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題名 從日本參議院全國選區談日本政黨與利益團體的關係 作者 林超琦
Lin, Chao-Chi貢獻者 政治系 關鍵詞 日本政治 ; 侍從主義 ; 利益團體 ; 組織動員 ; 參議院選舉 ; 監督機制
Japanese politics ; clientelism ; monitoring mechanism ; upper house elections ; Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ; mobilization日期 2013-06 上傳時間 22-Nov-2013 15:17:06 (UTC+8) 摘要 長期以來，日本參議院全國選區的議員多半是全國性利益團體代表，而且還是「利益團體推薦、政黨提名」的模式。值得注意的是，日本參議院全國選區的選舉制度，並沒有規定席次必需按照社會背景與職業來分配。如果不是正式制度所規定，為什麼大部分參議院全國選區的議員會是利益團體的代表？又為什麼會發展出「利益團體推薦、政黨提名」的模式？本文以為若要比較完整地了解日本參議院全國選區為什麼會成為政黨與利益團體合作的場域，必須要從政黨與利益團體整體的關係，尤其是自由民主黨與利益團體的侍從主義關係去了解。侍從主義強調特殊性，恩庇主只會將資源分配給「有支持我、投給我」的人，因此，能被分配到利益的前提是：追隨者必須要表現支持或是承諾未來會支持。雖然眾議院選舉是影響執政的關鍵，但是因為選制設計的關係，眾議院無法顯現全國性利益團體的投票情形。反而是參議院選舉全國選區，儘管選制改革，一直是以全國為一選區，使得特定利益團體的動員情形得以有機會展現，反而可以做為一種監督機制（monitoring mechanism），讓自民黨知道利益團體是否有按照承諾投票支持。此外，透過利益團體的動員與分擔選舉所需要的花費，無形中也解決了政黨競選的困境，參議院選舉全國選區成了政黨與利益團體合作的雙贏場域。本文並檢證過去參議院全國選區的情形，以瞭解為什麼會有自民黨有組織動員優勢的說法。最後，本文並討論政黨輪替對於日本政黨與利益團體關係可能的影響。
For a long time, a majority of elected candidates in the national district for the upper house elections have not only been backed by interest groups but have been representatives of nationally-organized interest groups. Interestingly, in Japan, there are no laws requiring that upper house members be vocational representatives. How has the pattern ”interest groups endorse and parties nominate” almost become a norm? Some analyses already point out that this is because interest groups with sound, vertically-integrated organizations have advantages in mobilizing votes and can redress parties` mobilization weaknesses. While it is true that parties without sound local chapters have difficulties campaigning effectively, this paper argues that the pattern ”interest groups endorse and parties nominate” should be understood in a broader context of clientelism where the LDP dominated Japan over a long period and, as a patron, used public policy to promise and deliver benefits in exchange for the electoral support of interest groups, namely, the client. However, a clientelistic exchange is contingency-based and is not simultaneous, and a monitoring mechanism is therefore needed to know whether or not the client voted for the patron as promised. Although lower house elections are critical, due to electoral rules, votes by different groups for a particular candidate cannot be easily investigated in lower house elections. By contrast, a nationwide district in relation to the upper house elections (1947-1980) has allowed nationally organized interest groups to show their ability to mobilize votes. As a result, the national district in regard to the upper house elections has inadvertently served as a monitoring mechanism for parties to investigate votes by different groups. This paper also investigates how both parties and interest groups have adapted themselves to the subsequent electoral rule changes of 1983 and 2001, and have continued to use a nationwide district in the upper house elections to serve as a monitoring mechanism. In conclusion, this paper discusses possible changes in the relationship between parties and interest groups in Japan that resulted from the change in government in 2009.關聯 台灣政治學刊,17(1), 107-183 資料類型 article dc.contributor 政治系 en_US dc.creator (作者) 林超琦 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Chao-Chi - dc.date (日期) 2013-06 en_US dc.date.accessioned 22-Nov-2013 15:17:06 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 22-Nov-2013 15:17:06 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Nov-2013 15:17:06 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/61793 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 長期以來，日本參議院全國選區的議員多半是全國性利益團體代表，而且還是「利益團體推薦、政黨提名」的模式。值得注意的是，日本參議院全國選區的選舉制度，並沒有規定席次必需按照社會背景與職業來分配。如果不是正式制度所規定，為什麼大部分參議院全國選區的議員會是利益團體的代表？又為什麼會發展出「利益團體推薦、政黨提名」的模式？本文以為若要比較完整地了解日本參議院全國選區為什麼會成為政黨與利益團體合作的場域，必須要從政黨與利益團體整體的關係，尤其是自由民主黨與利益團體的侍從主義關係去了解。侍從主義強調特殊性，恩庇主只會將資源分配給「有支持我、投給我」的人，因此，能被分配到利益的前提是：追隨者必須要表現支持或是承諾未來會支持。雖然眾議院選舉是影響執政的關鍵，但是因為選制設計的關係，眾議院無法顯現全國性利益團體的投票情形。反而是參議院選舉全國選區，儘管選制改革，一直是以全國為一選區，使得特定利益團體的動員情形得以有機會展現，反而可以做為一種監督機制（monitoring mechanism），讓自民黨知道利益團體是否有按照承諾投票支持。此外，透過利益團體的動員與分擔選舉所需要的花費，無形中也解決了政黨競選的困境，參議院選舉全國選區成了政黨與利益團體合作的雙贏場域。本文並檢證過去參議院全國選區的情形，以瞭解為什麼會有自民黨有組織動員優勢的說法。最後，本文並討論政黨輪替對於日本政黨與利益團體關係可能的影響。 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) For a long time, a majority of elected candidates in the national district for the upper house elections have not only been backed by interest groups but have been representatives of nationally-organized interest groups. Interestingly, in Japan, there are no laws requiring that upper house members be vocational representatives. How has the pattern ”interest groups endorse and parties nominate” almost become a norm? Some analyses already point out that this is because interest groups with sound, vertically-integrated organizations have advantages in mobilizing votes and can redress parties` mobilization weaknesses. While it is true that parties without sound local chapters have difficulties campaigning effectively, this paper argues that the pattern ”interest groups endorse and parties nominate” should be understood in a broader context of clientelism where the LDP dominated Japan over a long period and, as a patron, used public policy to promise and deliver benefits in exchange for the electoral support of interest groups, namely, the client. However, a clientelistic exchange is contingency-based and is not simultaneous, and a monitoring mechanism is therefore needed to know whether or not the client voted for the patron as promised. Although lower house elections are critical, due to electoral rules, votes by different groups for a particular candidate cannot be easily investigated in lower house elections. By contrast, a nationwide district in relation to the upper house elections (1947-1980) has allowed nationally organized interest groups to show their ability to mobilize votes. As a result, the national district in regard to the upper house elections has inadvertently served as a monitoring mechanism for parties to investigate votes by different groups. This paper also investigates how both parties and interest groups have adapted themselves to the subsequent electoral rule changes of 1983 and 2001, and have continued to use a nationwide district in the upper house elections to serve as a monitoring mechanism. In conclusion, this paper discusses possible changes in the relationship between parties and interest groups in Japan that resulted from the change in government in 2009. - dc.format.extent 4662591 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.relation (關聯) 台灣政治學刊,17(1), 107-183 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 日本政治 ; 侍從主義 ; 利益團體 ; 組織動員 ; 參議院選舉 ; 監督機制 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Japanese politics ; clientelism ; monitoring mechanism ; upper house elections ; Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ; mobilization en_US dc.title (題名) 從日本參議院全國選區談日本政黨與利益團體的關係 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) article en
