| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 徐麗振 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsu, Li-Chen | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2013-10 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/61797 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Prior experimental studies on tax evasion generally assume that the budget and the probability of audit are exogenously given, and ignore taxpayers` incentives to detect evasion and their compliance behaviour under such incentives. The experimental evidence of the present paper shows that, on average, subjects are willing to spend 20 to 30% of their tax revenue on auditing. Compliance is also greatly improved if subjects can determine the budget and, hence, the probability of audit. These findings suggest that taking taxpayers` incentives to detect evasion into consideration is important for the design of compliance-improvement audit schemes. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 441413 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Pacific Economic Review, 18(4), 475-501 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/1468-0106.12034 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12034 | en_US |
