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題名 論垂直相關市場中之整併策略：以互補要素模型分析
Merger Decisions in Vertically Related Market with Complementary Inputs作者 謝宜庭 貢獻者 溫偉任
謝宜庭關鍵詞 垂直整併決策
賽局理論
談判力
雙互補要素
Vertical Merger
Game Theory
Nash Bargaining
Complementary Inputs日期 2015 上傳時間 17-Aug-2015 14:06:55 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文利用互補要素模型分析垂直相關市場中之整併策略，並討論在不同談判力下之各種均衡市場結構。當下游廠商所需生產要素之一為獨賣要素，另一由寡占廠商生產時，下游廠商與上游非獨賣要素廠商將視整併後談判力保存程度大小與獨占要素廠商進行補貼與否而決定是否進行垂直整併，上游獨賣要素廠商則會經由比較整併一家下游廠商和任由其他廠商垂直整併所能獲得之利潤，決定在下游廠商談判力較大的情況下併購下游廠商。而當上游非獨賣要素廠商談判力極小或極大時，上游獨賣要素廠商與下游廠商整併亦較為有利。
This research investigates merger decisions in a vertically-related market with two complementary intermediate inputs by using the Nash bargaining model. The production of final good involves two complementary inputs, exclusive inputs and commonly available inputs. The downstream firms and the oligopolistic upstream firms would merge if the preservation of bargaining power after merger is large enough or the monopolistic input supplier subsidizes them to do so. The monopolistic input supplier compares the gains of merging a downstream firm and the profit of letting other firms integrate. The monopolistic supplier would merge a downstream firm when the bargaining power of the downstream firms is large. Also, merging with a downstream firm becomes more profitable for the monopolistic supplier if the bargaining power of oligopolistic upstream firms is extremely small or extremely large.參考文獻 Aghion, P., Antras, P., and Helpman, E. (2007), Negotiating free trade. Journal of International Economics, 73(1), 1-30.Arrow, K. J. (1975), Vertical integration and communication. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 173-183.Chongvilaivan, A. (2014), Upstream Foreclosure Decisions under Successive Monopoly Structure. Managerial and Decision Economics, DOI: 10.1002/mde.2692Coase, R. H. (1937), The nature of the firm. Econometrica, 5, 386-405.Hart, O., Tirole, J., Carlton, D. W., and Williamson, O. E. (1990). Vertical integration and market foreclosure. Brookings papers on economic activity. Microeconomics, 205-286.Lin, P. (2006). Strategic spin-offs of input divisions. European Economic Review, 50(4), 977-993.Matsushima, N., and Mizuno, T. (2012). Equilibrium Vertical Integration with Complementary Input Markets. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy,12(1).Matsushima, N., and Mizuno, T. (2013). Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers. European Journal of Operational Research, 228(1), 208-216.Reisinger, M., and Tarantino, E. (2013). Vertical Integration with Complementary Inputs. Working paper.Riordan, M. H., and Williamson, O. E. (1985). Asset specificity and economic organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3(4), 365-378.Rubinfeld, D. L., and Singer, H. J. (2001). Vertical foreclosure in broadband access? The Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(3), 299-318.Salinger, M. A. (1988), Vertical mergers and market foreclosure. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345–356.Spengler, J. (1950), Vertical integration and anti-trust policy. Journal of Political Economy, 58(4), 347–352.Williamson, O. E. (1969), Allocation efficiency and the limits of antitrust. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 59, 105-123.Williamson, O. E. (1971), The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations. American Economic Review, 61, 112-123.尹慧中、陳昱翔、劉芳妙、湯淑君 (2015)。〈蘋果財測冷場 供應鏈照high〉，《經濟日報》，2013/07/24。 陳?嘉 (2014)。論科諾寡占中之垂直整併促成：以互補要素模型分析。國立政治大學，臺北市。 黃日燦 (2013)。〈好事多磨 鴻夏異國戀碎〉，《經濟日報》，2013/06/13。 劉怡妤 (2015)。〈蘋果牽線 藍思攻上游藍寶石長晶〉，《聯合晚報》，2015/06/04。 韓青秀 (2012)。〈In-cell面板良率低 恐成新一代iPhone出貨變數〉，2015年07月27日，取自http://www.maximavc.com。 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易研究所
102351032資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102351032 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 溫偉任 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝宜庭 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 謝宜庭 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2015 en_US dc.date.accessioned 17-Aug-2015 14:06:55 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 17-Aug-2015 14:06:55 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-Aug-2015 14:06:55 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102351032 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77549 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102351032 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文利用互補要素模型分析垂直相關市場中之整併策略，並討論在不同談判力下之各種均衡市場結構。當下游廠商所需生產要素之一為獨賣要素，另一由寡占廠商生產時，下游廠商與上游非獨賣要素廠商將視整併後談判力保存程度大小與獨占要素廠商進行補貼與否而決定是否進行垂直整併，上游獨賣要素廠商則會經由比較整併一家下游廠商和任由其他廠商垂直整併所能獲得之利潤，決定在下游廠商談判力較大的情況下併購下游廠商。而當上游非獨賣要素廠商談判力極小或極大時，上游獨賣要素廠商與下游廠商整併亦較為有利。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research investigates merger decisions in a vertically-related market with two complementary intermediate inputs by using the Nash bargaining model. The production of final good involves two complementary inputs, exclusive inputs and commonly available inputs. The downstream firms and the oligopolistic upstream firms would merge if the preservation of bargaining power after merger is large enough or the monopolistic input supplier subsidizes them to do so. The monopolistic input supplier compares the gains of merging a downstream firm and the profit of letting other firms integrate. The monopolistic supplier would merge a downstream firm when the bargaining power of the downstream firms is large. Also, merging with a downstream firm becomes more profitable for the monopolistic supplier if the bargaining power of oligopolistic upstream firms is extremely small or extremely large. