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題名 Xunzi as a Semantic Inferentialist: Zhengmin, Bian-Shuo and Dao-Li
作者 Lin, chung-I
林從一
貢獻者 政大哲學系
關鍵詞 Xunzi; Name-rectification ; Semantic inferentialism
日期 2011
上傳時間 21-Aug-2012 13:36:20 (UTC+8)
摘要 It is an assumed view in Chinese philosophy that the grammatical differences between English or Indo-European languages and classical Chinese explain some of the differences between the Western and Chinese philosophical discourses. Although some philosophers have expressed doubts about the general link between classical Chinese philosophy and syntactic form of classical Chinese, I discuss a specific hypothesis, i.e., the mass-noun hypothesis, in this essay. The mass-noun hypothesis assumes that a linguistic distinction such as between the singular terms and the predicates is sufficient to justify or necessarily leads to a specific ontological distinction such as the distinction between the particular and the universal. I argue that one cannot read off semantic properties simply from syntactic ones and hence the syntactic differences do not automatically translate into the semantic differences between languages, that the syntactic features of Chinese nouns do not have explanatory significance in explaining why the particular-universal problem does not arise in the classical period of Chinese philosophy, and that the part-whole ontology allegedly informed by the mass-noun-like semantics does not provide a natural or intuitive picture of the language-world relation.
關聯 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 10(3), 311-340
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-011-9228-z
dc.contributor 政大哲學系en
dc.creator (作者) Lin, chung-Ien
dc.creator (作者) 林從一zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2011-
dc.date.accessioned 21-Aug-2012 13:36:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 21-Aug-2012 13:36:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 21-Aug-2012 13:36:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53360-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) It is an assumed view in Chinese philosophy that the grammatical differences between English or Indo-European languages and classical Chinese explain some of the differences between the Western and Chinese philosophical discourses. Although some philosophers have expressed doubts about the general link between classical Chinese philosophy and syntactic form of classical Chinese, I discuss a specific hypothesis, i.e., the mass-noun hypothesis, in this essay. The mass-noun hypothesis assumes that a linguistic distinction such as between the singular terms and the predicates is sufficient to justify or necessarily leads to a specific ontological distinction such as the distinction between the particular and the universal. I argue that one cannot read off semantic properties simply from syntactic ones and hence the syntactic differences do not automatically translate into the semantic differences between languages, that the syntactic features of Chinese nouns do not have explanatory significance in explaining why the particular-universal problem does not arise in the classical period of Chinese philosophy, and that the part-whole ontology allegedly informed by the mass-noun-like semantics does not provide a natural or intuitive picture of the language-world relation.en
dc.format.extent 421392 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language zh_TWen
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 10(3), 311-340en
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Xunzi; Name-rectification ; Semantic inferentialismen
dc.title (題名) Xunzi as a Semantic Inferentialist: Zhengmin, Bian-Shuo and Dao-Lien
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1007/s11712-011-9228-zen_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-011-9228-zen_US