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題名 中心.衛星工廠訂價政策之研究
作者 莫一誠
貢獻者 劉維琪
莫一誠
日期 1984
上傳時間 5-Dec-2016 17:06:08 (UTC+8)
摘要 第一章 緒論1 \n第一節 研究動機與目的1 \n第二節 研究方法與架構3 \n第三節 研究限制5 \n第二章 文獻探討7 \n第一節 道德危險下的基本模式說明8 \n第二節 完全資訊下的分析與結果12 \n第三節 不完全資訊下的分析與結果16 \n第三章 中心-衛星工廠體系之探討33 \n第一節 中心-衛星工廠的定義33 \n第二節 中心-衛星工廠的互補利益36 \n第三節 日本建立汽車衛星工業的實例38 \n第四節 本論文中所採用的中心-衛星工廠模式42 \n第四章 訂價方法之探討49 \n第一節 訂價的重要性49 \n第二節 邊際成本定價法52 \n第三節 平均成本定價法53 \n第四節 其他訂價方法57\n第五章 研究模式之提出與解答63 \n第一節 模式的提出與說明65 \n第二節 完全資訊下的分析與結果71 \n第三節 不完全資訊下的分析與結果79 \n第六章 結論與建議93 \n第一節 結論93 \n第二節 建議95\n參考書目97\n圖目錄\n圖 1 - 1 研究架構4 \n圖 2 - 1 Principal和Agent在1st-best Solution的效用值16 \n圖 2 - 2 fa≧0 , 1st - best solution和2nd - best solution之比較22 \n圖 2 - 3 fa< 0 , 1st - best solution 和 2nd - bests Solution之比較22 \n圖 2 - 4 例子的 2nd - best solution的圖27 \n圖 3 - 1 傳統的衛星工廠觀念圖35 \n圖 3 - 2 歐美的衛星工廠觀念圖35
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Baiman, S. and Demski, J. S. &quot; Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems. &quot; Journal of Accounting Research ( Supplement 1980), pp.184-234.\n2. Balachandran, B. V. and Ramakrishnan, R. T. S. &quot; Internal Control and External Auditing for Incentive Compensation Schedules. &quot; Journal of Accounting Research, ( Supplement 1980), pp.140-183.\n3. Baron, D. P. and Holmstrom, Bengt. &quot; The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem. &quot; Journal of Finance, (December 1980 ), pp. 1115-1138.\n4. Baron, D. P. and DE Bondt, R. R. &quot; On the Design of Regulatory Price Adjustanent Mechanisms. &quot; Journal of Economic Theory 24, (1981), pp.70-94.\n5. Baron, D. P. and DE Bondt, R. R. &quot; Fuel Adjustment Mechanisms and Economic Efficiency. &quot; The Journal of Industrial Economics) (March 1979 ), pp. 243-261.\n6. Baron, D. P. &quot; Incentives Contracts and Competitive Bidding. &quot; American Economic Review, (June 1972 ), pp. 384-394.\n7. Baron, D. P &quot; The Incentive Problem and the Design of Investment Banking Contracts. &quot; Journal of Ranking and Finance, ( July 1979 ), pp. 157-175.\n8. Borch, K. &quot; Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market. &quot; Economstrica, ( Juny 1962), pp.424-444.\n9. Clarke, F. H. and Darrough, M. N. &quot; Optimal Incentive Schemes. &quot; Economic letters 5, (1980), pp. 305-310.\n10. Clarke, F. H. and Darrough, M. N. &quot; Optimal Employment Contracts in a Principal-Agent Relationship. &quot; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4, (1983), pp.69-90.\n11. Cummias, J. M. &quot; Incentive Contracting for National Defense: a Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing. &quot; Bell Journal of Economics, ( Spring 1977 ), pp. 168-185.\n12. Demski, J. S. and Feltham, G. A. &quot;Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems.&quot; The Accounting Review, ( April 1978 ), pp. 336-359.\n13. Demski, J. S. and Kreps, D. M. &quot;Models is Managerial Accounting.&quot; Journal of Accounting Research, ( Supplement 1982 ), pp. 117-160.\n14. Diamond, D. W. and Verrecchia, R. E. &quot;Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices.&quot; Journal of Finance, (May l982 ), pp. 275-287.\n15. Eaton, B. C. and White, W. D. &quot;The Economy of High Wages: An Agency Problem. &quot; Economica, (May 1983), pp. 1175-1181.\n16. Eaton, B. C. and White, W. D. &quot; Agent Compensation and The Limits of Bonding. &quot; Economic Inquiry, ( Jnly 1982), pp. 330-343.\n17. Evans Ⅲ, J. H. &quot;Optimal Contracts with Costly Conditional Auditing. &quot;Journal of Accounting Research, ( Supplement 1980 ), pp.108-139.