| dc.contributor | 經濟學系 | en |
| dc.creator (作者) | 廖郁萍 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Yu-Ping Liao | en |
| dc.creator (作者) | Michelle J. White | en |
| dc.creator (作者) | Liao, Y-P. | en |
| dc.creator (作者) | White, M.J. | en |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 25-Mar-2010 09:06:47 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 25-Mar-2010 09:06:47 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 25-Mar-2010 09:06:47 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.issn (ISSN) | 1465-7252 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/38240 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often. | en |
| dc.language | en_US | en |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | American Law and Economics Review 4(2),258-294 | en |
| dc.title (題名) | No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis | en |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
