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題名 商譽的建立與股利政策的平穩性 其他題名 Reputation Acquisition and the Smoothing of Dividends 作者 謝淑貞 貢獻者 國際經營與貿易學系 關鍵詞 管理者誘因;資訊不對稱;連續均衡;股利政策
Managerial incentive;Information asymmetry;Sequential equilibrium;Dividend policy日期 1996 上傳時間 2014-09-02 摘要 在這個研究,我們證明存在於管理者與股東之間,因風險的不同偏好而產生的代理問題,可以藉設立管理者的商譽模型,而得到解決。 傳統上存在於管理者和股東之間的代理問題,是因若有風險性債券流通在外,那麼股東可以藉採取高風險的投資計畫,而剝削債權人的財富。但是管理者因為希望建立高能力的商譽,所以會採取低風險的投資計畫因而有潛在的衝突。但是,我們的研究可以解決這個代理問題,因為跟傳統的模型不同,我們假設管理者不僅想建立高能力的商譽,也想建立順承股東利益的商譽,畢竟管理者是由股東僱用和解聘的。 利用設立的管理者誘因模型,我們證明如果公司的管理者是保守的話,那麼公司的股利政策會趨於平穩。
In this paper, we show that the potential conflict between manager and shareholder can be eliminated under some circumstances by formulating managerial reputation in the model. Traditional agency problem between manager and shareholder arises as shareholder prefers excessively risky project in order to expropriate the wealth of bondholders, while manager, for personal reputation reasons, displays extraordinary conservatism, in choosing safe projects. We show that since managers are hired and fired by shareholders, managers develop not only a reputation for high ability but also a reputation for aligning with shareholders` interests in excessively risky projects. From the implication of the model, we obtain that the dividend policy of the firm in which managers have reputational concerns displays smoothing pattern over time.關聯 行政院國家科學委員會
計畫編號NSC85-2415-H004-007資料類型 report dc.contributor 國際經營與貿易學系 en_US dc.creator (作者) 謝淑貞 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 1996 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2014-09-02 - dc.date.available 2014-09-02 - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2014-09-02 - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/69529 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在這個研究,我們證明存在於管理者與股東之間,因風險的不同偏好而產生的代理問題,可以藉設立管理者的商譽模型,而得到解決。 傳統上存在於管理者和股東之間的代理問題,是因若有風險性債券流通在外,那麼股東可以藉採取高風險的投資計畫,而剝削債權人的財富。但是管理者因為希望建立高能力的商譽,所以會採取低風險的投資計畫因而有潛在的衝突。但是,我們的研究可以解決這個代理問題,因為跟傳統的模型不同,我們假設管理者不僅想建立高能力的商譽,也想建立順承股東利益的商譽,畢竟管理者是由股東僱用和解聘的。 利用設立的管理者誘因模型,我們證明如果公司的管理者是保守的話,那麼公司的股利政策會趨於平穩。 en_US dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this paper, we show that the potential conflict between manager and shareholder can be eliminated under some circumstances by formulating managerial reputation in the model. Traditional agency problem between manager and shareholder arises as shareholder prefers excessively risky project in order to expropriate the wealth of bondholders, while manager, for personal reputation reasons, displays extraordinary conservatism, in choosing safe projects. We show that since managers are hired and fired by shareholders, managers develop not only a reputation for high ability but also a reputation for aligning with shareholders` interests in excessively risky projects. From the implication of the model, we obtain that the dividend policy of the firm in which managers have reputational concerns displays smoothing pattern over time. en_US dc.format.extent 232 bytes - dc.format.mimetype text/html - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.relation (關聯) 行政院國家科學委員會 en_US dc.relation (關聯) 計畫編號NSC85-2415-H004-007 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 管理者誘因;資訊不對稱;連續均衡;股利政策 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Managerial incentive;Information asymmetry;Sequential equilibrium;Dividend policy en_US dc.title (題名) 商譽的建立與股利政策的平穩性 zh_TW dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Reputation Acquisition and the Smoothing of Dividends en_US dc.type (資料類型) report en
