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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35752
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dc.contributor.advisor何靜□zh_TW
dc.contributor.author張珮宸zh_TW
dc.creator張珮宸zh_TW
dc.date2003en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-18T07:55:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-18T07:55:56Z-
dc.date.issued2009-09-18T07:55:56Z-
dc.identifierG0091258029en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35752-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description經濟研究所zh_TW
dc.description91258029zh_TW
dc.description92zh_TW
dc.description.abstract本文主要探討存戶決策對銀行投資組合決策之影響，及其可能引發之系統性風險的程度。以代表性銀行開始分析，假設銀行投資於安全性資產與風險性資產，而存戶依其決策可能會產生兩個均衡同時存在之情形。本文利用演化的力量，發展出以風險性資產報酬率作為均衡選擇之標準：當風險性資產報酬率低於某一水準時，擠兌的均衡會單獨發生。並比較銀行考慮擠兌發生可能性時，其投資組合承擔風險之程度，及可能引發的銀行倒閉機率大小。推廣至二家模型，發現愈多家銀行在作投資決策考慮存戶擠兌之可能性，愈會增加經濟體系中之系統性風險，顯示銀行與存戶之衝突與金融體系之脆弱性。最後討論資本適足性管制與央行最後貸款人角色能否有效降低銀行倒閉機率。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents第一章 前言•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1\n第二章 代表性銀行模型•••••••••••••••••••••••• 8\n 第一節　經濟環境•••••••••••••••••••••••• 8\n 第二節　存戶與銀行決策•••••••••••••••••• 10\n 第三節　投資衝擊與存戶決策••••••••••••••• 11\n 第四節　存戶提款決策•••••••••••••••••••• 12\n 第五節　比較靜態分析•••••••••••••••••••• 20\n 第六節　政策分析•••••••••••••••••••••••• 22\n第三章 二家銀行模型•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 28\n 第一節　經濟環境•••••••••••••••••••••••• 28\n 第二節　存戶與銀行決策•••••••••••••••••• 29\n 第三節　系統性風險•••••••••••••••••••••• 32\n第四章 結論•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 34\n參考文獻 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 37zh_TW
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dc.language.isoen_US-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091258029en_US
dc.subject銀行擠兌zh_TW
dc.subject系統性風險zh_TW
dc.subject演化穩定策略zh_TW
dc.subject演化賽局zh_TW
dc.subjectbank runen_US
dc.subjectsystemic risken_US
dc.subjectevolutionarily stable strategyen_US
dc.subjectevolutionary gameen_US
dc.title存戶決策、銀行投資決策與系統性風險之分析zh_TW
dc.typethesisen
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