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題名 An Overlooked Effect of Mandatory Audit-Firm Rotation on Investigation Strategies
作者 戚務君
Chi, Wuchun
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 Sarbanes–Oxley Act; Audit–firm; rotation Audit fees; Investigation strategy
日期 2011.04
上傳時間 12-May-2014 15:51:16 (UTC+8)
摘要 Section 207 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, the SOX Act) passed by the US Congress requires a study of mandatory auditor rotation of registered public accounting firms. In the debate over the costs and benefits of mandatory audit–firm rotation, one cost has been overlooked: that of more aggressive monitoring. Because few countries have put such mandatory rotation into practice, there is little empirical evidence available for analysis of its costs and benefits. My research, therefore, uses an analytical approach to demonstrate that, in a firm that has a well-functioning independent board, as required by section 301 of the SOX Act, the board will adopt a more aggressive strategy in investigating the collusion between the manager and the auditor and pay a higher audit fee than it would have done in an environment with no audit–firm rotation requirement. The results of this research alter the balance between the costs and benefits of a mandatory audit–firm rotation requirement and should not be ignored by regulators considering implementing such a requirement.
關聯 OR Spectrum - Quantitative Approaches in Management, 33(2), 265-285
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0221-4
dc.contributor 會計系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 戚務君zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chi, Wuchun-
dc.date (日期) 2011.04en_US
dc.date.accessioned 12-May-2014 15:51:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 12-May-2014 15:51:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 12-May-2014 15:51:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/65959-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Section 207 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, the SOX Act) passed by the US Congress requires a study of mandatory auditor rotation of registered public accounting firms. In the debate over the costs and benefits of mandatory audit–firm rotation, one cost has been overlooked: that of more aggressive monitoring. Because few countries have put such mandatory rotation into practice, there is little empirical evidence available for analysis of its costs and benefits. My research, therefore, uses an analytical approach to demonstrate that, in a firm that has a well-functioning independent board, as required by section 301 of the SOX Act, the board will adopt a more aggressive strategy in investigating the collusion between the manager and the auditor and pay a higher audit fee than it would have done in an environment with no audit–firm rotation requirement. The results of this research alter the balance between the costs and benefits of a mandatory audit–firm rotation requirement and should not be ignored by regulators considering implementing such a requirement.en_US
dc.format.extent 310413 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) OR Spectrum - Quantitative Approaches in Management, 33(2), 265-285en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sarbanes–Oxley Act; Audit–firm; rotation Audit fees; Investigation strategyen_US
dc.title (題名) An Overlooked Effect of Mandatory Audit-Firm Rotation on Investigation Strategiesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1007/s00291-010-0221-4en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0221-4en_US