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題名 Regulating China`s Power Sector: Creating an Independent Regulator without Autonomy
作者 Tsai, Chung-min
貢獻者 政治系
關鍵詞 China; power reform; independent regulatory agency; State Electricity Regulatory Commission; regulatory capture
日期 2014-06
上傳時間 12-Jun-2014 10:00:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 Throughout its period of economic transition, the Chinese state has readjusted its relationship with industry and developed new regulatory schemes. China`s first industry-specific independent regulatory agency, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), was created in 2003. Its operation does not follow Western practice which adopts the best institutional arrangement for autonomous regulators. This article will examine the failings and regulatory capture of SERC. I argue that because the process of creating a new regulator involves resource reallocation and power redistribution, SERC has suffered both endogenous and exogenous disadvantages since its inception. The compromised institutional design, along with insufficient resources and fragmented authority, has considerably weakened SERC`s regulatory capacity. Moreover, SERC was not designed as part of the reform schedule, but rather emerged later as a response to institutional necessities, which also contributes to its vulnerability. As a result, the state has exposed SERC to potential capture by both government entities and regulated enterprises.
關聯 The China Quarterly, Volume 218 , pp 452-473
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000381
dc.contributor 政治系en_US
dc.creator (作者) Tsai, Chung-minen_US
dc.date (日期) 2014-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned 12-Jun-2014 10:00:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 12-Jun-2014 10:00:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 12-Jun-2014 10:00:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/66662-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Throughout its period of economic transition, the Chinese state has readjusted its relationship with industry and developed new regulatory schemes. China`s first industry-specific independent regulatory agency, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), was created in 2003. Its operation does not follow Western practice which adopts the best institutional arrangement for autonomous regulators. This article will examine the failings and regulatory capture of SERC. I argue that because the process of creating a new regulator involves resource reallocation and power redistribution, SERC has suffered both endogenous and exogenous disadvantages since its inception. The compromised institutional design, along with insufficient resources and fragmented authority, has considerably weakened SERC`s regulatory capacity. Moreover, SERC was not designed as part of the reform schedule, but rather emerged later as a response to institutional necessities, which also contributes to its vulnerability. As a result, the state has exposed SERC to potential capture by both government entities and regulated enterprises.en_US
dc.format.extent 537054 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) The China Quarterly, Volume 218 , pp 452-473en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) China; power reform; independent regulatory agency; State Electricity Regulatory Commission; regulatory captureen_US
dc.title (題名) Regulating China`s Power Sector: Creating an Independent Regulator without Autonomyen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1017/S0305741014000381en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000381en_US