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題名 由反傾銷「歸零法則」爭議看世貿組織之司法與立法關係
其他題名 Zeroing in the WTO---A Case Study on Tensions between the Judicial and Legislative Processes of the WTO
作者 楊光華
貢獻者 國立政治大學國際貿易學系
行政院金融監督管理委員會保險局
關鍵詞 法律;反傾銷;歸零法則;世貿組織;司法;立法
日期 2008
上傳時間 22-Jun-2012 09:48:52 (UTC+8)
摘要 「歸零法則」是許多國家於反傾銷程序中常採取之措施,亦即將負傾銷差額歸零,而不使之可以抵銷正傾銷差額。究竟此種作法是否違反WTO 反傾銷協定之規範?儘管嚴格而言,找不到禁止的明文;不過由於烏拉圭回合新增的反傾銷協定第2.4.2 條規定於調查階段決定反傾銷差額是否存在時,原則上僅得使用加權平均對加權平均或逐筆比較兩種方式以比較正常價格與出口價格,而前者又必須考慮「所有可資比較」之出口價格,鑑於「歸零法則」並不考慮出口價格高於正常價格之部分,故若於加權平均比較時採取歸零作法,恐有違反上述規定之嫌。持此種主張之會員國訴諸爭端解決獲得勝利後,非但未使「歸零法則」之爭議塵埃落定,反而引發 WTO 立法權與司法權間之劍拔弩張。本計畫自爭端解決第 141 號案──歐盟課徵印度棉質床單反傾銷稅案,第 264 號案──美、加軟木案五談起,說明小組及上訴機構依據第2.4.2 條之文義解釋確立以加權平均進行比較時不得採用「歸零法則」的立論,但接下來當歐盟、加拿大、日本、墨西哥在第294 號案、第264 號案之履行爭議案、第322 號案、以及第344 號案中陸續挑戰美國在反傾銷的「非」調查階段或是在「逐筆比較」時採取「歸零」作法之不當後,上訴機構竟出人意表地完全推翻各小組根據上述立論所為之美方並未違反規定的裁決,一再地擴大「歸零法則」禁用之範圍,不僅令小組覺得困擾,也使美國終於決定訴諸立法程序,提案在規則談判中增訂反傾銷協定第2.4.3 條以使「歸零法則」取得明文的合法地位。規則談判主席採納大部分美國提案的結果雖使得「反傾銷之友」大為反彈,使得此事之後續發展尚待觀察,惟無論如何,此例所引發的立法與司法功能之互動,前所未見,本計畫因此對之進行研究,以探討WTO 之立法功能是否能有效地制衡WTO 之司法功能,進而推論WTO 之機構問題是否得因此獲得解決。
“negative” dumping margins as zero so that they cannot be used to offset positive dumping margins. Whether such practice is permitted under the WTO Antidumping Agreement is subject to question because strictly speaking there cannot find any explicit ban in the text. Article 2.4.2, which was newly added to the Antidumping Agreement in the Uruguay Round, however requires the existence of dumping margin during investigation phase to be established only by a weighted average-to-weighted average comparison or a transaction-to-transaction comparison. Given that counting as zero the result of comparison showing a “negative” margin in effect changes the export price of those compared transactions, zeroing seems to fail the requirement in an average-to-average comparison that “all comparable export transactions” be counted. Members with such view confirmed such interpretation through their victory in relevant cases they brought for dispute settlement. Unfortunately, these cases did not cease the controversy of zeroing practice, but increased the tensions between WTO legislative and judicial functions. This study first discusses EC-Bed Linen (DS141) and the US-Softwood Lumber, V (DS264) and explains how the two panels and the Appellate Body reached the ruling that in an average-to-average comparison during investigation phase does not permit zeroing based on the treaty interpretation of Article 2.4.2, first sentence. It then goes through the cases brought by the EU., Canada, Japan and Mexico challenging U.S.’ zeroing practices during non-investigation phases or even in a transaction-to-transaction comparison. Despite the relevant panels maintained the same view as previously upheld in DS141 and DS264 and therefore ruled in favor of the U.S., the Appellate Body surprisingly reversed all these panels’ rulings and broadened the ban on zeroing. Such overreach not only troubled the panels, but also made the US propose to the Negotiation Group on Rules to correct the Appellate Body’s rulings. It suggested adding a new provision as Article 2.4.3 so to explicitly authorize zeroing practice in the text. The Chair of Negotiation Group in his drafted Rules text largely reflected US’ demands on zeroing and resulted in severe criticism from the group so called “friends of anti-dumping negotiations.” Therefore, it is too early to predict the future development of this matter. Nevertheless, this matter for sure has no precedent at all and justifies this study. The study based on this case would explore whether the legislative process in the WTO is strong enough to balance the judicial process, and further assess whether the institutional problems that the WTO faces can be resolved through such process.
