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題名 企業成長機會與裁量性紅利關連性之研究
On the association between growth opportunities and discretionary bonus作者 郭芫宇 貢獻者 梁嘉紋
郭芫宇關鍵詞 裁量性紅利
企業成長機會
公司績效日期 2011 上傳時間 30-Oct-2012 11:43:24 (UTC+8) 摘要 在2004年時，美國證券交易委員會規定企業應於Form 8-K或股東會說明書揭露高階經理人所得之裁紅利金額，並明確劃分公式型紅利與裁量性紅利之定義，前者為依契約設定之績效衡量指標所發放之金額，後者為薪酬委員會利用主觀性指標裁決發放之金額。企業成長機會屬於公司特性之一，不同的公司面臨不同成長機會，成長機會較大的公司其價值來自於未來的投資計畫，依賴高階經理人的決策程度高，因此會給予高較大的報酬。而相對地，成長機會較小的公司由於其現有資產較大，高階經理人重在監督現有資產而少有投資決策的功能，因此其獎酬較小。有別於過去研究對企業成長機會與高階經理人之薪酬，本研究將針對裁量性紅利是否會受到企業成長機會之影響。本研究針對2006至2010年標準普爾前五百(S&P 500)之公司，進行高階經理人裁量性紅利與企業成長機會之探討。以企業成長機會大小及企業績效，分別探討與高階經理人所得之裁量性紅利之關聯。實證結果發現，企業成長機會大時，越會發放高階經理人之裁量性紅利；本研究亦發現，公司成長機會愈大且獎酬委員會依照主觀性指標衡量高階經理人之表現加以發放裁量性紅利，具有激勵高階經理人之效果，進而正面影響公司績效。 參考文獻 李芳倖，1998，會計方法選擇與負債比率及高階主管報酬之關連性研究，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。林穎芬與周俊德，2002，管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究，會計評論，第34期1月：77-99。洪玉舜與王泰昌，2005，績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性，證券市場發展季刊，第17卷第2期：35-100。晁群祥，1993，台灣上市公司成長機會對融資及股利政策影響之研究，中山大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。陳慧娟，1995，我國上市公司資本結構、成長與Tobin’s Q關聯之研究，私立東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文。傅鍾仁、歐進士與張寶光，2002，我國企業經理人薪酬與其經營績效之實證，管理學報，第19卷第6期：1073-1096。蔡柳卿，2006，相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響，管理評論，第25卷第1期：69-94。Baber, S. K., and K. R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive compensation: The role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25:169-193.Baber, S. K., and K. R. Kumar. 1999. The explanatory power of earnings levels vs. earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. The Accounting Review 74:459-472.Baber, W. R., S. N. Janakiraman, and S. H. Kang. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21:297-318.Baker, G. P. 1993. Growth, corporate policies and the investment opportunity set. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:161-165.Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy. 1994. Subjective performance measurement in optional incentive contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:1125-1156.Banker, R.D., G. Potter, and D. Srinivasan. 2000. An empirical investigation of an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting Review 75:65-92.Barclay, M. J. and C. W. Smith. 1995. The maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of Financial 50:609-631.Bushman, R, R. Indjejikian, and A. Smith. 1996. CEO compensation: The role of an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting Review 75:65-92.Chen, Chih-Ying. 2002. Additional evidence on the association between director stock ownership and incentive compensation. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 19:21-44.Christie, A. 1989. Equity risk, the opportunity set, production cost and debt. Working paper, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. Christie, A., M. Joye, and R. Watts. 1994. Organization of the firm: theory and evidence. University of Rochester Unpublished manuscript.Chung, K. H. and C. Charoenwong. 1991. Investment options, assets in place, and the risk of stocks. Financial Management 20:21-33.Clinch, G., and J. Magliolo. 1993. CEO compensation and components of earnings in bank holding companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:241-272.Collins, D. W. and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemproal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings respond coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11:143-181.Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief officer compensation, and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51:371-406.Dechow, P., M.R. Huson , and R.G. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem. Journal of Accounting and Economics 14: 51-89.Dechow, P., M.R. Huson , and R.G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges on executives’ cash compensation. The Accounting Reviews 69:138-156.Dess, G. G. and Robinson R. B. 1984. Measuring organizational performance in the absence of objective measures: The case of the privately-held firm and conglomerate business unit. Strategic Management Journal 5:265-273.Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management Review 14:57-74.Farnsworth, H. and Talor, J. 2006. Evidence of the compensation of portfolio managers. Journal of Financial Research. XXIX:305-324. Finkelstein, S., and D.C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9:543-558.Fitzgeald, L., R. Johnson, S. Brignall, R. Silvestro, and C. Voss. 1991. Performance Measurement in Service Businesses. Cambridge, MA: The Charted Institute of Management Accountants.Freedman, Sara R., Rober T. Keller, and John R. Montanari. 