| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lai, Yu-Bong | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005.03 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Nov-2014 14:58:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Nov-2014 14:58:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Nov-2014 14:58:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71045 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper highlights the effects of the structures of games on interest groups` lobbying behavior. When policies are determined simultaneously, environmentalists prefer a higher tariff and a stricter environmental product standard, in order to hinder imports of a good that generate negative consumption-type externalities. In a sequential game, where the tariff is determined first, environmentalists will attempt to reduce the tariff. A reduction in the tariff tightens the environmental standard, which has a stronger trade-restrictive effect. To take advantage of the stronger trade-restrictive effect of environmental regulation, environmentalists will strategically lobby for a lower tariff barrier. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 124 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161(3), 473-490. | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Political behavior; Tariffs; Economic models; Economic theory; Game theory; Interest groups; Lobbying; Environmentalists; Environmental policy | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The Political Economy of Tariffs and Environmental Standards | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
