dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Wang, Jue-Shyan | en_US |
dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 洪曉吟 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Hung, Hsiao-Yin | en_US |
dc.creator (作者) | 洪曉吟 | zh_TW |
dc.creator (作者) | Hung, Hsiao-Yin | en_US |
dc.date (日期) | 2005 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 10:58:03 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 10:58:03 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 10:58:03 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0093255020 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34703 | - |
dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 93255020 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 94 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在非營利組織之中,由於經理人與組織之利益不一致,因此在甄選新人的過程中可能產生代理人問題,負責甄選的主管可能因任用的標準及心目中的動機而影響聘審的結果。本研究即探討若非營利組織的聘審主管在心目中對應徵新人存有偏見或者考慮應徵新人未來對自身升遷的影響,並考慮應徵新人可採取遊說聘審主管活動下,討論聘審賽局均衡結果的情況。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In the nonprofit organization, because benefit between the manager and the organization is different, there would be the agent problem in the process of selecting new employees. The manager being responsible for employment may consider his criterion and motive to change the selecting conclusion. In our study, we discuss if the manager has prejudice against applicant or he consider if the new employee will affect his promotion in the future. Moreover, we assume the applicant can lobby the manager. How will it affect the selection conclusion? We will construct a lobbying game theory model to do research and we hope could recommend the improving directions for the employ system in the nonprofit organization. | en_US |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言..............................1第二章 文獻回顧..........................3第三章 模型介紹..........................6第一節 聘審主管對應徵新人存在偏見........6第二節 聘審主管考慮自身的升遷............8第三節 聘審主管同時考慮偏見與升遷........9第四章 均衡分析.........................11第一節 聘審主管對應徵新人存在偏見.......11第二節 聘審主管考慮自身的升遷...........21第三節 聘審主管同時考慮偏見與升遷.......28第五章 均衡討論.........................38第六章 結論與延伸.......................40附錄一..................................42附錄二..................................45附錄三..................................47參考文獻................................50 | zh_TW |
dc.format.extent | 43865 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 77420 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 76503 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 47595 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 103794 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 103908 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 133543 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 432151 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 76238 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 87668 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 97234 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 58481 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093255020 | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 非營利組織 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 聘審活動 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 遊說賽局 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Nonprofit Organization | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Employment | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Lobby Game | en_US |
dc.title (題名) | 聘審活動之遊說賽局 | zh_TW |
dc.title (題名) | Lobby Game of Employment | en_US |
dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 一、中文文獻 | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 司徒達賢 (1999),「非營利組織的經營管理」,天下遠見出版。 | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 陳金貴 (1994),「美國非營利組織的人力資源管理」,瑞興圖書。 | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 陳萱(2005),「拔擢或打壓」,國立政治大學財政學系研究所碩士論文。 | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 二、英文文獻 | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972), “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review, 62, 777-795. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Baumol, W. J. (1959), Business Behavior, Value and Growth, New York: Macmillan. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Blau, J. R. and G. Rabrenovic (1991), “Interorganizational Relations of Nonprofit Organizations:An Exploratory Study,” Sociological Forum, 6:2, 327-347. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Carmichael, H. L. (1988), “Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure,” Journal of Political Economy, 96, 453-472. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Chan, W. (1996), “External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion,” Journal of Labor Economics, 14:4, 555-570. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Chen, K.-P. (2003), “Sabotage in Promotion Tournament,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 19:1, 119-140. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Cyert, R. M. and J. G. March (1963), Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Drucker, P. F. (1990), Managing the Nonprofit Organization: Practices and Principles, New York : Harper Collins . | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Dart, R. (2004), “Being “Business-Like” in a Nonprofit Organization: A Grounded and Inductive Typology,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33:2, 290-310. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Dessein, W. (2002), “Authority and Communication in Organizations,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 811– 838. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Fama, E. F. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 88:2, 288-307. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Friebel, G. and M. Raith (2004), “Abuse of Authority in Hierarchical Communication ,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35:2, 224-244. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Greenwald, B. C., (1986), “Adverse Selection in the Labor Market,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 325-347. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3:3, 305-360. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Kreps, D. M. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863-894. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1988), “The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,” Econometrica, 56, 1153-1175. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | McCambridge, R. (2004), “Underestimating the Power of Nonprofit Governance,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33:2, 346-354. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Saxton, G.. D. and M. A. Benson, (2005), “Social Capital and the Growth of the Nonprofit Sector,” Social Science Quarterly, 86:1, 16-35. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Sengupta, S. (2004), “Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 1327-1347. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Simon, H. A. (1959), “Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science,” American Economic Review, 49, 253-283. | zh_TW |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Wolf, T. (1990), Managing a Nonprofit Organization, New York : Simon & Schuster. | zh_TW |