\n18. Fama, E. F. &quot; Agency Problems and the Firm. &quot; Journal of Political Economics, (April 1980), pp. 288-307.\n19. Gjesdal, F. &quot; Accounting for Stewardship. &quot; Journal of Accounting Research, ( Spring 1981 ), pp. 208-231.\n20. Gjesdal , F. &quot; Information and Incentives: The Agency Problem. &quot; Review of Economic Stndies, ( July 1982 ), pp. 373-390.\n21 Green, R. C. &quot; Investment Behavior in the Presence of Moral Hoazard. &quot;A Progress Report, (Jan 1982 ),University of Wisconsin.\n22. Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. &quot;An Analysis of The Principal-Agent Problem, &quot; Econometrica, ( Jan 1983 ), pp. 7-45.\n23. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. &quot;Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education, Employment, Health Insurance and Law Enforcement. &quot;American Economic Review, (March 1978 ), pp. 20-30.\n24. Harris M. and Raviv, A. &quot;Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information.&quot; Journal of Economic Theery 20, (1979), pp. 231-259.\n25. 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A. &quot;On the Economic Theory of Agency and the Principal of Similiarity. &quot; pp. 215-240. in Balch, M. S., McFudden, D. L. and Wu, S. Y. (eds.) Essays on Economic Behavior wnder Uncertainty. Amesterdam : North Holland Publishing Company, 1974.\n43 Ross, S. A, &quot; Equilibrium and Agency-Inadmissible Agents in the Public Agency Problem. &quot;American Economic Review, (May 1979 ), pp. 308-312.\n44. Sapping ton, D. and Demski, J. S. &quot;Mnlti-Agent Control in Perfectly Correlated Environment. &quot; Economic Letters 13, (1983), pp. 325-330.\n45. Scherer, F. M. &quot;The Theory of Contractnal Incentives for Cost Reduction. &quot;Quarterly Journal of Economics, ( May 1964 ), pp. 257-280.\n46. Shavell, S. &quot; Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship. &quot; Bell Journal of Economics, ( Spring 1979 ), pp. 55-73.\n47. Shavell, S. &quot; On Moral Hazard and Insurance. &quot;Quarterly Journal of Economics, ( Nov 1979 ), pp. 541-562.\n48. Stiglitz, J. 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關聯 國立政治大學
企業管理研究所
碩士
72
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 劉維琪
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 莫一誠
dc.creator (作者) 莫一誠zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 1984
dc.date.accessioned 5-Dec-2016 17:06:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-Dec-2016 17:06:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Dec-2016 17:06:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=119787-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 第一章 緒論1 \n第一節 研究動機與目的1 \n第二節 研究方法與架構3 \n第三節 研究限制5 \n第二章 文獻探討7 \n第一節 道德危險下的基本模式說明8 \n第二節 完全資訊下的分析與結果12 \n第三節 不完全資訊下的分析與結果16 \n第三章 中心-衛星工廠體系之探討33 \n第一節 中心-衛星工廠的定義33 \n第二節 中心-衛星工廠的互補利益36 \n第三節 日本建立汽車衛星工業的實例38 \n第四節 本論文中所採用的中心-衛星工廠模式42 \n第四章 訂價方法之探討49 \n第一節 訂價的重要性49 \n第二節 邊際成本定價法52 \n第三節 平均成本定價法53 \n第四節 其他訂價方法57\n第五章 研究模式之提出與解答63 \n第一節 模式的提出與說明65 \n第二節 完全資訊下的分析與結果71 \n第三節 不完全資訊下的分析與結果79 \n第六章 結論與建議93 \n第一節 結論93 \n第二節 建議95\n參考書目97\n圖目錄\n圖 1 - 1 研究架構4 \n圖 2 - 1 Principal和Agent在1st-best Solution的效用值16 \n圖 2 - 2 fa≧0 , 1st - best solution和2nd - best solution之比較22 \n圖 2 - 3 fa< 0 , 1st - best solution 和 2nd - bests Solution之比較22 \n圖 2 - 4 例子的 2nd - best solution的圖27 \n圖 3 - 1 傳統的衛星工廠觀念圖35 \n圖 3 - 2 歐美的衛星工廠觀念圖35
dc.format.extent 115 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) 國立政治大學
dc.relation (關聯) 企業管理研究所
dc.relation (關聯) 碩士
dc.relation (關聯) 72
dc.title (題名) 中心.衛星工廠訂價政策之研究zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesis
