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題名 From Predator to Debtor: Soft Budget Constraint and the Semi-Planned Administration in Rural China
作者 劉雅靈
Liu, Yia-Ling
貢獻者 社會系
關鍵詞 Budget deficits; Public finance; Grass roots movement; Bailouts; Public administration; Deficit financing
日期 2012-05
上傳時間 24-Dec-2014 10:16:35 (UTC+8)
摘要 This article explores the institutions of the Chinese semi-planned administration under which the grassroots role of debtors has loomed large and made possible the transition of grassroots cadres from predators to debtors. The institutional features of the semi-panned administration -- the institution of target responsibility, the legacy of cost shifting, and the paternalistic care provided by the socialist state -- together with related policy measures explain the pathology of budget deficits and debt problems at the grassroots level across rural China. An investigation into the public finances of grassroots governments in Wenzhou, Wuxi, and Jianshi illuminates how the Chinese semi-planned administration has shaped individual cadres` calculations and behavior, perpetuated their irresponsible spending, and reproduced local soft budget constraints. This article argues that without an outright revamping of the institutions of the Chinese semi-planned administration, the current practice of simply writing off rural debt through financial bailouts perpetuates soft budget constraints across the countryside.
關聯 Modern China,38(3), 308-345
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0097700411432674
dc.contributor 社會系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 劉雅靈zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Liu, Yia-Lingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2012-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned 24-Dec-2014 10:16:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 24-Dec-2014 10:16:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 24-Dec-2014 10:16:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/72273-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This article explores the institutions of the Chinese semi-planned administration under which the grassroots role of debtors has loomed large and made possible the transition of grassroots cadres from predators to debtors. The institutional features of the semi-panned administration -- the institution of target responsibility, the legacy of cost shifting, and the paternalistic care provided by the socialist state -- together with related policy measures explain the pathology of budget deficits and debt problems at the grassroots level across rural China. An investigation into the public finances of grassroots governments in Wenzhou, Wuxi, and Jianshi illuminates how the Chinese semi-planned administration has shaped individual cadres` calculations and behavior, perpetuated their irresponsible spending, and reproduced local soft budget constraints. This article argues that without an outright revamping of the institutions of the Chinese semi-planned administration, the current practice of simply writing off rural debt through financial bailouts perpetuates soft budget constraints across the countryside.en_US
dc.format.extent 332962 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Modern China,38(3), 308-345en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Budget deficits; Public finance; Grass roots movement; Bailouts; Public administration; Deficit financingen_US
dc.title (題名) From Predator to Debtor: Soft Budget Constraint and the Semi-Planned Administration in Rural Chinaen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1177/0097700411432674-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0097700411432674-