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1 緒論 12 文獻回顧 33 理論基礎 5 3.1 基準模型設定 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · ·5 3.1.1 模型變數定義 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 7 3.1.2 賽局決策順序 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 8 3.2 基準模型第二階段賽局均衡分析 · · · · · · · · · · · · · 11 3.2.1 B、D廠商完全分立 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·11 3.2.2 一組B、D廠商整併 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·16 3.2.3 兩組B、D廠商完全整併 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·20 3.2.4 第二階段賽局之均衡 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·23 3.3 基準模型研究結果 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·27 3.3.1 A廠商與D1廠商整併 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 27 3.3.2 A廠商進行垂直整併之條件 · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·29 3.3.3 給定各廠商談判力下A廠商利潤之變化 · · · · · · · · · 314 調整整併廠商談判力之延伸模型 39 4.1 延伸模型設定 · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 39 4.2 延伸模型研究結果 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 40 4.2.1 第二階段賽局之均衡 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·40 4.2.2 A廠商進行垂直整併之條件 · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·46 4.2.3 在特定整併環境下，A廠商之整併策略與利潤之變化· · · · 495 加入新賽局階段之延伸模型 52 5.1 延伸模型設定 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·52 5.1.1 延伸模型賽局決策順序 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 52 5.2 延伸模型研究結果 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·55 5.2.1 A廠商進行補貼之意願與可行性 · · · · · · · · · · · ·55 5.2.2 A廠商進行垂直整併之條件 · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·60 5.2.3 在特定整併環境下，A廠商之整併策略與利潤之變化· · · · 616 結論 64參考文獻 66 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1408282 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102351032 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 垂直整併決策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 賽局理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 談判力 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 雙互補要素 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Vertical Merger en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Game Theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Nash Bargaining en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Complementary Inputs en_US dc.title (題名) 論垂直相關市場中之整併策略：以互補要素模型分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Merger Decisions in Vertically Related Market with Complementary Inputs en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aghion, P., Antras, P., and Helpman, E. (2007), Negotiating free trade. Journal of International Economics, 73(1), 1-30.Arrow, K. J. (1975), Vertical integration and communication. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 173-183.Chongvilaivan, A. (2014), Upstream Foreclosure Decisions under Successive Monopoly Structure. Managerial and Decision Economics, DOI: 10.1002/mde.2692Coase, R. H. (1937), The nature of the firm. Econometrica, 5, 386-405.Hart, O., Tirole, J., Carlton, D. W., and Williamson, O. E. (1990). Vertical integration and market foreclosure. Brookings papers on economic activity. Microeconomics, 205-286.Lin, P. (2006). Strategic spin-offs of input divisions. European Economic Review, 50(4), 977-993.Matsushima, N., and Mizuno, T. (2012). Equilibrium Vertical Integration with Complementary Input Markets. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy,12(1).Matsushima, N., and Mizuno, T. (2013). Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers. European Journal of Operational Research, 228(1), 208-216.Reisinger, M., and Tarantino, E. (2013). Vertical Integration with Complementary Inputs. Working paper.Riordan, M. H., and Williamson, O. E. (1985). Asset specificity and economic organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3(4), 365-378.Rubinfeld, D. L., and Singer, H. J. (2001). Vertical foreclosure in broadband access? The Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(3), 299-318.Salinger, M. A. (1988), Vertical mergers and market foreclosure. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345–356.Spengler, J. (1950), Vertical integration and anti-trust policy. Journal of Political Economy, 58(4), 347–352.Williamson, O. E. (1969), Allocation efficiency and the limits of antitrust. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 59, 105-123.Williamson, O. E. (1971), The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations. American Economic Review, 61, 112-123.尹慧中、陳昱翔、劉芳妙、湯淑君 (2015)。〈蘋果財測冷場 供應鏈照high〉，《經濟日報》，2013/07/24。 陳?嘉 (2014)。論科諾寡占中之垂直整併促成：以互補要素模型分析。國立政治大學，臺北市。 黃日燦 (2013)。〈好事多磨 鴻夏異國戀碎〉，《經濟日報》，2013/06/13。 劉怡妤 (2015)。〈蘋果牽線 藍思攻上游藍寶石長晶〉，《聯合晚報》，2015/06/04。 韓青秀 (2012)。〈In-cell面板良率低 恐成新一代iPhone出貨變數〉，2015年07月27日，取自http://www.maximavc.com。 zh_TW
