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題名 Agent-based modeling of the El Farol Bar problem
作者 陳樹衡
Chen, Shu-Heng ; Gostoli, Umberto
貢獻者 經濟系
關鍵詞 El Farol Bar problem; Social Preferences; Social Networks; Self-Organization; Emergence of Coordination
日期 2012
上傳時間 20-Mar-2014 16:23:54 (UTC+8)
摘要 In this paper, we study the self-coordination problem as demonstrated by the well-known El Farol problem (Arthur, 1994), which has later become what is known as the minority game in the econophysics community. While the El Farol problem or the minority game has been studied for almost two decades, existing studies are mostly only concerned with efficiency. The equality issue, however, has been largely neglected. In this paper, we build an agent-based model to study both efficiency and equality and ask whether a decentralized society can ever possibly self-coordinate a result with the highest efficiency while also maintaining the highest degree of equality. Our agent-based model shows the possibility of achieving this social optimum. The two key determinants to make this happen are social preferences and social networks. Hence, not only doe institutions (networks) matter, but individual characteristics (preferences) also matter. The latter are open to human-subject experiments for further examination.
關聯 Simulation in Computational Finance and Economics: Tools and Emerging Applications, IGI Global, chapter 17, 359-377
資料類型 book/chapter
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-2011-7.ch017
dc.contributor 經濟系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳樹衡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Shu-Heng ; Gostoli, Umbertoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2012en_US
dc.date.accessioned 20-Mar-2014 16:23:54 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 20-Mar-2014 16:23:54 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Mar-2014 16:23:54 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64743-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this paper, we study the self-coordination problem as demonstrated by the well-known El Farol problem (Arthur, 1994), which has later become what is known as the minority game in the econophysics community. While the El Farol problem or the minority game has been studied for almost two decades, existing studies are mostly only concerned with efficiency. The equality issue, however, has been largely neglected. In this paper, we build an agent-based model to study both efficiency and equality and ask whether a decentralized society can ever possibly self-coordinate a result with the highest efficiency while also maintaining the highest degree of equality. Our agent-based model shows the possibility of achieving this social optimum. The two key determinants to make this happen are social preferences and social networks. Hence, not only doe institutions (networks) matter, but individual characteristics (preferences) also matter. The latter are open to human-subject experiments for further examination.en_US
dc.format.extent 496930 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Simulation in Computational Finance and Economics: Tools and Emerging Applications, IGI Global, chapter 17, 359-377en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) El Farol Bar problem; Social Preferences; Social Networks; Self-Organization; Emergence of Coordinationen_US
dc.title (題名) Agent-based modeling of the El Farol Bar problemen_US
dc.type (資料類型) book/chapteren
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.4018/978-1-4666-2011-7.ch017en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-2011-7.ch017 en_US