1982. The compensation program: Balancing organizational and employee needs. Compensation Review 14:47-53.Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:125-160.Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1995. Compensation policy and investment opportunity set. Financial Management 24:19-31.Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1998. The relation between nonrecurring accounting transactions and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review 73:235-253.Gay, G. D. and J. Nam. 1998. The underinvestment problem and corporate derivatives use. Financial Management 27:53-69.Gibbs, M., Merchant, K.A. and Van der Stede, W., and Vargas, M. E. 2004. Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review 79:409-436.Gomez-Megia, L. R., H.Tosi, and T. Hinkin. 1987. Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal 30:51-70. Hayes, R. M., and S. Schaefer. 2000. Implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance. Rand Journal of Economics 31:273-293.Hemmer, T. 1996. On the design and choice of “modern” management accounting measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19:209-245.Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10:74-91.Ittner, C., and D. Larcker. 1998. Are nonfinancial measures leading indicators of financial performance? An analysis of customer satisfaction. Journal of Accounting Research 36:1-35.Janakiraman, S., R. Lambert and D. Larcker. 1992. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30:53-69.Jensen, M.C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.Kallapur S. and Trombley M. A. 1999. The association between investment opportunity set proxies and realized growth. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 26:505-519.Kambe S. 2006. Subjective evaluation in agency contracts. Japanese Economic Review 57: 121–140.Kaplan, R., and D. Norton. 1992. The balance scorecard-measures that drive performance. Harvard Business Review 70:71-79.Kester, W. C. 1986. An option approach to corporate finance. Ch.5 in: E. I. Altman, ed., Handbook of corporate finance, Wiley, New York.Land, L. H. P. and R. M. Stulz. 1994. Tobin’s Q, corporate diversification and firm performance. Journal Of Political Economy 102:1248-1280.Lambert, R., and D. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25:85-125.Lambert, R, D. Larcker and K. Weigelt. 1993. The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly 38:438-461.Lewellen, W., C. Lorderer, and K. Martin. 1987. Executive compensation contracts and executive incentive problem: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 9:287-310.Linderberg, E. B., and S. A. Ross. 1981. Tobin’s q ration and industrial organization . Journal of Business:1-32.Mason, S. P., and R. C. Merton. 1985. The role of contingent claims analysis in corporate finance. Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin:7-54.Merle Ederhof. 2010. Discretion in Bonus Plans. The Accounting Review 85:1921-1949.Mathis, R. L. and I. H. Jackson. 2003. Personnel/Human Resource Management, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.Murphy, D. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5:147-175.Myers, S. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5:147-175.Nisar, T. M. 2007. Evaluation of subjectivity in incentive pay. Journal of Financial Service Research 31:53-73.Pilotte, E. 1992. Growth opportunity and the stock response to financing. Journal of Business 65:371-394.Rajan, M., and S. Reichelstein. 2006. Subjective performance indicators and disctretionary bonus pools. Journal of Accounting Research 44:585-618.Ryan, H. E. and R. Wiggins. 2002. The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy. Financial Management Spring:5-29.Sapp, S. 2008. The impact of corporate governance on executive compensation.European Financial Management 14:710-746.Skinner, D. J. 1993. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:407-443. Smith, C. and R. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32:263-292.Titman, S. and R. Wessels. 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance 43:1-19. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
99353047