關聯 基礎研究
學術補助
研究期間:9708~ 9807
研究經費:508仟元
資料類型 report
dc.contributor 國立政治大學國際貿易學系en_US
dc.contributor 行政院金融監督管理委員會保險局en_US
dc.creator (作者) 楊光華zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned 22-Jun-2012 09:48:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-Jun-2012 09:48:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Jun-2012 09:48:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53109-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 「歸零法則」是許多國家於反傾銷程序中常採取之措施,亦即將負傾銷差額歸零,而不使之可以抵銷正傾銷差額。究竟此種作法是否違反WTO 反傾銷協定之規範?儘管嚴格而言,找不到禁止的明文;不過由於烏拉圭回合新增的反傾銷協定第2.4.2 條規定於調查階段決定反傾銷差額是否存在時,原則上僅得使用加權平均對加權平均或逐筆比較兩種方式以比較正常價格與出口價格,而前者又必須考慮「所有可資比較」之出口價格,鑑於「歸零法則」並不考慮出口價格高於正常價格之部分,故若於加權平均比較時採取歸零作法,恐有違反上述規定之嫌。持此種主張之會員國訴諸爭端解決獲得勝利後,非但未使「歸零法則」之爭議塵埃落定,反而引發 WTO 立法權與司法權間之劍拔弩張。本計畫自爭端解決第 141 號案──歐盟課徵印度棉質床單反傾銷稅案,第 264 號案──美、加軟木案五談起,說明小組及上訴機構依據第2.4.2 條之文義解釋確立以加權平均進行比較時不得採用「歸零法則」的立論,但接下來當歐盟、加拿大、日本、墨西哥在第294 號案、第264 號案之履行爭議案、第322 號案、以及第344 號案中陸續挑戰美國在反傾銷的「非」調查階段或是在「逐筆比較」時採取「歸零」作法之不當後,上訴機構竟出人意表地完全推翻各小組根據上述立論所為之美方並未違反規定的裁決,一再地擴大「歸零法則」禁用之範圍,不僅令小組覺得困擾,也使美國終於決定訴諸立法程序,提案在規則談判中增訂反傾銷協定第2.4.3 條以使「歸零法則」取得明文的合法地位。規則談判主席採納大部分美國提案的結果雖使得「反傾銷之友」大為反彈,使得此事之後續發展尚待觀察,惟無論如何,此例所引發的立法與司法功能之互動,前所未見,本計畫因此對之進行研究,以探討WTO 之立法功能是否能有效地制衡WTO 之司法功能,進而推論WTO 之機構問題是否得因此獲得解決。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) “negative” dumping margins as zero so that they cannot be used to offset positive dumping margins. Whether such practice is permitted under the WTO Antidumping Agreement is subject to question because strictly speaking there cannot find any explicit ban in the text. Article 2.4.2, which was newly added to the Antidumping Agreement in the Uruguay Round, however requires the existence of dumping margin during investigation phase to be established only by a weighted average-to-weighted average comparison or a transaction-to-transaction comparison. Given that counting as zero the result of comparison showing a “negative” margin in effect changes the export price of those compared transactions, zeroing seems to fail the requirement in an average-to-average comparison that “all comparable export transactions” be counted. Members with such view confirmed such interpretation through their victory in relevant cases they brought for dispute settlement. Unfortunately, these cases did not cease the controversy of zeroing practice, but increased the tensions between WTO legislative and judicial functions. This study first discusses EC-Bed Linen (DS141) and the US-Softwood Lumber, V (DS264) and explains how the two panels and the Appellate Body reached the ruling that in an average-to-average comparison during investigation phase does not permit zeroing based on the treaty interpretation of Article 2.4.2, first sentence. It then goes through the cases brought by the EU., Canada, Japan and Mexico challenging U.S.’ zeroing practices during non-investigation phases or even in a transaction-to-transaction comparison. Despite the relevant panels maintained the same view as previously upheld in DS141 and DS264 and therefore ruled in favor of the U.S., the Appellate Body surprisingly reversed all these panels’ rulings and broadened the ban on zeroing. Such overreach not only troubled the panels, but also made the US propose to the Negotiation Group on Rules to correct the Appellate Body’s rulings. It suggested adding a new provision as Article 2.4.3 so to explicitly authorize zeroing practice in the text. The Chair of Negotiation Group in his drafted Rules text largely reflected US’ demands on zeroing and resulted in severe criticism from the group so called “friends of anti-dumping negotiations.” Therefore, it is too early to predict the future development of this matter. Nevertheless, this matter for sure has no precedent at all and justifies this study. The study based on this case would explore whether the legislative process in the WTO is strong enough to balance the judicial process, and further assess whether the institutional problems that the WTO faces can be resolved through such process.en_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 基礎研究en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 學術補助en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 研究期間:9708~ 9807en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 研究經費:508仟元en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 法律;反傾銷;歸零法則;世貿組織;司法;立法en_US
dc.title (題名) 由反傾銷「歸零法則」爭議看世貿組織之司法與立法關係zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Zeroing in the WTO---A Case Study on Tensions between the Judicial and Legislative Processes of the WTOen_US
dc.type (資料類型) reporten