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題名 薪酬委員會的特性與參與程度對薪酬績效敏感度之影響
作者 黃韻如
Huang, Yun Ru
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
黃韻如
Huang, Yun Ru
關鍵詞 薪酬委員會
薪酬績效敏感度
參與程度
代理問題
日期 2013
上傳時間 21-Jul-2014 15:36:00 (UTC+8)
摘要 金融海嘯爆發，薪酬契約的設計及公司薪酬績效間聯結程度之議題又再次受到關注，企業績效不彰，高階主管卻坐領高薪，因而引發肥貓之爭議。我國亦於2010年增訂證券交易法第14-6條，強制上市櫃公司應設置薪資報酬委員會。本研究旨在探討薪酬委員會的特性與參與程度對薪酬績效敏感度之影響，在薪酬委員會的特性方面著重在薪酬委員之財務專業背景及社會網絡，參與程度則以開會次數及出席率來衡量。以美國S&P500公司為樣本，在薪酬委員會特性方面，未發現財務專業背景及社會網絡與薪酬績效敏感度有顯著關聯，參與程度方面，開會次數與薪酬績效敏感度為正的顯著相關，而出席率則無顯著關聯。
參考文獻 Adams, R., 2005. What do boards do? Evidence from board committee and director compensation data. Working Paper, Stockholm School of Economics.
Adams, R., and D. Ferreira. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94: 291–309.
Agrawal, A. and R. Knoeber. 1999. Outside directors, politics, and firm performance. Working paper, North Carolina State University.
Ahn, S., and M. D. Walker. 2007. Corporate governance and the spinoff decision. Journal of Corporate Finance 13: 76-93.
Allen M .1981. Power and privilege in the large corporation: Corporate control and managerial compensation. Journal of Social 86:1112–1123.
Anderson, R., and J. Bizjak. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Bankingand Finance 27(7): 1323-1348.
Arrow, K. J. 1985. Informational structure of the firm. The American Economic Review 75: 303-307.
Baber, W. R., S-H. Kang, and K.R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive compensation: The Role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25: 169-193.
Bacon, J. 1973. Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of the Board. The Conference Board and American Society of Corporate Secretaries, New York.
Bantel, K. A., and S. E. Jackson. 1989. Top management and innovations in banking: Does the composition of the top team make a difference. Strategic Management Journal 10: 107-124.
Barth, E. M., W. H. Beaver., and W. R. Landsman. 1998. Relative valuation roles of equity book value and net income as a function of financial health. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1): 1-34.
Baysinger, B. D., and H. N. Butler. 1985. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1: 101-24.
Beasley, M.S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71(4): 443-465.
Bebchuk, L., J. Fried., and D. Walker. 2002. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation. The University of Chicago Law Review (69): 751-846.
Becher, D. A., T. L. Campbell II., and M. B. Frye. 2005. Incentive compensation for bank directors: The impact of deregulation. The Journal of Business 78(5): 1753-1778.
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Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 1999. The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. Business Lawyer 54: 921-963.
Brick, I. E., O. Palmon., and J. K. Wald. 2006.CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance12 (3): 403-423
Brickley, J., J. Linck., and J. Coles. 1999. What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 52: 341–77.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
101353043
102
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353043
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃韻如zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Yun Ruen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃韻如zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Yun Ruen_US
dc.date (日期) 2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned 21-Jul-2014 15:36:00 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 21-Jul-2014 15:36:00 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 21-Jul-2014 15:36:00 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0101353043en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/67582-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101353043zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 金融海嘯爆發，薪酬契約的設計及公司薪酬績效間聯結程度之議題又再次受到關注，企業績效不彰，高階主管卻坐領高薪，因而引發肥貓之爭議。我國亦於2010年增訂證券交易法第14-6條，強制上市櫃公司應設置薪資報酬委員會。本研究旨在探討薪酬委員會的特性與參與程度對薪酬績效敏感度之影響，在薪酬委員會的特性方面著重在薪酬委員之財務專業背景及社會網絡，參與程度則以開會次數及出席率來衡量。以美國S&P500公司為樣本，在薪酬委員會特性方面，未發現財務專業背景及社會網絡與薪酬績效敏感度有顯著關聯，參與程度方面，開會次數與薪酬績效敏感度為正的顯著相關，而出席率則無顯著關聯。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章、緒論 1
第一節、研究動機與目的 1
第二節、研究架構 4
第三節、研究問題 5
第貳章、文獻探討 6
第一節、代理理論 6
第二節、薪酬委員會品質影響因素 10
第參章、研究方法 18
第一節、研究假說 18
第二節、實證模型與變數衡量 22
第三節、研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源 31
第肆章、實證結果與分析 33
第一節、敘述性統計分析 33
第二節、相關性分析 36
第三節、多元迴歸分析結果 39
第四節、敏感性測試 43
第伍章、研究結論與建議 49
第一節、研究結論 49
第二節、研究限制 51
第三節、研究建議 52
參考文獻 53
附錄一 薪酬委員會設置規定 64
第一節 美國對薪酬委員會設置之規定 64
第二節 台灣對薪酬委員會設置之規定 69		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 6124408 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353043en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬委員會zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬績效敏感度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 參與程度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理問題zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 薪酬委員會的特性與參與程度對薪酬績效敏感度之影響zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Adams, R., 2005. What do boards do? Evidence from board committee and director compensation data. Working Paper, Stockholm School of Economics.
Adams, R., and D. Ferreira. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94: 291–309.
Agrawal, A. and R. Knoeber. 1999. Outside directors, politics, and firm performance. Working paper, North Carolina State University.
Ahn, S., and M. D. Walker. 2007. Corporate governance and the spinoff decision. Journal of Corporate Finance 13: 76-93.
Allen M .1981. Power and privilege in the large corporation: Corporate control and managerial compensation. Journal of Social 86:1112–1123.
Anderson, R., and J. Bizjak. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Bankingand Finance 27(7): 1323-1348.
Arrow, K. J. 1985. Informational structure of the firm. The American Economic Review 75: 303-307.
Baber, W. R., S-H. Kang, and K.R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive compensation: The Role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25: 169-193.
Bacon, J. 1973. Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of the Board. The Conference Board and American Society of Corporate Secretaries, New York.
Bantel, K. A., and S. E. Jackson. 1989. Top management and innovations in banking: Does the composition of the top team make a difference. Strategic Management Journal 10: 107-124.
Barth, E. M., W. H. Beaver., and W. R. Landsman. 1998. Relative valuation roles of equity book value and net income as a function of financial health. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(1): 1-34.
Baysinger, B. D., and H. N. Butler. 1985. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1: 101-24.
Beasley, M.S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71(4): 443-465.
Bebchuk, L., J. Fried., and D. Walker. 2002. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation. The University of Chicago Law Review (69): 751-846.
Becher, D. A., T. L. Campbell II., and M. B. Frye. 2005. Incentive compensation for bank directors: The impact of deregulation. The Journal of Business 78(5): 1753-1778.
Bedard, J., M. Chtourou., and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice Theory 23(2): 13-35.
Berle, A. and G. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. MacMillan. New York, NY.
Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 1999. The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. Business Lawyer 54: 921-963.
Brick, I. E., O. Palmon., and J. K. Wald. 2006.CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance12 (3): 403-423
Brickley, J., J. Linck., and J. Coles. 1999. What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 52: 341–77.
Bryan, S., Hwang, L. A. Klein., and S. Lilien. 2000. Compensation of outside directors: An Empirical analysis of economic determinants. Working Paper, Social Science Research Network.
Buchanan, B. 1974.Building organizational commitment: The socialization of managers in work organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 19: 533–46.
Bugeja, M. Z., Z. P. Matolcsy., and H. Spiropoulos. 2011. The association between gender-diverse compensation committees, CEO compensation and firm performance. Working Paper.
Bushman, R., Q. Chen., E. Engel., and A. Smith. 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity, and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37:167–201.
Cadman B., M. Carter., and S. Hillegeist. 2010. The incentives of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49(2): 263-280.
Carpenter, M. A., and J. D. Westphal. 2001. The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal 44: 4.
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