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題名 薪酬委員會組成及品質與代理問題之關聯性
The association between the composition and quality of compensation committee and agency problem作者 周盈萱
Chou, Ying Hsuan貢獻者 梁嘉紋
周盈萱
Chou, Ying Hsuan關鍵詞 薪酬委員會
薪酬委員會組成
薪酬委員會品質
代理問題
compensation committee
composition of compensation committee
quality of compensation committee
agency problem日期 2012 上傳時間 11-Jul-2013 16:27:01 (UTC+8) 摘要 功能性委員會－薪酬委員會之設置可被認為是強化公司治理的關鍵之一，其主要功能是在於協助公司完成健全高階經理人之考核與薪酬管理制度，並讓公司治理結構更加完善。薪酬委員會之設置已在歐美國家行之有年，而我國至最近 2011 年才強制上市櫃及興櫃公司設置薪酬委員會，目的在於希望藉由薪酬委員會之設置能有助於屏除公司經營團隊存有肥貓之疑慮。而距離實施已有一年之時間，本研究主要在於探討現階段上市櫃公司薪酬委員會組成及品質與代理問題之關聯性。實證結果發現：由公股主導之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁有學術背景之佔比愈高；專業經理人治理及盈餘分配比愈高之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁有企業界背景之佔比愈高；機構投資人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁有學術及企業兩者經驗之佔比愈高；經理人持股愈高、機構投資人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，薪酬委員會品質愈佳；盈餘分配比愈高、有交叉持股行為之上市櫃公司，其薪酬委員會品質愈差。
The compensation committee plays an important role in enhancing cooperate governance. The purpose of the compensation committee is not only to administer and evaluate the company`s compensation policies for the board of directors, but also to set appropriate and supportable pay programs for the CEO and other executive officers of the company. The existence of compensation committee is common in developed countries, but was just required in Taiwan since 2011. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the composition of compensation committee and its quality associated with agency problem. By using sample of 1,440 listed companies in Taiwan, the result shows that government-owned corporations tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members from academic background; companies ruled by managers tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members with business background; the higher the proportion of institutional investors in the company, the higher the proportion of the compensation committee members possess both academic and business experience. In addition, CEO’s shareholding and institutional investors’ shareholding are positively associated with the quality of the compensation committee. However, the cash flow right is negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee; a company with cross-shareholding characteristic is also negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee.Key參考文獻 中文部分王文宇，2005，設立獨立董監事對公司治理的影響，法令月刊，56卷1期：45-64。王文宇，2008，公司法論，4版，台北：元照。王元章，2001，內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值，證券市場發展季刊，第十三卷第三期：29-69。王玉珍，2002，股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究，國立中央大學企業管理研究所碩士生論文。王建仁，2005，探討高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。朱珊慧，2010，薪酬委員會相關法律問題之研究，私立東吳大學法學院法律學系碩士論文。宋致皓，2006，董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。李伶珠，2011，薪酬委員會實務指南，會計研究月刊第307期(六月)：70-75。李伶珠與劉毅馨，2011，設置薪酬委員會之實務議題，會計研究月刊第308期(七月)：62-66 。李馨蘋與莊宗憲，2007，公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究，東吳大學經紀商學學報第五十七期：1-27。周行一、陳錦村與陳坤宏，1996，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第四卷第一期：15-139。陳清祥，2011，他山之石-借鏡美國薪酬委員會運作與獎酬資訊透明化，會計研究月刊第306期(5月)：110-116。陳羽甄，2007，高階主管替換與相對績效之關係-探討台灣家族與非家族企業，.國立東華大學企業管理學系碩士論文。俞海琴，1994，內部人事持股比率與融資策略關係之實證研究，管理評論，第十三卷第二期：109-131。俞海琴、周本鄂，1991，台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q 關係之研究，管理評論，第十三卷第一期：79-98。洪榮華、陳香如與王玉珍，2005，公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係-股權結構與董事會特性的觀點，輔仁管理評論，第12卷第3期: 23-40.黃素慧、黃劭彥、洪嘉聲與林萱霈，2011，公司治理是否能增加我國家族企業之企業價值，經營管理論叢，Vol.7, No.2：13-37。張詩玫，1999，董事會特性與公司經營績效關聯性之探討，國立台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。劉靜容，2002，經理者股權與公司績效—內生轉換聯立方程模型分析，私立淡江大學產業經濟學所未出版碩士論文。錢逸達，2003，內部人士薪酬之決定因素－公司績效或公司治理，國立成功大學會計學系碩士論文。英文部分Adams, M. 1997. Determinants of Audit Committee Formation in the Life Insurance Industry: New Zealand Evidence. Journal of Business Research 38(2): 123-129.Ali, A., T. Chen, and S. Radhakrishnan. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms.Journal of Accounting and Economics 44: 238-286.Berger, P. G., E. Ofek, and D. L. Yermack. 1997. Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions. Journal of Finance 4: 1411-1437.Burkart, M., F. Panunzi, and A. Shleifer. 2002. Family Firms. Working paper. Harvard University.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 1999. Expropriation of minority shareholders in East Asia. Policy Research paper 2088.Cordeiro, J., R. Veliyath, E. J. Eramus, and M. Tax. 2000. An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Outside Director Compensation. Corporate Governance,83: 268-279.Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51: 371-406.Chrisman, J., J. Chua, and P. Sharma. 2005. Trends and directions in the development of a strategic management theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 29: 555-575.Conyon, M. J. and H. Lerong. 2004. Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in US Entrepreneurial Firms. University of Pennsylvania. Working paper.Daily, C. M. 1998. Compensation Committee Composition Determinant of CEO Compensation. Academy of Management Journal 2nd ser. 41: 2008-2020.Fernando, L. and F. Urzúa. 2007. Board Independence, Firm Performance And Ownership Concentration: Evidence From Chile. Universidad Diego Portales. Working paper.Fuerst, O. and S. H. Kang. 2000. Corporate governance, expected operation performance, and pricing. Working Paper. Yale School of Management.Gordon, L. A. and J. Pound. 