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題名 The Relation between Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking: Evidence from China
作者 廖四郎
Huang, Yi-Ting; Wu, Ming-Cheng; Liao, Szu-Lang
貢獻者 金融系
日期 2012.08
上傳時間 25-Jun-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms` leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers` portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate
關聯 Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 49(March suppl.), 107-125
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/REE1540-496X4902S206
dc.contributor 金融系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 廖四郎zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Yi-Ting; Wu, Ming-Cheng; Liao, Szu-Langen_US
dc.date (日期) 2012.08en_US
dc.date.accessioned 25-Jun-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 25-Jun-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 25-Jun-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/66917-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms` leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers` portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovateen_US
dc.format.extent 131888 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 49(March suppl.), 107-125en_US
dc.title (題名) The Relation between Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking: Evidence from Chinaen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.2753/REE1540-496X4902S206en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/REE1540-496X4902S206en_US