Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34708
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dc.contributor.advisor王智賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.author楊敦雅zh_TW
dc.creator楊敦雅zh_TW
dc.date2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-18T02:58:43Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-18T02:58:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009-09-18T02:58:43Z-
dc.identifierG0094255004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34708-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description94255004zh_TW
dc.description96zh_TW
dc.description.abstract在「商標」與「知識」等無形資產逐漸成為經濟社會中重要生產要素的今日,保障其所有權是維持市場秩序的重要方式之一,為此我國公平交易法第二十條與智慧財產相關法律均有相關規範。本文由政治獻金遊說的角度出發,探討當此類無形資產掌握在外國廠商手中時,本國民選政府如何制定最適的仿冒查緝率。本文研究發現,在沒有利益團體遊說的情況下,本國政府的最適查緝率為零;然若外國正版商的參與政治獻金遊說,即使本國政府對全國福利的重視程度相對於政治獻金兩倍以上,外國正版商的遊說仍可能大幅改變本國政府的選擇,使查緝率大幅提升至仿冒能夠在市場生存的查緝上限;若外國正版商與本國消費者均付出政治獻金遊說,則雙方將會落入類似囚犯的困境中。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents第一章 前言………………………………………………………….1\n第二章 基本模型…………………………………………………….5\n  第一節 外國正版商與本國仿冒商的市場競爭……………….6\n  第二節 禁止政治獻金遊說下,本國政府的最適查緝率…….9\n第三章 允許政治獻金遊說,本國政府的最適查緝率…………….11 \n  第一節 允許本國消費者參與遊說…………………………....14  \n第二節 允許外國正版商參與遊說…………………………....15\n  第三節 允許外國正版商與本國消費者參與遊說…………....19\n第四章 結論………………………………………………………….23\n附錄一 ……………………………………………………………...…24\n附錄二 ……………………………………………………………...…24\n參考文獻 ………………………………………………………...……26zh_TW
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dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094255004en_US
dc.subject智慧財產權zh_TW
dc.subject政治獻金zh_TW
dc.title仿冒查緝與政治獻金zh_TW
dc.typethesisen
dc.relation.reference參考文獻zh_TW
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