1993. Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals. Journal of Finance 48: 697-718.Hamilton, R. W. and D. R. Freer. 2011. The Law of corporations in a Nutshell. 6th ed. St. Paul, M.N.: West.Hartzell, J. C. and L. T. Starks. 2003. Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation. Journal of Finance 58: 2351-2374.Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback. 1983. Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 1: 5-50.Jensen, M. C. and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.Li, J. 1994. Ownership Structure and Board Composition : A Multi-country Test of Agency Theory Prediction. University of Hawaii. Working paper.Menon, K., and D. Williams. 1994. The use of audit committee for monitoring.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 13: 121-139.Monem, R. 2011. Determinants of Board Structure: Evidence from Australia.Griffith University. Working paper.Neter, J., W. Wasserman, and M. H. Kutner.1989. Applied Linear Regression Models.2nd Edition. Homewood, Illinois: Irwin.Newman, H. A. and H. A. Mozes. 1999. Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices? Financial Management Vol. 28, No 3 (Autumn): 41-53.Newman, H. A. 2000. The Impact of Ownership Structure on the Structure of Compensation Committees. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting (June): 653-678Oviatt, B. M. 1988. Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-shareholder Relationship, Incentives for Congruent Interests. Academy of Management Review 13: 214-225.Pincus, K., M. Rusbarsky, and J. Wong. 1989. Voluntary Formation of Corporate Audit Committees among NASDAQ Firms. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 8(4): 239-265.Pound, J. 1988. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 237-265.Sakawa, H., K. Moriyama, and N. Watanabel. 2012. Relation between Top Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japanese Public Disclosed Data. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 20, No. 6 (November): 593-608.Starks, L. 2000. Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors: Implications for Latin America. AB ANTE, Estudios en Dirreccion de Empresas 2: 161-182.Sun, J. and S. Cahan. 2009. The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review Vol. 17, No. 2: 193-207.Sun, J. and S. Cahan. 2012. The economic determinants of compensation committee quality. Managerial Finance Vol. 38, No. 2: 188-205.Wan, N. 2009. Remuneration Committee, Ownership Structure and Pay for Performance: Evidence from Malaysia. Universiti Utara Malaysia. Working paper.Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40(2): 185-211. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
100353058
101資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353058 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 周盈萱 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chou, Ying Hsuan en_US dc.creator (作者) 周盈萱 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chou, Ying Hsuan en_US dc.date (日期) 2012 en_US dc.date.accessioned 11-Jul-2013 16:27:01 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 11-Jul-2013 16:27:01 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jul-2013 16:27:01 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0100353058 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58775 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100353058 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 101 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 功能性委員會－薪酬委員會之設置可被認為是強化公司治理的關鍵之一，其主要功能是在於協助公司完成健全高階經理人之考核與薪酬管理制度，並讓公司治理結構更加完善。薪酬委員會之設置已在歐美國家行之有年，而我國至最近 2011 年才強制上市櫃及興櫃公司設置薪酬委員會，目的在於希望藉由薪酬委員會之設置能有助於屏除公司經營團隊存有肥貓之疑慮。而距離實施已有一年之時間，本研究主要在於探討現階段上市櫃公司薪酬委員會組成及品質與代理問題之關聯性。實證結果發現：由公股主導之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁有學術背景之佔比愈高；專業經理人治理及盈餘分配比愈高之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁有企業界背景之佔比愈高；機構投資人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁有學術及企業兩者經驗之佔比愈高；經理人持股愈高、機構投資人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，薪酬委員會品質愈佳；盈餘分配比愈高、有交叉持股行為之上市櫃公司，其薪酬委員會品質愈差。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The compensation committee plays an important role in enhancing cooperate governance. The purpose of the compensation committee is not only to administer and evaluate the company`s compensation policies for the board of directors, but also to set appropriate and supportable pay programs for the CEO and other executive officers of the company. The existence of compensation committee is common in developed countries, but was just required in Taiwan since 2011. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the composition of compensation committee and its quality associated with agency problem. By using sample of 1,440 listed companies in Taiwan, the result shows that government-owned corporations tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members from academic background; companies ruled by managers tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members with business background; the higher the proportion of institutional investors in the company, the higher the proportion of the compensation committee members possess both academic and business experience. In addition, CEO’s shareholding and institutional investors’ shareholding are positively associated with the quality of the compensation committee. However, the cash flow right is negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee; a company with cross-shareholding characteristic is also negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee.Key en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 ...................................................... 