiments on the provision of public goods Ⅰ: Resources, interest, group size, and the free rider problem, American Journal of Sociology 84, 1335-1360.
Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1980), Experiments on the provision of public goods Ⅱ: Provision points, stakes, experience and the free rider problem, American Journal of Sociology 85, 926-937.
Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1981), Economists free ride, does anyone else?, Journal of Public Economics 15, 295-310.
Ochs, J. and A.E. Roth (1989), An experimental study of sequential bargaining, American Economics Review 79, 355-384.
Palfrey, T.R. and J.E. Prisbrey (1997), Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: How much and why?, American Economics Review 87, 829-846.
Rabin, M. (1993), Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302.
Warr, P.G. (1982), Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity, Journal of Public Economics 19, 131-138.
Weimann, J. (1994), Individual behavior in a free riding experiment, Journal of Public Economics 54, 185-200.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
90255003
91
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255003
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 徐麗振zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃裕舜zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 黃裕舜zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2002en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Sep-2009 10:54:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Sep-2009 10:54:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Sep-2009 10:54:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0090255003en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34681-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 90255003zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在公共財實驗中,受試者決策行為存在著「相互性」的考量是用來解釋受試者出現合作行為的原因之一。本篇研究以三人一組的實驗驗證受試者確有相互性之考量。受試者欲以較高的貢獻去「回報」同組成員的高貢獻,而受試者亦欲以較低的貢獻去「報復」同組成員的低貢獻。此外,當受試者同時面對的組員有著兩種截然不同的貢獻態度時,受試者的「相互性」卻並非是正負中和而完全抵銷,受試者行為會受兩股相反方向力量的影響而顯得變動較為劇烈,且受試者傾向有較深的報復情緒,這樣的情緒會凌駕互助的情緒而影響受試者的決策。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 目次
1. 前言
2. 文獻回顧
2.1 早期學者關於公共財的實驗結果
2.2 實驗結果趨向理論解的解釋
2.3 實驗結果偏離理論解的解釋
2.4 關於相互性的文獻回顧
3. 研究動機與目的
4. 實驗設計與執行過程
5. 實驗結果
5.1 學習效果
5.2 終期效果
5.3 restart效果
6. 關於受試者相互性行為的觀察
6.1 簡述受試者行為的基本觀察
6.2 分類受試者行為符合相互性之預期
6.3 受試者投資決策之方向符合相互性預期
7. 結論與未來可研究方向
附錄:實驗步驟說明
參考文獻
zh_TW
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dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255003en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 相互性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公共財實驗zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 相互性對公共財實驗中合作行為的影響zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andreoni, J. (1988), Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments, Journal of Public Economics 37, 291-304.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andreoni, J. (1990), Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving, Economic Journal 100, 464-477.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andreoni, J., P.M. Brown, and L. Vesterlund (2002), What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence, Games and Economic Behavior 40, 1-24.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andreoni, J. and J.H. Miller (1993), Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence, Economic Journal 103, 570-585.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bagnoli, M. and M. McKee (1991), Voluntary contribution games: Efficient private provision of public goods, Economic Inquiry 29, 351-366.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bolton, G.E. (1991), A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence, American Economics Review 81, 1096-1136.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bolton, G.E. and A. Ockenfels (2000), ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition, American Economics Review 90, 166-193.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Burlando, R. and J.D. Hey (1997), Do Anglo-Saxons free-ride more?, Journal of Public Economics 64, 41-60.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Carpenter, J.P. (2002), Information, fairness, and reciprocity in the best shot game, Economics Letters 75, 243-248.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Clark, K. and M. Sefton (2001), The sequential prisoner’s dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation, Economic Journal 111, 51-58.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cooper, D.J. and C.K. Stockman (2002), Fairness and learning: An experiment examination, Games and Economic Behavior 41, 26-45.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Croson, R.T.A. (1996), Partners and strangers revisited, Economics Letters 53, 25-32.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Rider (1993), Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 437-459.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999), A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Isaac, R.M., K.F. McCue, and C.R. Plott (1985), Public goods provision in an experimental environment, Journal of Public Economics 26, 51-74.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Isaac, R.M., D. Schmidtz, and J.M. Walker (1988), The assurance problem in a laboratory market, Public Choice 62, 217-236.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Isaac, R.M. and J.M. Walker (1988), Group size effect in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 179-199.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Isaac, R.M., J.M. Walker, and S.H. Thomas (1984), Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations, Public Choice 43, 113-149.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Isaac, R.M., J.M. Walker, and A. Williams (1994), Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics 54, 1-36.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Keser, C. and F. van Winden (2000), Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102, 23-29.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kim, O. and M. Walker (1984), The free rider problem: Experimental evidence, Public Choice 43, 3-24.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kreps, D.M., P. Milgrom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson (1982), Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma, Journal of Economics Theory 27, 245-252.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1979), Experiments on the provision of public goods Ⅰ: Resources, interest, group size, and the free rider problem, American Journal of Sociology 84, 1335-1360.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1980), Experiments on the provision of public goods Ⅱ: Provision points, stakes, experience and the free rider problem, American Journal of Sociology 85, 926-937.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1981), Economists free ride, does anyone else?, Journal of Public Economics 15, 295-310.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ochs, J. and A.E. Roth (1989), An experimental study of sequential bargaining, American Economics Review 79, 355-384.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Palfrey, T.R. and J.E. Prisbrey (1997), Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: How much and why?, American Economics Review 87, 829-846.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Rabin, M. (1993), Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Warr, P.G. (1982), Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity, Journal of Public Economics 19, 131-138.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Weimann, J. (1994), Individual behavior in a free riding experiment, Journal of Public Economics 54, 185-200.zh_TW