| dc.contributor.advisor | 溫偉任 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wen, Wei Jen | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 張偉瑱 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Chang, Wei Chen | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張偉瑱 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chang, Wei Chen | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2011 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 5-Sep-2013 16:53:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 5-Sep-2013 16:53:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 5-Sep-2013 16:53:46 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0983510201 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60546 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國際經營與貿易研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 98351020 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 100 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本文將探討當一販售耐久財的獨佔廠商面臨到商品產量限制以及市場上存在著個人需求不確定性時的最適訂價模式。此外本文也透過分析不同時期消費者所面臨的每期使用價格變化來說明當消費者存在個人需求不確定性時，廠商於兩期使用價格的設定會出現異於Coasian耐久財模型的兩期使用價格設定。當商品效用在第二期出現壞結果時低於一定標準時，廠商兩期使用價格訂價模式將出現第一期使用價格下降而第二期使用價格反而上升的現象，甚至可能出現第二期使用價格高於第一期使用價格的現象。而這與Coasian耐久財模型所呈現的兩期使用價格訂價模式是大不相同。 我們發現當廠商採取非價格承諾的訂價策略且廠商產能處於一定的數值時，廠商採取讓消費者面臨限量風險的訂價策略可獲得較Coasian耐久財模型更高的利潤。由此可見產能限制將可使廠商在採取非價格承諾的訂價策略下仍能透過讓消費者面臨限量的風險來保有獨佔力並且賺取較高利潤。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper will investigate the best pricing strategy for durable goods monopolist with capacity constraint and individual demand uncertainty. We also introduce the concept of “per-period usage price” and illustrate the difference between traditional Coasian durable goods pricing strategy and ours. When the product utility turns out to be a bad outcome and its value is lower than the certain standard, first period’s per-period usage price will decrease while second period’s per-period usage price will increase simultaneously. This consequence is totally different from Coasian durable goods model. When monopolist use non-commitment pricing strategy and face capacity constraint, monopolist will set the price for exerting the risk of rationing to consumers which will help monopolist gain higher profit than Coasian durable goods model. This shows that capacity constraint will help monopolist keep monopoly power and gain higher profit. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 壹、緒論..................................................................................................................1貳、文獻回顧........................................................................................................3參、模型設定........................................................................................................5一、每期使用價格..........................................................................................9二、模型分析..................................................................................................131.情境1之廠商訂價策略和利潤..........................................................132.情境2之廠商訂價策略和利潤..........................................................173.情境3之廠商訂價策略和利潤..........................................................204.情境4之廠商訂價策略和利潤..........................................................245.情境5之廠商訂價策略和利潤..........................................................26肆、廠商最適訂價策略分佈與比較......................................................28一、考量(c=0)時廠商最適訂價策略分佈......................................29二、考量(c=0.2,c=0.4)時廠商最適訂價策略分佈...............32伍、價格承諾......................................................................................................37陸、結論與建議................................................................................................43參考文獻................................................................................................................45附件一、輔助定理(1)之證明...................................................................46附件二、輔助定理(3)之證明...................................................................47附件三、輔助定理(4)之證明...................................................................49附件四、輔助定理(5)之證明...................................................................50附件五、輔助定理(6)之證明...................................................................52附件六、輔助定理(7)之證明...................................................................54附件七、廠商利潤變化解析(u變動)..................................................55附件八、價格承諾下廠商最適訂價策略...........................................58 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 1446267 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0983510201 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 耐久財 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 產能限制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 個人需求不確定性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | durable goods | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | capacity constraint | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | individual demand uncertainty | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 產能限制與個人需求不確定性對耐久財獨佔廠商訂價策略之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Durable Goods Monopoly with Capacity Constraint and Individual Demand Uncertainty | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Bulow, J. (1982), “Durable Goods Monopolists”, Journal of Political Economy, 90(4), 314-332.Coase, R. (1972), “Durability and Monopoly”, Journal of Law and Economics, 15(4), 143-149.Denicolo, V. and Garella, G. (1999), “Rationing in a Durable Goods Monopoly”, Journal of Economics, 30(1), 44-55.McAfee, P. and Wiseman, T. (2008), “Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjectur-e”, Review of Economic Studies, 75(1), 317-332.Moller, M. and Watanabe, M. (2010), “Advance Purchase Discount Versus Clearance Sales”, The Economic Journal, 120(9), 1125-1148.Nocke, V. and Peitz, M. (2008), “Advance-purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination device”, CEPR Discussion Paper No.6664.Stokey, N. (1981), “Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing”, Bell Journal of Economics, 12(1), 112-128. | zh_TW |
