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題名 不完全資訊和雙重改變下的分群模型
Grouping with Heterogeneity: Incomplete Information and Double Mutation作者 邱彥閔 貢獻者 莊委桐
邱彥閔關鍵詞 分群模型
異質人群
不完全資訊
改變
隨機潛能
長期均衡
grouping
heterogenous population
incopmplete information
mutation
stochastic potential
equilibria in long term日期 2011 上傳時間 30-Oct-2012 14:04:49 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文首先構建了在完全資訊下的異質分群模型。當玩家可以觀察其他玩家的類型，則均衡必定是非隔離的：大多數玩家將無意移動，這是因為他們的夥伴可以為他們帶來最好的報酬。均衡狀態將會是一個有效率的狀態。 然後，我們構建另一個分組模型:訊息不完全和雙重改變下的分群模型。結果表明，雖然非隔離的均衡有可能是在短期的穩定均衡，但只有隔離的均衡狀態可以在長期維持穩定。這是因為在長期下，大多數非隔離狀態可以輕易地切換到隔離狀態的緣故。
This paper first constructs a grouping model with heterogeneous population under the setting of complete information. When player can observe other`s type, the result isnon-segregation: most players have no intention to move and they can match with the one who brings them the best payoff in the original group. The equilibrium state is always efficient. We then construct another grouping model with incomplete information and double mutation. The result shows that, although non-segregation equilibria may emerge as stable equilibria in the short run, only segregation equilibria can be stochastically stable in the long run. This is because most of non-segregated states can switch to the others by the same re-sistance and some of them can easily switch to segregated state, but it is hard to switch back.參考文獻 1. Borgers, T. and Sarin, R. "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," International Economic Review, 2000, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 921-950.2. Carrington, William J., Detragiache, Enrica, and Vishwanath, Tara. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, 1996, vol. 86, pp. 909-930.3. Castillo, Marco and Petrie, Ragan. "Discrimaination in The Lab: Does Information Trump Appearance," Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, pp. 50-59.4. Currarini, Sergio, Jackson,Matthew O., and Pin, Paolo. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation," Econometrica, 2009, vol. 77, No. 4, pp.1003-1045.5. Foster, D.P., Young H.P. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, 2006, pp. 341-367.6. Hart, Sergiu and Mas-Colell, Andreu. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, 2000, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1127-1150.7. Hoff, Karla and Sen, Arijit. "Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segreagation," American Economic Review, 2005, vol.95, pp. 1167-1189.8. Jackson, Matthew O. and Watts, Alison. "Social Games: Matching and The Play of Infinity Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, pp. 170-191.9. Milchtaich, Igal. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, vol. 38, pp. 318-346.10. Schelling, Thomas C. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, 1971, vol. 59, pp.488-493.11. William T. Bielby and James N. Baron, "Sex Segreagation With Occupations," American Economic Review, 1998, vol. 76, pp. 43-47.12. Young H.P. “Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions." Prinston, 2001. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
99258018
100資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099258018 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 莊委桐 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 邱彥閔 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 邱彥閔 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2011 en_US dc.date.accessioned 30-Oct-2012 14:04:49 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 30-Oct-2012 14:04:49 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Oct-2012 14:04:49 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0099258018 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54881 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 99258018 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文首先構建了在完全資訊下的異質分群模型。當玩家可以觀察其他玩家的類型，則均衡必定是非隔離的：大多數玩家將無意移動，這是因為他們的夥伴可以為他們帶來最好的報酬。均衡狀態將會是一個有效率的狀態。 然後，我們構建另一個分組模型:訊息不完全和雙重改變下的分群模型。結果表明，雖然非隔離的均衡有可能是在短期的穩定均衡，但只有隔離的均衡狀態可以在長期維持穩定。這是因為在長期下，大多數非隔離狀態可以輕易地切換到隔離狀態的緣故。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper first constructs a grouping model with heterogeneous population under the setting of complete information. When player can observe other`s type, the result isnon-segregation: most players have no intention to move and they can match with the one who brings them the best payoff in the original group. The equilibrium state is always efficient. We then construct another grouping model with incomplete information and double mutation. The result shows that, although non-segregation equilibria may emerge as stable equilibria in the short run, only segregation equilibria can be stochastically stable in the long run. This is because most of non-segregated states can switch to the others by the same re-sistance and some of them can easily switch to segregated state, but it is hard to switch back. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 封頁謝辭摘要目次1. Introduction and Literature Review…………………………………………….…..52. Grouping Equilibrium with Complete Information……………………………...…73. Two-Group Grouping Model with incomplete information…………………….…11 3.1 Setting of Incomplete Information…………………………………………...12 3.2 Equilibrium with incomplete information ………………………………......144. Stochastic Stability with Double Mutations……………………………………….23 4.1. Stochastic stability when type size difference is small……………………...24 4.1.1. Specifications of recurrent classes……………………………...…24 4.1.2. Transition between classes in the same specification…………..…25 4.1.3. Transition between specification (i) and (iii)……………………...28 4.1.4. Transition between specification (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v)…………..30 4.1.5. Transition between (i), (ii), (iv), and (v)…………………………..32 4.1.6. The stochastic potential of classes in each specification…………..36 4.2. Stochastic stability when type size difference is large………………………415. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………44Appendix A…………………………………………………………………………..46Reference……………………………………………………………………………..47 zh_TW dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099258018 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分群模型 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 異質人群 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 不完全資訊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 改變 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 隨機潛能 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 長期均衡 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) grouping en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) heterogenous population en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) incopmplete information en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) mutation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) stochastic potential en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) equilibria in long term en_US dc.title (題名) 不完全資訊和雙重改變下的分群模型 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Grouping with Heterogeneity: Incomplete Information and Double Mutation en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Borgers, T. and Sarin, R. "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," International Economic Review, 2000, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 921-950.2. Carrington, William J., Detragiache, Enrica, and Vishwanath, Tara. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, 1996, vol. 86, pp. 909-930.3. Castillo, Marco and Petrie, Ragan. "Discrimaination in The Lab: Does Information Trump Appearance," Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, pp. 50-59.4. Currarini, Sergio, Jackson,Matthew O., and Pin, Paolo. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation," Econometrica, 2009, vol. 77, No. 4, pp.1003-1045.5. Foster, D.P., Young H.P. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, 2006, pp. 341-367.6. Hart, Sergiu and Mas-Colell, Andreu. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, 2000, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1127-1150.7. Hoff, Karla and Sen, Arijit. "Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segreagation," American Economic Review, 2005, vol.95, pp. 1167-1189.8. Jackson, Matthew O. and Watts, Alison. "Social Games: Matching and The Play of Infinity Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, pp. 170-191.9. Milchtaich, Igal. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, vol. 38, pp. 318-346.10. Schelling, Thomas C. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, 1971, vol. 59, pp.488-493.11. William T. Bielby and James N. Baron, "Sex Segreagation With Occupations," American Economic Review, 1998, vol. 76, pp. 43-47.12. Young H.P. “Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions." Prinston, 2001. zh_TW