100資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353047 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 郭芫宇 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 郭芫宇 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2011 en_US dc.date.accessioned 30-Oct-2012 11:43:24 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 30-Oct-2012 11:43:24 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Oct-2012 11:43:24 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0099353047 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54759 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 99353047 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在2004年時，美國證券交易委員會規定企業應於Form 8-K或股東會說明書揭露高階經理人所得之裁紅利金額，並明確劃分公式型紅利與裁量性紅利之定義，前者為依契約設定之績效衡量指標所發放之金額，後者為薪酬委員會利用主觀性指標裁決發放之金額。企業成長機會屬於公司特性之一，不同的公司面臨不同成長機會，成長機會較大的公司其價值來自於未來的投資計畫，依賴高階經理人的決策程度高，因此會給予高較大的報酬。而相對地，成長機會較小的公司由於其現有資產較大，高階經理人重在監督現有資產而少有投資決策的功能，因此其獎酬較小。有別於過去研究對企業成長機會與高階經理人之薪酬，本研究將針對裁量性紅利是否會受到企業成長機會之影響。本研究針對2006至2010年標準普爾前五百(S&P 500)之公司，進行高階經理人裁量性紅利與企業成長機會之探討。以企業成長機會大小及企業績效，分別探討與高階經理人所得之裁量性紅利之關聯。實證結果發現，企業成長機會大時，越會發放高階經理人之裁量性紅利；本研究亦發現，公司成長機會愈大且獎酬委員會依照主觀性指標衡量高階經理人之表現加以發放裁量性紅利，具有激勵高階經理人之效果，進而正面影響公司績效。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 6第一節 研究動機與目的 6第二節 研究問題 8第三節 研究架構 8第貳章 文獻探討 10第一節 代理問題 10第二節 高階經理人薪酬之決定因素 12第三節 企業成長機會 15第四節 公司績效 24第參章 研究設計 26第一節 研究假說 26第二節 變數衡量與模型建立 29第三節 實證模型 32第四節 研究期間與樣本選取 34第肆章 實證結果與分析 38第一節 敘述性統計分析 38第二節 多元迴歸分析結果 46第三節 額外測試 52第伍章 研究結論、限制與建議 59第一節 研究結論 59第二節 研究限制 61第三節 研究建議 61第四節 研究貢獻 62參考文獻 63 zh_TW dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353047 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 裁量性紅利 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 企業成長機會 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司績效 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 企業成長機會與裁量性紅利關連性之研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) On the association between growth opportunities and discretionary bonus en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 李芳倖，1998，會計方法選擇與負債比率及高階主管報酬之關連性研究，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。林穎芬與周俊德，2002，管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究，會計評論，第34期1月：77-99。洪玉舜與王泰昌，2005，績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性，證券市場發展季刊，第17卷第2期：35-100。晁群祥，1993，台灣上市公司成長機會對融資及股利政策影響之研究，中山大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。陳慧娟，1995，我國上市公司資本結構、成長與Tobin’s Q關聯之研究，私立東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文。傅鍾仁、歐進士與張寶光，2002，我國企業經理人薪酬與其經營績效之實證，管理學報，第19卷第6期：1073-1096。蔡柳卿，2006，相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響，管理評論，第25卷第1期：69-94。Baber, S. K., and K. R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive compensation: The role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25:169-193.Baber, S. K., and K. R. Kumar. 1999. The explanatory power of earnings levels vs. earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. The Accounting Review 74:459-472.Baber, W. R., S. N. Janakiraman, and S. H. Kang. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21:297-318.Baker, G. P. 1993. Growth, corporate policies and the investment opportunity set. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:161-165.Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy. 1994. Subjective performance measurement in optional incentive contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:1125-1156.Banker, R.D., G. Potter, and D. Srinivasan. 2000. An empirical investigation of an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting Review 75:65-92.Barclay, M. J. and C. W. Smith. 1995. The maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of Financial 50:609-631.Bushman, R, R. Indjejikian, and A. Smith. 1996. CEO compensation: The role of an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The Accounting Review 75:65-92.Chen, Chih-Ying. 2002. Additional evidence on the association between director stock ownership and incentive compensation. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 19:21-44.Christie, A. 1989. Equity risk, the opportunity set, production cost and debt. Working paper, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. Christie, A., M. Joye, and R. Watts. 1994. Organization of the firm: theory and evidence. University of Rochester Unpublished manuscript.Chung, K. H. and C. Charoenwong. 1991. Investment options, assets in place, and the risk of stocks. Financial Management 20:21-33.Clinch, G., and J. Magliolo. 1993. CEO compensation and components of earnings in bank holding companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:241-272.Collins, D. W. and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemproal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings respond coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11:143-181.Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief officer compensation, and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51:371-406.Dechow, P., M.R. Huson , and R.G. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem. Journal of Accounting and Economics 14: 51-89.Dechow, P., M.R. Huson , and R.G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges on executives’ cash compensation. The Accounting Reviews 69:138-156.Dess, G. G. and Robinson R. B. 1984. Measuring organizational performance in the absence of objective measures: The case of the privately-held firm and conglomerate business unit. Strategic Management Journal 5:265-273.Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management Review 14:57-74.Farnsworth, H. and Talor, J. 2006. Evidence of the compensation of portfolio managers. Journal of Financial Research. XXIX:305-324. Finkelstein, S., and D.C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9:543-558.Fitzgeald, L., R. Johnson, S. Brignall, R. Silvestro, and C. Voss. 1991. Performance Measurement in Service Businesses. Cambridge, MA: The Charted Institute of Management Accountants.Freedman, Sara R., Rober T. Keller, and John R. Montanari. 1982. The compensation program: Balancing organizational and employee needs. Compensation Review 14:47-53.Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:125-160.Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1995. Compensation policy and investment opportunity set. Financial Management 24:19-31.Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1998. The relation between nonrecurring accounting transactions and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review 73:235-253.Gay, G. D. and J. Nam. 1998. The underinvestment problem and corporate derivatives use. Financial Management 27:53-69.Gibbs, M., Merchant, K.A. and Van der Stede, W., and Vargas, M. E. 2004. Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review 79:409-436.Gomez-Megia, L. R., H.Tosi, and T. Hinkin. 1987. Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal 30:51-70. Hayes, R. M., and S. Schaefer. 2000. Implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance. Rand Journal of Economics 31:273-293.Hemmer, T. 1996. On the design and choice of “modern” management accounting measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19:209-245.Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10:74-91.Ittner, C., and D. Larcker. 1998. Are nonfinancial measures leading indicators of financial performance? An analysis of customer satisfaction. Journal of Accounting Research 36:1-35.Janakiraman, S., R. Lambert and D. Larcker. 1992. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30:53-69.Jensen, M.C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.Kallapur S. and Trombley M. A. 1999. The association between investment opportunity set proxies and realized growth. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 26:505-519.Kambe S. 2006. Subjective evaluation in agency contracts. Japanese Economic Review 57: 121–140.Kaplan, R., and D. Norton. 1992. The balance scorecard-measures that drive performance. Harvard Business Review 70:71-79.Kester, W. C. 1986. An option approach to corporate finance. Ch.5 in: E. I. Altman, ed., Handbook of corporate finance, Wiley, New York.Land, L. H. P. and R. M. Stulz. 1994. Tobin’s Q, corporate diversification and firm performance. Journal Of Political Economy 102:1248-1280.Lambert, R., and D. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25:85-125.Lambert, R, D. Larcker and K. Weigelt. 1993. The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly 38:438-461.Lewellen, W., C. Lorderer, and K. Martin. 1987. Executive compensation contracts and executive incentive problem: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 9:287-310.Linderberg, E. B., and S. A. Ross. 1981. Tobin’s q ration and industrial organization . Journal of Business:1-32.Mason, S. P., and R. C. Merton. 1985. The role of contingent claims analysis in corporate finance. Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin:7-54.Merle Ederhof. 2010. Discretion in Bonus Plans. The Accounting Review 85:1921-1949.Mathis, R. L. and I. H. Jackson. 2003. Personnel/Human Resource Management, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.Murphy, D. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5:147-175.Myers, S. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5:147-175.Nisar, T. M. 2007. Evaluation of subjectivity in incentive pay. Journal of Financial Service Research 31:53-73.Pilotte, E. 1992. Growth opportunity and the stock response to financing. Journal of Business 65:371-394.Rajan, M., and S. Reichelstein. 2006. Subjective performance indicators and disctretionary bonus pools. Journal of Accounting Research 44:585-618.Ryan, H. E. and R. Wiggins. 2002. The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy. Financial Management Spring:5-29.Sapp, S. 2008. The impact of corporate governance on executive compensation.European Financial Management 14:710-746.Skinner, D. J. 1993. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:407-443. Smith, C. and R. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32:263-292.Titman, S. and R. Wessels. 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance 43:1-19. zh_TW
