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題名 Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan`s Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics
作者 Wang, Jennifer L.
王儷玲
貢獻者 風險管理與保險學系
日期 2004
上傳時間 26-Oct-2015 17:42:36 (UTC+8)
摘要 This article investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan`s automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
關聯 Risk Management and Insurance Review, 7(1), 53-71
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1098-1616.2004.00036.x
dc.contributor 風險管理與保險學系
dc.creator (作者) Wang, Jennifer L.
dc.creator (作者) 王儷玲zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2004
dc.date.accessioned 26-Oct-2015 17:42:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 26-Oct-2015 17:42:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-Oct-2015 17:42:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/79053-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This article investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan`s automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
dc.format.extent 99821 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Risk Management and Insurance Review, 7(1), 53-71
dc.title (題名) Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan`s Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/j.1098-1616.2004.00036.x
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1098-1616.2004.00036.x