資產減損之決定因素與盈餘資訊性後果：論公司治理之角色

Abstract

過去關於認列資產減損之決定因素的研究結果相當分歧，有些研究發現管理者主要係基於投機報導動機而認列資產減損；相反地，有些則發現管理者認列資產減損的主因符合效率訂約。本研究認為，過去文獻結果不一致的原因之一是忽略了公司治理。有鑑於此，本研究旨在探討公司治理機制如何影響資產減損認列之決定因素及其盈餘資訊性後果。研究結果顯示：有效的公司治理能限制管理當局機會主義下的報導行為，令其基於效率訂約列報資產減損，使財報資訊更能允當表達公司的財務狀況及經營成果。呼應前述研究結果，本研究進一步之分析發現：平均而言，資產減損的認列會導致盈餘資訊性的下降，惟在公司治理機制較佳時，資產減損的認列才能提高盈餘的資訊性。整體而言，公司治理機制對於管理當局認列資產減損之決策，扮演了一個重要的角色。

This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on both the determinants and earnings informativeness of asset impairments. The current evidence is mixed on the determinants of asset impairments and much of this literature has focused on an opportunistic explanation. We suggest that the mixed evidence might arise from missing the corporate governance factor in the research framework. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the accounting choice for asset impairments is dominated by efficient contracting (opportunistic reporting) while corporate governance is strong (weak). Consistent with this expectation, our empirical result shows that while firms have strong (weak) corporate governance, the magnitude of asset impairment is mainly explained by the firm’s economic conditions (opportunistic reporting by managers), which thereby improves (deteriorates) the informativeness of earnings. In short, this study demonstrates that corporate governance does play an important role in managers’ accounting decisions for asset impairments.