| dc.contributor | 財管系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 姜堯民 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chiang,Yao-Min | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012.06 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 11-Nov-2013 09:35:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 11-Nov-2013 09:35:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 11-Nov-2013 09:35:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/61542 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The relationship between a government and a franchise firm in a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project is one that is wrought with incentive problems. It is well known that a contingent payment structure can help alleviate moral hazard problems. This paper provides a flexible franchise fee scheme from the perspective of a government which can charge a sufficient franchise fee and provide enough incentive for a private firm in a BOT project. This flexible franchise fee structure has option-like properties. A pricing model is derived in this paper to price this flexible franchise fee scheme. The closed-form pricing model that I have provided in this paper can help evaluate the effect of a flexible franchise fee on the performance of BOT projects. A numerical analysis shows that the proposed flexible franchise fee scheme is especially suitable for BOT projects with long investment horizons and revenue uncertainty. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 182534 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Real Estate Review, 15(1), 127-139 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | BOT;Franchise fee;Real options;Option pricing model | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | A Flexible Franchise Fee Scheme in a BOT Project | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