1第一節 研究背景與動機 ................................................................................................... 1第二節 研究目的 ............................................................................................................... 3第三節 研究架構 ............................................................................................................... 4第貳章 文獻探討 .................................................. 5第一節 公司治理與薪酬委員會 ....................................................................................... 5第二節 美國薪酬委員會制度 ......................................................................................... 10第三節 我國目前薪酬委員會制度 ................................................................................. 17第叁章 研究方法 ................................................. 22第一節 研究假說 ............................................................................................................. 22第二節 研究變數 ............................................................................................................. 26第三節 研究對象與研究期間 ......................................................................................... 35第四節 統計方法分析 ..................................................................................................... 36第肆章 實證結果與分析 ........................................... 37第一節 敘述性統計分析 ................................................................................................. 37第二節 相關係數分析 ..................................................................................................... 41第三節 迴歸分析 ............................................................................................................. 45第伍章 結論與建議 ............................................... 57第一節 結論 ..................................................................................................................... 57第二節 研究限制 ............................................................................................................. 59第三節 後續研究之建議 ................................................................................................. 60參考文獻 ......................................................... 61表目錄表4-1各變數之敘述性統計量 ......................................... 40表4-2自變數之相關係數-Pearson相關檢定 ............................. 42表4-3自願性設置薪酬委員會的迴歸分析 ............................... 48表4-4 截至2012年底召開薪酬委員會議次數的迴歸分析 ................. 49表4-5 獨立董事在薪酬委員會佔比的迴歸分析 .......................... 50表4-6 董事在薪酬委員會之佔比的迴歸分析 ............................ 51表4-7 薪酬委員會委員擁有學術背景之佔比的迴歸分析 .................. 52表4-8 薪酬委員會委員擁有企業界背景之佔比的迴歸分析 ................ 53表4-9 薪酬委員會成員具學術及企業兩者經驗之佔比的迴歸分析 .......... 54表4-10 薪酬委員會品質分數(CCQ)的迴歸分析 .......................... 55表4-11 額外測試-薪酬委員會品質分數(CCQ)的迴歸分析 ................. 56 zh_TW dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353058 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬委員會 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬委員會組成 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬委員會品質 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理問題 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) compensation committee en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) composition of compensation committee en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) quality of compensation committee en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) agency problem en_US dc.title (題名) 薪酬委員會組成及品質與代理問題之關聯性 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The association between the composition and quality of compensation committee and agency problem en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分王文宇，2005，設立獨立董監事對公司治理的影響，法令月刊，56卷1期：45-64。王文宇，2008，公司法論，4版，台北：元照。王元章，2001，內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值，證券市場發展季刊，第十三卷第三期：29-69。王玉珍，2002，股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究，國立中央大學企業管理研究所碩士生論文。王建仁，2005，探討高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。朱珊慧，2010，薪酬委員會相關法律問題之研究，私立東吳大學法學院法律學系碩士論文。宋致皓，2006，董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。李伶珠，2011，薪酬委員會實務指南，會計研究月刊第307期(六月)：70-75。李伶珠與劉毅馨，2011，設置薪酬委員會之實務議題，會計研究月刊第308期(七月)：62-66 。李馨蘋與莊宗憲，2007，公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究，東吳大學經紀商學學報第五十七期：1-27。周行一、陳錦村與陳坤宏，1996，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第四卷第一期：15-139。陳清祥，2011，他山之石-借鏡美國薪酬委員會運作與獎酬資訊透明化，會計研究月刊第306期(5月)：110-116。陳羽甄，2007，高階主管替換與相對績效之關係-探討台灣家族與非家族企業，.國立東華大學企業管理學系碩士論文。俞海琴，1994，內部人事持股比率與融資策略關係之實證研究，管理評論，第十三卷第二期：109-131。俞海琴、周本鄂，1991，台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q 關係之研究，管理評論，第十三卷第一期：79-98。洪榮華、陳香如與王玉珍，2005，公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係-股權結構與董事會特性的觀點，輔仁管理評論，第12卷第3期: 23-40.黃素慧、黃劭彥、洪嘉聲與林萱霈，2011，公司治理是否能增加我國家族企業之企業價值，經營管理論叢，Vol.7, No.2：13-37。張詩玫，1999，董事會特性與公司經營績效關聯性之探討，國立台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。劉靜容，2002，經理者股權與公司績效—內生轉換聯立方程模型分析，私立淡江大學產業經濟學所未出版碩士論文。錢逸達，2003，內部人士薪酬之決定因素－公司績效或公司治理，國立成功大學會計學系碩士論文。英文部分Adams, M. 1997. 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