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P. &quot; Incentives Contracts and Competitive Bidding. &quot; American Economic Review, (June 1972 ), pp. 384-394.\n7. Baron, D. P &quot; The Incentive Problem and the Design of Investment Banking Contracts. &quot; Journal of Ranking and Finance, ( July 1979 ), pp. 157-175.\n8. Borch, K. &quot; Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market. &quot; Economstrica, ( Juny 1962), pp.424-444.\n9. Clarke, F. H. and Darrough, M. N. &quot; Optimal Incentive Schemes. &quot; Economic letters 5, (1980), pp. 305-310.\n10. Clarke, F. H. and Darrough, M. N. &quot; Optimal Employment Contracts in a Principal-Agent Relationship. &quot; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4, (1983), pp.69-90.\n11. Cummias, J. M. &quot; Incentive Contracting for National Defense: a Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing. &quot; Bell Journal of Economics, ( Spring 1977 ), pp. 168-185.\n12. Demski, J. S. and Feltham, G. A. &quot;Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems.&quot; The Accounting Review, ( April 1978 ), pp. 336-359.\n13. Demski, J. S. and Kreps, D. M. &quot;Models is Managerial Accounting.&quot; Journal of Accounting Research, ( Supplement 1982 ), pp. 117-160.\n14. Diamond, D. W. and Verrecchia, R. E. &quot;Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices.&quot; Journal of Finance, (May l982 ), pp. 275-287.\n15. Eaton, B. C. and White, W. D. &quot;The Economy of High Wages: An Agency Problem. &quot; Economica, (May 1983), pp. 1175-1181.\n16. Eaton, B. C. and White, W. D. &quot; Agent Compensation and The Limits of Bonding. &quot; Economic Inquiry, ( Jnly 1982), pp. 330-343.\n17. Evans Ⅲ, J. H. &quot;Optimal Contracts with Costly Conditional Auditing. &quot;Journal of Accounting Research, ( Supplement 1980 ), pp.108-139.\n18. Fama, E. F. &quot; Agency Problems and the Firm. &quot; Journal of Political Economics, (April 1980), pp. 288-307.\n19. Gjesdal, F. &quot; Accounting for Stewardship. &quot; Journal of Accounting Research, ( Spring 1981 ), pp. 208-231.\n20. Gjesdal , F. &quot; Information and Incentives: The Agency Problem. &quot; Review of Economic Stndies, ( July 1982 ), pp. 373-390.\n21 Green, R. C. &quot; Investment Behavior in the Presence of Moral Hoazard. &quot;A Progress Report, (Jan 1982 ),University of Wisconsin.\n22. Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. &quot;An Analysis of The Principal-Agent Problem, &quot; Econometrica, ( Jan 1983 ), pp. 7-45.\n23. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. &quot;Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education, Employment, Health Insurance and Law Enforcement. &quot;American Economic Review, (March 1978 ), pp. 20-30.\n24. Harris M. and Raviv, A. &quot;Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information.&quot; Journal of Economic Theery 20, (1979), pp. 231-259.\n25. 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E. &quot; Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. &quot; Review of Economics Stndies, ( April 1974 ), pp. 219-225.\n49. Townsend, R. M. &quot;Optimal Multi-Period Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationship under Private Information. &quot; Journal of Political Economics 90, (1982), pp. 1166-1186.\n50. Weitzman, M. L. &quot; Efficient Incentive Contracts. &quot; Quarterly Journal of Economics, (June 1980 ), pp. 719-730.\n51. Watts, R. L. and Eimmerman, J. L. &quot;Agency Problem Auditing and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence. &quot; Journal of Law Economics, (Oct 1983 ), pp. 613-633.