| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Ho,Yi-Cheng ;Steven G. Craig;Alan J. Satterlee | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008-07 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59126 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Economics of Governance, 9(3), 265-285 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Empirical voting model;Judges;Demand for judicial sanctions;Voter information | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s10101-007-0042-3 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0042-3 | en_US |
