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題名 保障善意第三人的重覆賽局均衡
其他題名 Protection of the Bona Fides Third Party: An Application to Repeated Games
作者 王智賢;陳恭平
貢獻者 財政系
關鍵詞 重覆賽局 ; 保障善意第三人 ; 單向連結賽局
Repeated games ; Protection of bona fides third party ; One-way-joint game
日期 1997.09
上傳時間 3-Nov-2014 14:58:36 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文嘗試以民法學說上保障善意第三人的概念來修正(refine)重覆賽局中的子賽 局完全均衡。在作法上,我們定義一個三人單向連結賽局(one-way-joint game)來強調問題 的本質,並提出保障善意第三人均衡的概念來主張我們對此種型式賽局均衡所要求的修飾方 向。我們的結論是:三人單向連結賽局中,若是以應得權益來保障善意第三人時,則其可成 為重覆賽局均衡解的集合大小,將與間接關係參賽者之間的利害衝突性質有關。
We propose a refinement of subgame perfect equilibria for repeated games, which we call "protection of the bona fides third parry equilibrium". It requires that if a player is not a deviator, his continuation payoff on any out-of- equlibrium path should not be lower than that of the original equilibrium. We then define a one-way-joint game and apply our equilibrium concept to it. Our result shows that the size of the set of equilibrium payoffs crucially depends on the nature of the conflict of interests between the indirect players.
關聯 經濟論文叢刊, 25(3), 293-307.
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 王智賢;陳恭平zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1997.09en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-Nov-2014 14:58:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-Nov-2014 14:58:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Nov-2014 14:58:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71048-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文嘗試以民法學說上保障善意第三人的概念來修正(refine)重覆賽局中的子賽 局完全均衡。在作法上,我們定義一個三人單向連結賽局(one-way-joint game)來強調問題 的本質,並提出保障善意第三人均衡的概念來主張我們對此種型式賽局均衡所要求的修飾方 向。我們的結論是:三人單向連結賽局中,若是以應得權益來保障善意第三人時,則其可成 為重覆賽局均衡解的集合大小,將與間接關係參賽者之間的利害衝突性質有關。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We propose a refinement of subgame perfect equilibria for repeated games, which we call "protection of the bona fides third parry equilibrium". It requires that if a player is not a deviator, his continuation payoff on any out-of- equlibrium path should not be lower than that of the original equilibrium. We then define a one-way-joint game and apply our equilibrium concept to it. Our result shows that the size of the set of equilibrium payoffs crucially depends on the nature of the conflict of interests between the indirect players.en_US
dc.format.extent 264 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 經濟論文叢刊, 25(3), 293-307.en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 重覆賽局 ; 保障善意第三人 ; 單向連結賽局en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Repeated games ; Protection of bona fides third party ; One-way-joint gameen_US
dc.title (題名) 保障善意第三人的重覆賽局均衡zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Protection of the Bona Fides Third Party: An Application to Repeated Gamesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen