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題名 Learning Effects on Maintenance Outsourcing
作者 唐揆
Tang, Kwei
貢獻者 企管系
關鍵詞 Maintenance outsourcing; Learning; Cost subsidization
日期 2009.01
上傳時間 16-Oct-2014 18:00:01 (UTC+8)
摘要 The objective of this paper is to study learning effects on maintenance outsourcing. We consider a situation in which a manufacturer offers a short-term outsourcing contract to an external contractor who is responsible for scheduling and performing preventive maintenance and carrying out minimal repairs when the process fails. The manufacturer’s payment to the contractor consists of a fixed amount along with cost subsidization for each maintenance operation performed. We assume learning occurs when the contractor performs preventive maintenance that reduces both time and cost. Two types of learning are considered: natural learning and learning by costly efforts. We demonstrate that a well-designed payment scheme can induce the contractor to adopt the maintenance schedule that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit.
關聯 European Journal of Operational Research, 192(1),138-150
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 企管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 唐揆zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tang, Kweien_US
dc.date (日期) 2009.01en_US
dc.date.accessioned 16-Oct-2014 18:00:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 16-Oct-2014 18:00:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 16-Oct-2014 18:00:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70632-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The objective of this paper is to study learning effects on maintenance outsourcing. We consider a situation in which a manufacturer offers a short-term outsourcing contract to an external contractor who is responsible for scheduling and performing preventive maintenance and carrying out minimal repairs when the process fails. The manufacturer’s payment to the contractor consists of a fixed amount along with cost subsidization for each maintenance operation performed. We assume learning occurs when the contractor performs preventive maintenance that reduces both time and cost. Two types of learning are considered: natural learning and learning by costly efforts. We demonstrate that a well-designed payment scheme can induce the contractor to adopt the maintenance schedule that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit.en_US
dc.format.extent 461192 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) European Journal of Operational Research, 192(1),138-150en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Maintenance outsourcing; Learning; Cost subsidizationen_US
dc.title (題名) Learning Effects on Maintenance Outsourcingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen