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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50000
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dc.contributor.advisor王智賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorWang, Jue-Shyanen_US
dc.contributor.author蔡騰緯zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorTsai, Teng-Weien_US
dc.creator蔡騰緯zh_TW
dc.creatorTsai, Teng-Weien_US
dc.date2009en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-09T08:01:08Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-09T08:01:08Z-
dc.date.issued2010-12-09T08:01:08Z-
dc.identifierG0097255002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50000-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description財政研究所zh_TW
dc.description97255002zh_TW
dc.description98zh_TW
dc.description.abstract本文採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所建立的政治獻金模型為架構，來分析國內外廠商如何透過政治獻金的捐贈，以達到影響政府對於貿易管制政策中關稅或配額政策的偏好，進一步我們可得出關稅與配額等價性成立與否之結論。本文研究發現，首先，在兩國廠商皆無政治獻金遊說的情況下，關稅與配額等價性的命題不會成立。其次，在兩國廠商有政治獻金遊說的情況下，除了一個特例的情形外，本國政府均會偏好採用從量關稅政策，此時，關稅與配額等價性的命題將無法成立。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThis paper applies the original model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and analyzes how the domestic and foreign firms may influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy via political contributions. Besides, we can examine whether the arguments for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, may in fact hold or not given the political contributions. It is shown that in the case of no campaign contributions, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold. Furthermore, when the firms in the two countries lobby by political contributions, the domestic government will adopt a tariff policy except some special case. Then the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents第一章 前言................................................1\n第二章 關稅遊說模型.........................................6\n 第一節 兩國廠商的市場競爭..................................6\n 第二節 本國政府最適從量關稅的決策...........................8\n第三章 進口配額遊說模型.....................................16\n 第一節 兩國廠商的市場競爭.................................17\n 第二節 本國政府最適進口配額的決策..........................18\n第四章 各種本國社會福利權數下，本國政府採行之貿易管制措施.......25\n第五章 結論...............................................30\n附錄一....................................................31\n參考文獻...................................................32zh_TW
dc.format.extent418268 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoen_US-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255002en_US
dc.subject政治獻金zh_TW
dc.subject關稅zh_TW
dc.subject配額zh_TW
dc.subject關稅與配額等價性zh_TW
dc.subjectPolitical Contributionsen_US
dc.subjectTariffsen_US
dc.subjectQuotasen_US
dc.subjectthe Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotasen_US
dc.title關稅與配額等價性：政治獻金之應用zh_TW
dc.titleThe equivalence of tariffs and quotas: an application of political contributionsen_US
dc.typethesisen
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